NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 31 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN CHADWICK, No. 15-15845
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01477-GMS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
BMO HARRIS BANK NA,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 18, 2017**
Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
John Chadwick appeals pro se the district court’s summary judgment in his
action alleging federal and state law violations related to defendant’s efforts to
collect arrears on his home mortgage. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo, Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Cir. 2012), and we affirm.
The district properly granted summary judgment because the unambiguous
terms of the settlement and release agreement Chadwick entered into released
defendant from all causes of action arising from or relating to Chadwick’s
mortgage dispute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Arizona v. Tohono O’odham
Nation, 818 F.3d 549, 561 (9th Cir. 2016) (the Arizona Supreme Court has rejected
use of parol evidence to vary or contradict a final agreement).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by staying discovery until it
ruled on defendant’s summary judgment motion. See Little v. City of Seattle, 863
F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that
the district court “has wide discretion in controlling discovery” and that “[s]uch
rulings will not be overturned unless there is a clear abuse of discretion”).
We do not consider Chadwick’s contentions, raised for the first time on
appeal, that defendant engaged in fraud or misrepresentation to induce Chadwick
to enter into the settlement and release agreement. See Cold Mountain v. Garber,
375 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In general, we do not consider an issue raised
for the first time on appeal.”).
AFFIRMED.
2 15-15845