J-S76008-16
2016 PA Super 301
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JACK WILLIAMS
Appellant No. 3138 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 30, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0000048-2015
BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED DECEMBER 23, 2016
Appellant Jack Williams appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (“trial court”),
following his bench conviction for escape under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5121(a).
Upon review, we affirm.
The facts and procedural history underlying this case are undisputed.
On November 30, 2014, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole
(“Board”) issued a warrant to commit and detain Appellant on technical
parole violations for changing residence without permission and failure to
report as instructed. As a result, Appellant was moved to Kintock Hall, a
half-way house, where he was to remain pending the resolution of his
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S76008-16
technical parole violations. While at Kintock Hall, Appellant suffered a
medical emergency on December 2, 2014. Appellant was escorted by a
member of Kintock Hall to Temple University Hospital. Upon arrival at the
hospital, Appellant left the company of his escort and fled. Appellant was
charged with escape. He proceeded to a bench trial, following which the trial
court found him guilty of escape. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 11½
to 23 months’ imprisonment on September 30, 2015. Appellant timely
appealed to this Court. Following Appellant’s filing of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement of errors complained of on appeal, the trial court issued a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
On appeal, Appellant raises two issues for our review:
[I.] Was the evidence insufficient to support [A]ppellant’s
conviction for escape where the Commonwealth failed to prove
that [A]ppellant was in official detention at Kintock Hall, a
halfway house, and not under parole supervision, at the time of
the alleged escape?
[II.] Should not this matter be remanded to the trial court for a
new trial or a hearing on after-discovered evidence because
while this case was pending on appeal [A]ppellant received a
letter from the [Board] clarifying that he was under parole
supervision when he left Temple Hospital without
[1]
authorization?
____________________________________________
1
On May 13, 2016, Appellant filed in this Court a “Petition to Vacate Briefing
Schedule and to Remand Matter to Trial Court Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.
720.” In the petition, Appellant argued that on March 3, 2016, he received a
letter from the Board that included reference to facts that constituted after-
discovered evidence under Rule 720. Specifically, Appellant alleged that
according to the letter, he was merely on parole on December 2, 2014.
Consequently, Appellant argues that his status as parolee at the time he fled
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant’s Brief at 3.
We first address Appellant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for escape because the Commonwealth did not prove
that he was in “official detention” when he escaped from Kintock Hall on
December 2, 2014. Appellant points out that he was on parole on the date
in question, which is excluded from the definition of official detention under
Section 5121 of the Crimes Code. Thus, Appellant argues that the
Commonwealth could not establish the offense of escape because, as a
parolee, he was not in official detention.
“A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of
law.” Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000).
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test,
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
from the hospital renders his conviction for escape improper. Based on the
reasons set forth infra, we deny Appellant’s petition to vacate and remand.
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all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014),
appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014).
Section 5121 of the Crimes Code, relating to escape, provides in part:
(a) A person commits an offense if he unlawfully removes
himself from official detention or fails to return to official
detention following temporary leave granted for a specific
purpose or limited period.
....
(e) Definition.--As used in this section the phrase “official
detention” means arrest, detention in any facility for custody of
persons under charge or conviction of crime or alleged or found
to be delinquent, detention for extradition or deportation, or any
other detention for law enforcement purposes; but the phrase
does not include supervision of probation or parole, or
constraint incidental to release on bail.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5121(a) and (e) (emphasis added). In Commonwealth v.
Maldonado, 966 A.2d 1144 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal denied, 989 A.2d 8
(Pa. 2010), we addressed the issue of whether Section 5121 necessarily
excludes all parolees from its ambit, even those who have been arrested for
violating terms of their parole, are notified they are considered to be in pre-
release status, and are detained in an official housing facility from which
they leave without permission prior to adjudication of their parole violation
hearings.
In Maldonado, each appellee was on state parole and was accused of
having committed technical parole violations of his respective parole
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conditions. Each was apprehended by his parole officer and sent to
Pennsylvania Community Alternative to Prison Program (“Penn CAPP”),
which is administered through a contract with the Pennsylvania Department
of Corrections. There, each appellee signed an “acknowledgement of
status,” which contained language that each appellee is no longer on parole,
but rather on pre-release. The appellees then left Penn CAPP without
permission. The Commonwealth charged them with escape. The trial court,
however, dismissed the charges after it granted the appellees’ respective
petitions for writ of habeas corpus. The Commonwealth timely appealed.
On appeal, we vacated the trial court’s order. In so doing, we
concluded that a defendant who was held in an “alternative to prison”
residence, awaiting the adjudication of possible parole violations, was being
officially detained under Section 5121 of the Crimes Code. The Maldonado
Court explained that “the legislative intent behind Section 5121 [is] to
punish all those who remove themselves from official detention without
permission.” Maldonado, 966 A.2d at 1147. The court explained that
Section 5121 does not necessarily exclude all parolees from its ambit,
reasoning that “it is apparent the exclusions for supervision of probation and
parole are not meant to apply to parolees who have been arrested for parole
violations, [and] placed in a detention facility[.]” Id. The Maldonado
Court further explained that once a parolee has been arrested and detained
for a technical violation, “he can hold no reasonable expectation that he
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retains the liberties and freedoms customary to a person operating under
‘supervision of parole.’” Id. The Court observed:
Critically, each [a]ppellee had been removed from the normal
course of supervision of parole and recommitted to a detention
facility pending a hearing to determine whether sufficient
evidence of parole violation supported his detainment. This
commitment was therefore not a term or condition of his release
under supervision of parole; it was a suspension of such release,
and a recommitment to official detention pending the outcome of
his hearing. Breaking free from such detention is certainly
among the mischief intended to be remedied by [S]ection 5121.
....
To give recommitted parole violators incentive to attempt a “no-
risk” escape from detention centers such as Penn CAPP, centers
from which they are told they are not free to leave, needlessly
taxes our enforcement resources and places the public at large
in danger. We find this potentiality was not what the General
Assembly intended when it crafted and enacted the “supervision
of probation or parole” exclusion for persons released on parole.
Id. at 1148. Accordingly, the Maldonado Court held that Section 5121
applies to a parolee once he is detained for technical parole violation prior to
a formal adjudication of such violations by the Board.
Here, the evidence presented at trial, viewed in a light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, establishes the Commonwealth proved the necessary
elements of escape. At the bench trial, the Commonwealth presented the
testimony of two witnesses: Marie Faison (“Ms. Faison”), Corrections
Counselor for the Department of Corrections in the Division of Community
Corrections, and Allison Van Fleet (“Ms. Van Fleet”), Assistant District
Attorney in Philadelphia. N.T. Trial, 7/6/15, at 8-28. Ms. Faison testified
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that in her capacity at the Department of Corrections, she supervised “all
[state intermediate punishment] cases” and interacted with contracted
facilities, “which are half-way houses the Commonwealth subcontracts with.”
Id. at 9. She testified that she supervised Kintock Hall, the contracted
facility at issue here, which is located in Philadelphia. Id. at 10. Ms. Faison
pointed out that at Kintock Hall, “[t]hey keep daily records of every offender.
They notate the ins and outs, what their charges are, what their sentences
are, what kinds of programs that they’re involved in at the facility.” Id. at
10-11. She then read from Appellant’s December 2, 2014 incident report,
which was introduced and admitted into evidence and described Appellant as
a parole violator:
On December the 2nd, 2014, at approximately 6:50 p.m.,
resident, [Appellant], BL1311615-DS, signed out of the facility
on an approved emergency medical pass, escorted by S. Louis,
resident supervisor, and was transported via ambulance to
Temple University Hospital, located at 3401 North Broad Street,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19140, telephone, 215-707-2000,
after complaining of chest pain and trouble breathing.
On December the 2nd, 2014, at approximately 6:55 p.m.,
Ericka Jordan-Frager, deputy officer, contacted PBPP247 and
spoke to PC077, to inform him that [Appellant] was taken to
Temple Hospital at 6:50 via ambulance and with a staff escort.
On December the 2nd, 2014, at approximately 6:58, Ms. Jordan-
Flager contacted Mr. Johnson, contract facility coordinator, to
inform that [Appellant] was taken to Temple Hospital with a staff
escort.
On December the 2nd, 2014, at approximately 9:09 p.m.,
[Appellant] walked away from Temple University Hospital and
away from Mr. Louis without authorization. On December the
2nd, at approximately 9:09, Mr. Louis contacted Devon Williams,
the resident supervisor, to inform him that [Appellant] walked
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away from Temple University Hospital and away from staff
without authorization.
On December the 2nd, 2014, at approximately 9:12 p.m.,
Mr. Williams contacted Ms. Jordan-Flager to inform her that
[Appellant] walked away from Temple University Hospital and
away from Mr. Louis without authorization at 9:09. On
December 2nd, 2014, at approximately 9:16, Ms. Jordan-Flager
contacted Ms. Johnson to inform her of the occurrence. On
December 2nd, 2014, at 9:19 p.m., Mr. Williams flagged the
subject escape packet to the Pennsylvania State Police.
On December 2nd, 2014, at approximately 9:20, Ms.
Jordan-Flager contacted PBPP247 and spoke to PC077 to inform
them of the occurrence. On December 2nd, 2014, at
approximately 9:31 p.m., Mr. Williams contacted Pennsylvania
State Police and spoke to Trooper Hampton who confirmed that
the escape packet was received.
Id. at 15-17.
On cross-examination, Ms. Faison acknowledged that, although she
worked directly out of the regional office, she was familiar with Kintock Hall.
Id. at 19-20. She further acknowledged “Kintock houses offenders in a few
different classification statuses,” such as parole violators, parolees, and pre-
release. Id. at 20. Ms. Faison admitted that she had never met Appellant
and that she did not have any personal knowledge of the December 2, 2014
incident. Finally, she also acknowledged that she did not write up
Appellant’s incident report.
Next, Ms. Van Fleet testified that she worked as an assistant district
attorney in the east bureau of the trial division at the District Attorney’s
Office. Id. at 22. She testified that she received a two-page letter from
Appellant, “a few days prior to the first trial listing[.]” Id. at 24. After the
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letter was introduced and admitted into evidence without objection, Ms. Van
Fleet read portions of it into the record:
To whom it may concern at the district attorney’s office, my
name is [Appellant], 714571. I’m being held at CFCF for a[n]
escape charge, which I was accused for walking away from
Kintock half-way house. My case number is CP51CR0000048-
2015. I was offered one-and-a-half to three years for this case.
Please let me explain. That’s 18 months. Then parole is going
to give me a 18 month hit and going to take all my street time,
which is 17 months. That’s almost four-and-a-half years for
walking away from a half-way house.
Id. at 27-28 (emphasis added).
In response, Appellant testified on his own behalf. He testified that,
on November 30, 2014, he arrived at the Kintock Hall facility, where he was
residing on the day of the incident. Id. at 36. Appellant testified that he
was designated a parolee at Kintock Hall, where he was placed for being
delinquent on his parole. Id. at 36-37, 46. He, however, testified that the
Board did not revoke his parole until March 12, 2015, when it disposed of
the technical violations that landed him at Kintock Hall. Id. at 37-38. Thus,
Appellant maintained that, while he was at Kintock Hall, he had not been
adjudicated a parole violator. Rather, he was merely a parolee awaiting the
disposition of the underlying violations.
Thus, based upon the foregoing and consistent with Maldonado, we
agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant’s conviction for escape
was supported by sufficient evidence of record. Here, the fact that Appellant
was designated a parolee is immaterial. As we noted in Maldonado,
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Section 5121 does not apply to parolees who have been arrested for parole
violations and placed in a detention facility, because such parolees have no
reasonable expectation that they retain the liberties and freedoms
customary to a person operating under supervision of parole. As the trial
court found:
[Appellant] was housed at Kintock not as a condition of his
parole but pending the outcome of his violation of parole
hearing. To seek emergency medical attention, [Appellant]
needed to be granted leave to go to the hospital and was
accompanied by a member of Kintock staff. From these facts, it
is reasonable to infer that [Appellant] was confined at Kintock.
[Appellant] was not free to come and go as he pleased, and his
liberty was restrained pending the outcome of his alleged parole
violations.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/18/16, at 6 (emphasis added). Moreover, when
Appellant left without permission from the hospital on December 2, 2014, he
was in detention at Kintock Hall. Accordingly, the evidence here is sufficient
to establish the element of “official detention” for purposes of convicting
Appellant of escape pursuant to Section 5121(a).
We next address Appellant’s argument that this matter should be
remanded to the trial court for a new trial or a hearing on after-discovered
evidence because while this case was pending on appeal he received a letter
from the Board on March 3, 2016, confirming that he was designated as a
parolee on the day he fled from Temple Hospital without authorization.
Rule 720, relating to post-sentence procedures and appeal, provides in
pertinent part:
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(C) After-Discovered Evidence. A post-sentence motion for a
new trial on the ground of after-discovered evidence must be
filed in writing promptly after such discovery.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(C); Commonwealth v. Castro, 93 A.3d 818, 828 (Pa.
2014) (noting that Rule 720(c) requires a motion for after-discovered
evidence to be filed promptly upon the discovery of such evidence). The
Note to Rule 720 states that “after-discovered evidence discovered during
the direct appeal process must be raised promptly during the direct appeal
process, and should include a request for a remand to the trial judge. It is
well-settled that to obtain relief, the after-discovered evidence must meet a
four-prong test:
(1) the evidence could not have been obtained before the
conclusion of the trial by reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence
is not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence will
not be used solely for purposes of impeachment; and (4) the
evidence is of such a nature and character that a different
outcome is likely. At an evidentiary hearing, an appellant must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that each of these
factors has been met in order for a new trial to be warranted.
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 939 A.2d 355, 359 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation
omitted), appeal denied, 958 A.2d 1047 (Pa. 2008).
Instantly, we conclude that the Board’s March 3, 2016 letter does not
constitute after-discovered evidence, as it is merely corroborative or
cumulative of Appellant’s argument, which we addressed above, that he was
on parole on December 2, 2014. In other words, the letter may best be
described as a different source for the same fact, i.e., Appellant was on
parole on the day in question. Even if the Board’s letter were after-
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discovered evidence, it would not compel a different outcome with respect to
Appellant’s conviction for escape. As we discussed earlier, it is immaterial
whether Appellant was designated as a parolee at Kintock Hall awaiting
formal adjudication by the Board of his technical violations. Under
Maldonado, once a parolee, such as Appellant here, has been arrested and
detained for technical parole violations prior to a formal adjudication of such
violations by the Board, he can hold no reasonable expectation that he
retains the liberties and freedoms customary to a person operating under
supervision of parole. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to vacate and remand denied.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/23/2016
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