UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1475
MONTELIS PETERS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CORPORAL ROB CAPLAN, Badge No. 122; CITY OF MOUNT RAINIER,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. George J. Hazel, District Judge.
(8:14-cv-00955-GJH)
Submitted: November 30, 2016 Decided: January 12, 2017
Before TRAXLER, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John Christopher Belcher, Oxon Hill, Maryland, for Appellant.
John F. Breads, Jr., LOCAL GOVERNMENT INSURANCE TRUST, Hanover,
Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Montelis Peters sued the City of Mount Rainier, Maryland,
and Corporal Rob Caplan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) and the
Maryland Declaration of Rights Articles 24 and 26. The
complaint alleged that the City and Corporal Caplan falsely
arrested Peters. The district court dismissed the case. Peters
now appeals the district court’s orders dismissing the § 1983
claim against the City and granting summary judgment to Corporal
Caplan on the § 1983 and Maryland claims. Finding no error, we
affirm.
First, we review de novo the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to Corporal Caplan. See Core Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Verizon Md. LLC, 744 F.3d 310, 320 (4th Cir. 2014). A court may
award summary judgment only when no genuine dispute of material
fact remains and the record shows that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Peters challenges the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Corporal Caplan on three grounds, alleging that the
court erred (1) by resolving disputed issues of material fact in
Corporal Caplan’s favor; (2) by ruling that Corporal Caplan had
probable cause to arrest Peters; and (3) by holding that
Corporal Caplan’s statement of probable cause was not materially
misleading.
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We conclude that the district court did not improperly
resolve disputed issues of material fact. Peters’ arguments
speculate about the meaning of evidence and fail to create a
dispute of material fact that is genuine.
The district court also properly ruled that Corporal Caplan
had probable cause to arrest Peters. The record supports the
district court’s finding that the police conducted an
investigative stop, not an arrest, when they stopped Peters.
See United States v. Elston, 479 F.3d 314, 319-20 (4th Cir.
2007) (requiring police to curtail suspect’s freedom to degree
of formal arrest to transform mere stop into an arrest). We
agree with the district court that the officers properly
conducted the stop, identifying a reasonable articulable
suspicion that Peters had committed a crime. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Second, we perceive no error in the district court’s
conclusion that Corporal Caplan’s statement of probable cause
was not materially false or misleading. See Miller v. Prince
George’s Cty., 475 F.3d 621, 628 (4th Cir. 2007). Thus, civil
liability could not attach to Corporal Caplan, and the district
court properly granted him summary judgment.
Finally, we turn to the dismissal of the § 1983 claim
against the City. To state a § 1983 claim against a
municipality, a plaintiff must allege that the municipality
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deprived or caused an official to deprive the plaintiff of a
constitutional right through an official policy or custom. See
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). As
discussed above, Peters has failed to allege a deprivation of
constitutional right, so his claim against the City must fail as
well. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799
(1986) (holding that municipal liability under § 1983 requires a
finding of constitutional injury as a prerequisite).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s rulings. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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