NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 3 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROMON CALHOUN, No. 15-16774
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-01684-VC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CITY OF HERCULES POLICE
DEPARTMENT; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Vince G. Chhabria, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 18, 2017**
Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Romon Calhoun appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of his constitutional rights. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo both the district court’s
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), Decker v. Advantage Fund Ltd., 362 F.3d 593, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2004),
and summary judgment, Edgerly v. City & County of San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946,
960 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Calhoun’s claims against Officer
Pesmark because Calhoun failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Pesmark
searched the trunk of Calhoun’s vehicle prior to obtaining a search warrant. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (explaining that to survive a motion
to dismiss a complaint must “plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief” and
that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Calhoun’s claim
against Officer Collard because Collard was entitled to qualified immunity. See
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (qualified immunity “protects all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)); see also People v. Iboa, 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 143,
149 (Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that “threats must be placed and understood in
their context”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Calhoun’s claim
2 15-16774
under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978),
because Calhoun failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the
city’s policy or custom caused a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See
Alexander v. City & County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1367-68 (9th Cir.
1994).
Calhoun’s motions to take judicial notice, filed on February 26, 2016, are
denied.
AFFIRMED.
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