Powell v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE DERRICK POWELL, § § No. 3 1 0, 201 6 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below_Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID No. 0909000858 STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Plaintiff Below, § Appellee. § Submitted: December 7, 2016 Decided: December 15, 2016 Before STR]NE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. Upon Motion to Vacate Death Sentence. GRANTED. Patrick J. Collins, Esquire (Arguea'), Collins & Associates, Wilmington, Delaware; Natalie S. Woloshin, Esquire, Woloshin, Lynch & Natalie, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendant Below, Appellant. Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire, John R. Williams, Esquire (Argued), Departrnent of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Plaintiff Below, Appellee. Herbert W. Mondros, Esquire, Margolis Edelstein, Wilrnington, Delaware; Edson A. Bostic, Esquire, Tiffani D. Hurst, Esquire, Jenny Osborne, Esquire, Off1ce of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware. Thomas C. Grimrn, Esquire, Rodger D. Smith II, Esquire, Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae, Luis G. Cabrera, Jr. Richard H. Morse, Esquire, Ryan Tack-Hooper, Esquire, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Delaware, Wilmington, Delaware; Brian W. Stull, Esquire, Cassandra Stubbs, Esquire, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Capital Punishment Project, Durharn, North Carolina, Attorneys for Amz'cz` Curiae, the Arnerican Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Delaware and the American Civil Liberties Union Capital Punishment Proj ect. Elena C. Norrnan, Esquire, Kathaleen St. J. McCormick, Esquire, Nicholas J. Rohrer, Esquire, Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP; Marc Bookman, Esquire, Atlantic Center for Capital Representation, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Attorneys for Amicus Curz'ae, the Atlantic Center for Capital Representation. PER CURIAM: The defendant below-appellant Derrick Powell is appealing the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief.l However, during the pendency of that appeal, Powell moved to vacate his death sentence based on the United States Supreme Court decision in Hurst v. Floria'a2 and this Court’s recent interpretation of that decision in Rauf v. State.3 The only issue addressed in this decision is Powell’s motion to vacate his death sentence. In Rauf, We held that, after Hurst, the capital sentencing procedures in Delaware’s death penalty statute are unconstitutional because the statute improperly permitted the imposition of a death sentence based upon a judicial determination of the necessary findings that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to mall==l=* [T]he major purpose of the constitutional standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt announced in Winship was to overcome an aspect of a criminal trial that substantially impairs the truth-finding function, and Winship is thus to be given complete retroactive effect.48 In Winship, the Supreme Court explained that a conviction based upon the civil preponderance standard would amount to “a lack of fundamental faimess”49 Later, Teague incorporated the “fundamental faimess” language from Ivan V. into its watershed procedural rule exception to non-retroactivity.50 In Hankerson v. North Carolina,51 another pre-Teague decision, the United States Supreme Court observed “we have never deviated from the rule stated in Ivan V. that ‘[w]here the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule (is) given complete 44 Ivan V., 407 U.s. a1204_05. 49 Winship, 397 U.s. at 363. 50 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.s. 288, 312 (1989). 51432 U.s. 233 (1977). 11 retroactive effect.”’52 The change in the burden of proof in Winship that was ruled retroactive in Ivan V. is no different from the change in the burden of proof that occurred in Rauf. Conclusion The decision in Rauf constitutes a new watershed procedural rule of criminal procedure that must be applied retroactively in Delaware, pursuant to our interpretation of Teague’s second exception to non-retroactivity. Accordingly, we hold that Rauf must be applied retroactively to Powell’s case, Therefore, Powell’s death sentence must be vacated and he must be sentenced to “imprisonrnent for the remainder of his natural life without benefit of probation or parole or any other reduction.”53 This decision is consistent with two prior opinions when this Court held that the extant death penalty statutes were unconstitutional and vacated all death sentences In 1973, following the United States Supreme Court decision in Furman,54 this Court held that the existing Delaware death penalty statute was unconstitutional.55 The three remaining prisoners on Delaware’s death row at the time had their death sentences vacated and were resentenced to life imprisonment 52 432 U.s. 233, 243-44 (1977) (quoting Ivan V., 407 U.s. a1204). 55 11 Del. C. §4209(d)(2). 54 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 55 See State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761 (Del. 1973). 12 Four years later, after the United States Supreme Court decision in Woodson v. North Carolina,56 this Court held Delaware’s mandatory death-sentencing statute was unconstitutional.57 State v. Spence consolidated the cases of all nine prisoners that had been sentenced to death under the mandatory scheme.58 We held that the death sentences of all nine should be vacated and each should be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.59 56 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 57 See State v. Spence, 367 A.2d 983, 986 (1976) (citing Woodson, 428 U.S. at 301, 303). 53 Id. at 985. 591d. ar 989-90. 13