IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-1460
Filed December 21, 2016
IN THE INTEREST OF J.G.-J.,
Minor child,
B.G., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Deborah F.
Minot, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child.
AFFIRMED.
Robin L. Miller, Marion, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Anthony A. Haughton of Linn County Advocate, Inc., Cedar Rapids,
guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, born in
2014. She contends (1) the State failed to prove the ground for termination cited
by the juvenile court, and (2) termination was not in the child’s best interests.
I. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to
Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2015). This statutory provision requires proof
of several elements including proof the child cannot be returned to the parent’s
custody. On our de novo review, we agree with the district court that this ground
was proved.
Following the child’s birth, the young mother left the child with the child’s
great-grandparents. After a year, the great-grandparents sought assistance with
medical care for the child. The State filed a child-in-need-of-assistance petition.
At this time, the mother was homeless. She stipulated to the child’s adjudication
as a child in need of assistance, and the department of human services initiated
services for the family.
The mother was inconsistent in following through with services, and the
State eventually filed a petition to terminate her parental rights. At the
termination hearing, a service provider who supervised visits testified to the
mother’s failure to cooperate. He stated, “[I]t just seems that there wasn’t ever a
pattern that was maintained with visitation.” He continued, “[W]e’ve had a lot of
cancellations,” and “[t]here was almost a month where nothing really happened.
I didn’t get any communication from [the mother].” The mother’s failure to
prioritize supervised visits with her child was unfortunate because, when they
took place, they went well. In fact, the service provider found no “immediate
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risks” and went so far as to transition the mother to semi-supervised visits,
including overnight stays at the child’s grandmother’s house.
By the time of the termination hearing, the mother was staying with the
child’s grandmother. According to the grandmother, the mother had informal
visits with her child in the grandmother’s home following a study approving the
home and following the department’s approval of her as an informal supervisor.
The grandmother’s testimony was inconsistent with the mother’s report that the
imminent birth of a second child precluded her from visiting the child. Because
the mother curtailed communication with the service provider and with the
department in the three months preceding the termination hearing, the extent of
contact between mother and child in those months is unclear.
For purposes of this opinion, we will assume the mother had contact with
her child beyond the formal visits scheduled by the service provider. However,
this informal contact did not make her ready to have the child returned to her
custody. The mother’s relationship with her mother and stepfather was tenuous.
At the time of the termination hearing, she was looking for an apartment but had
yet to secure one. She was unable to drive following an arrest a month before
the termination hearing for driving with a suspended license as a habitual
offender. The charge was pending as of the termination hearing.
In addition to these obstacles to reunification, the mother failed to follow
through with mental health services recommended by the department. The
department’s recommendation was based on a psychological evaluation
performed eight months before the termination hearing. After three sessions, the
evaluator diagnosed the mother with other specified personality disorder (with
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mixed features). The evaluator opined the mother’s history was “notable for
significant emotional distress and dysregulation, leading to a significant number
of prior suicide attempts, and concern for her well-being.” The evaluator
recommended the mother “seek individual psychotherapy to aid her in the
management of her depression, anxiety, and emotional regulation.” The
evaluator also suggested the mother consider “pharmacotherapy for
management of her difficulties with mood and dysregulation.” There was scant
indication the mother complied with these recommendations.
We conclude the child could not be returned to the mother’s custody at the
time of the termination hearing.
II. Termination must also be in the child’s best interests. See In re P.L.,
778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). The factors that may have militated against
termination were the bond the mother shared with her child as well as the fact
that the child was placed with a relative. The countervailing factor was the safety
of the child. See id. The child was out of the mother’s care for most of his life.
Although the mother was able to feed and engage with him appropriately during
the limited periods of supervised visitation, she failed to take advantage of the
department’s efforts to facilitate parenting on a more extended basis. Under
these circumstances, we conclude termination was in the child’s best interests.
We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child.
AFFIRMED.