MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Nov 22 2016, 9:29 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Christopher L. Clerc Gregory F. Zoeller
Columbus, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Katherine Modesitt Cooper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
M.P., November 22, 2016
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
03A01-1604-JV-857
v. Appeal from the Bartholomew
Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Stephen R.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Heimann, Judge
The Honorable Heather Mollo,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
03C01-1508-JD-4144
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issue
[1] The juvenile court adjudicated M.P. a delinquent child for committing battery
resulting in bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult.
M.P. appeals his adjudication and raises one issue for our review, which we
restate as: whether the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut his claim of
self-defense. Concluding the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut M.P.’s
assertion he acted in self-defense, we affirm his delinquency adjudication.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On April 28, 2015, S.G. went to Taco Bell during lunch to socialize with
friends. M.P. and I.J. also went to Taco Bell for lunch. S.G. purchased a drink
and went outside to the picnic tables. After learning certain information from a
friend, S.G. became upset and threw his drink in the direction of the trash can,
near where M.P. was standing. The drink exploded causing soda to spill on
M.P.’s clothing, angering M.P.
[3] M.P. placed his belongings on the ground, approached S.G., and struck him
three or four times in the face with a closed fist. M.P. then picked S.G. up and
slammed him to the ground. S.G. did not fight back and appeared to be “in
shock.” Transcript at 33. S.G. sustained a bloody nose, abrasions to the side of
his body, and pain and swelling to his previously-injured foot. Following the
fight, M.P. and I.J. returned to school while S.G. went into the restaurant to
call his mother.
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[4] The State alleged M.P. was a delinquent child for committing battery resulting
in bodily injury and disorderly conduct. At the fact-finding hearing, M.P.
admitted to striking S.G. in the face and slamming him to the ground; however,
he alleged he acted in self-defense. M.P. claimed S.G. walked towards him and
I.J. with his arm drawn back and fist clenched, and swung his arm at a drink
sitting on a table near them, causing it to fly in M.P.’s direction. At the
conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court took the matter under
advisement, but ultimately found M.P. a delinquent child for committing
battery resulting in bodily injury. M.P. now appeals his delinquency
adjudication.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[5] M.P. contends there is insufficient evidence to support his battery conviction
because the evidence supports a finding he acted in self-defense. When this
court reviews a claim of insufficient evidence regarding a juvenile delinquency
adjudication, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, and
we only consider the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the
judgment. B.R. v. State, 823 N.E.2d 301, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). We will
affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the
judgment. G.N. v. State, 833 N.E.2d 1071, 1075 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). The
standard for reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a
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claim of self-defense is the same standard applied to any sufficiency of the
evidence claim. Wallace v. State, 725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 2000).
II. Self-Defense
[6] To adjudicate M.P. a delinquent child for committing battery resulting in bodily
injury as a Class A misdemeanor, the State needed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally touched another person in
a rude, insolent, or angry manner, resulting in bodily injury to any other person.
Ind. Code §§ 35-42-2-1(b)(1), -(c) (2014).
[7] M.P. challenges his battery adjudication by asserting he acted in self-defense. A
valid claim of self-defense is a legal justification to an otherwise criminal act.
Wallace, 725 N.E.2d at 840. Our self-defense statute states in relevant part:
A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other
person to protect the person or a third person from what the
person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful
force . . . .
Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c). The amount of force used to protect oneself must be
proportionate to the urgency of the situation. Hollowell v. State, 707 N.E.2d
1014, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
[8] For a successful self-defense claim, M.P. must show that 1) he was in a place
where he had a right to be; 2) he acted without fault; and 3) he had a reasonable
fear of death or great bodily harm. Wallace, 725 N.E.2d at 840. The State has
the burden of disproving at least one of the elements of self-defense beyond a
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reasonable doubt. Hood v. State, 877 N.E.2d 492, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
trans. denied. The State may meet its burden “by rebutting the defense directly,
by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by simply
relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief.” Id.
[9] Here, the State presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate M.P. did not act
without fault. M.P. asserts the evidence demonstrates S.G. approached M.P.
with his arm drawn back and fist clenched, justifying his use of force against
S.G. However, this argument essentially asks that we assess witness credibility
and reweigh the evidence in his favor, which is the role of the fact-finder, not
the role of this court. Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ind. 2005). The
evidence favorable to the judgment demonstrates that S.G. spilled soda onto
M.P.’s clothing. Thereafter, M.P. reacted by grabbing S.G., punching him in
the face multiple times, and slamming him to the ground. The juvenile court
considered M.P.’s testimony S.G. approached him in a threatening manner
with his fists clenched but ultimately rejected it, which it had the right to do.
See Wallace, 725 N.E.2d at 840 (providing that a trier of fact has the right to
reject a defendant’s testimony supporting a claim of self-defense in light of
evidence to the contrary). Thus, M.P.’s actions are more accurately
characterized as retaliation, rather than self-defense.
[10] Further, M.P.’s use of force was not proportionate to the urgency of the
situation. “Where a person has used more force than is reasonably necessary to
repel an attack, the right of self-defense is extinguished, and the ultimate result
is that the intended victim then becomes the perpetrator.” Geralds v. State, 647
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N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied. Even if we accepted M.P.’s
argument he was justified in using force to defend himself, it is clear his
response went beyond what was necessary or appropriate. At the fact-finding
hearing, S.G. testified when M.P. struck him, “I put my hands up. I just stood
there.” Tr. at 11. Further, I.J. testified S.G. was “in shock, he didn’t really do
anything.” Id. at 33. Given S.G.’s passive reaction to M.P.’s actions, it is clear
M.P.’s use of force went beyond what would have been “reasonably necessary.”
Geralds, 647 N.E.2d at 373.
Conclusion
[11] The State presented sufficient evidence to rebut M.P.’s claim that he acted in
self-defense, and we therefore affirm M.P.’s delinquency adjudication.
[12] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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