OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of California
JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP
Attorney General
______________________________________
OPINION :
: No. 89-602
of :
: JANUARY 11, 1990
JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP :
Attorney General :
:
RONALD M. WEISKOPF :
Deputy Attorney General :
:
___________________________________________________________________
THE HONORABLE ROBERT G. BEVERLY, MEMBER OF THE CALIFORNIA
SENATE, has requested an opinion on the following question:
Does a California city have the authority to prohibit the
parking of particular categories of vehicles, such as recreational
vehicles or motor vehicles which exceed a specified length or
width, on its residential streets during all or certain hours of
the day?
CONCLUSION
A California city has no authority to prohibit the
parking of particular categories of vehicles on its residential
streets during all or certain hours of the day, with the exception
of commercial vehicles having a manufacturer's gross vehicle weight
rating of 10,000 pounds or more.
ANALYSIS
This opinion addresses the question of whether a
California city may adopt an ordinance to prohibit the general
parking of particular classes of vehicles on its residential
streets. For example, we are asked whether a city might enact an
ordinance to specifically prohibit the parking on residential
streets of oversized vehicles, or the parking of recreational
vehicles.1 We will see that the authority for a city to adopt such
1
The question asked does not define the term "recreational
vehicle" and the term is not defined in the Vehicle Code. However,
the term does have a customary meaning in the industry and among
1. 89-602
an ordinance must be found in the specifics of the Vehicle Code,
and on examining its provisions we will conclude that with the
exception of being able to prohibit the parking of certain
commercial vehicles in residential areas, a city is without
authority to particularize other types of vehicles, as by size, or
kind, or use, in order to similarly prohibit their parking.
Section 7 of article XI of the California Constitution
provides that a city "may make and enforce within its limits all
local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not
in conflict with general laws." (Cal. Const, art. XI, § 7.) This
authority is often referred to as the "police power" (70
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 210, 211 (1987)), and an ordinance adopted under
it would be presumed to be valid as long as it did not conflict
with general, i.e., state law. (Cf., Freeman v. Contra Costa
County Water District (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 404, 408; Stanislaus Co.
etc. Assn. v. Stanislaus (1937) 8 Cal.2d 378, 383, 384.)
But if a city ordinance adopted under the "police power"
does conflict with state law it would be void. ( People ex rel.
Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino (1984) 36 Cal.3d 476, 484; 72
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 180, 182 (1989).) Our Supreme Court has
summarized the notion of conflict:
"`"As defined by the cases the constitutional phrase
`conflict with general laws' ... may arise in several
different ways. It may grow out of the exact language of
the state and municipal laws [citations] or from a local
attempt `to impose additional requirements in a field
that is preempted by general law' [citations] or from the
state's adoption of `a general scheme for the regulation
of a particular subject' [citations]."'" (Baron v. City
of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 535, 541 [emphasis added];
see also People ex rel Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino,
supra, at 484-485; Lancaster v. Municipal Court (1972) 6
Cal.3d 805, 806, 808; 58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 519, 521-523,
529 (1975); 58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 13, 14, supra.)
"Conflict" with state law can thus arise in many ways,
and as pertinent herein, one of them occurs when the state has
enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme intended for uniform
application throughout the state and has indicated an intention to
preempt local regulation in the area. The Vehicle Code is such an
enactment and in fact contains its own preemption rule, found in
RV-users, where it normally includes vehicles which are self-
propelled or towed and which are designed to be slept in. Thus
"recreational vehicle" would include such vehicles as travel
trailers, van campers, truck campers, coaches, and motorhomes,
although taken on its face the term is broad enough to include any
vehicle used for "recreation."
2. 89-602
its section 21.2 ( Rumford v. City of Berkeley (1982) 31 Cal.3d
545, 551; County of Los Angeles v. City of Alhambra (1980) 27
Cal.3d 184, 189; Pipoly v. Benson (1942) 20 Cal.2d 366, 371; City
of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 749,
755, 756; Mervynne v. Acker (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 558, 561-562; 68
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 101, 102 (1985); 64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 707, 709
710 (1981); 55 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 178, 179 (1972).) In that section
the State has expressed its plenary power and its preemption of the
entire field of traffic regulation and control. (Rumford v. City
of Berkeley, supra, [the entire field of traffic control]; City of
Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa , supra, at 755 [the area of
motor vehicle traffic control]; 64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 707, 709,
supra [the area of motor vehicle traffic regulation and control].)
Section 21 provides as follows:
"Except as otherwise expressly provided, the
provisions of this code are applicable and uniform
throughout the state and in all counties and
municipalities therein, and no local authority shall
enact or enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by
this code unless expressly authorized therein."
Thus, "a city may regulate traffic on its public streets only to
the extent it is so expressly authorized in the Vehicle Code" (68
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 101, 102, supra; fn. omitted), and unless it has
been so expressly authorized, it "has no authority over vehicular
traffic control. [Citations.]" ( Rumford v. City of Berkeley,
supra, 31 Cal.3d at 550.) What this means is that "a [c]ity does
not have a `very wide discretion' under the police power in
legislating in the field covered by the Vehicle Code. Instead it
has no police power in that area at all, `unless expressly
authorized' [therein] by the Legislature." (City of Lafayette v.
County of Contra Costa , supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at 749; emphases
original.)
The regulation of parking on public streets is an adjunct
to the control and regulation of vehicular traffic, and that field
too is now preempted by state law. (County of Los Angeles v. City
of Alhambra, supra, 27 Cal.3d 184, 192-193; Siegel v. City of
Oakland (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 351, 357, 358; Mervynne v. Acker,
supra, 189 Cal.App.2d at 561; Bentley v. Chapman (1952) 113
Cal.App.2d 1, 3; 64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 707, 710, supra.)
It was not always so. Prior to 1935, the Vehicle Code
prohibited local authorities from enacting ordinances which in any
2
Further references to sections of the Vehicle Code will be by
section number only, and unidentified section references herein
should be understood to be to that Code unless context dictates
otherwise.
3. 89-602
way conflicted with its provisions (see e.g., Veh. Code [1919], §
22(d); Stats. 1919, ch. 147, p. 223, § 13), but since the Code did
not address "the method or manner of parking vehicles on the
streets of cities or towns" (cf., Flynn v. Blesdoe Co. (1928) 92
Cal.App. 145, 152), it was held that "no conflict [was] created by
a city ordinance regulating the same." (Ibid.) With the enactment
of the Vehicle Code of 1935 (Stats. 1935, ch. 27, p. 93), "the
Legislature determined to ... preempt the field of local
legislation in the area of motor vehicle traffic control." (City
of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at
755.) Section 458 of that Code provided:
"The provisions of this division [i.e., division 11
entitled "Traffic Laws"] are applicable and uniform
throughout the State and in all counties and
municipalities therein and no local authority shall enact
or enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this
division unless expressly authorized herein." (Stats.
1935, ch. 27, p. 164.)
But an undefined authority for local authorities to enact some
local parking regulations was found in section 472 of the Code, and
under it it was held that "local authorities [were] ... authorized
to enact special rules and regulations dealing with parking of
vehicles." (Pipoly v. Benson (1942) 20 Cal.2d 366, 373.)3
In 1953, however, the Legislature added former section
459.8 to the Vehicle Code to provide a specific, and as we shall
see a limited, grant of authority for local authorities to regulate
parking. (Stats. 1953, ch. 709, p. 1979, § 2.) The section
provided:
"The provisions of this division shall not prevent
local authorities, by ordinance or resolution, from
prohibiting the parking or standing of vehicles on
certain streets or highways, or portions thereof, at all
3
Section 472 of the Vehicle Code of 1935 provided:
"Curb Markings to Indicate Parking Regulations.
Whenever local authorities enact local parking
regulations and indicate them by the use of paint upon
curbs, the following colors only shall be used and such
colors indicate as follows: [red = no stopping; yellow =
stopping only to unload passengers or freight; white =
stopping only for loading or unloading of passengers;
green = time limit parking, as may be specified by local
ordinance.] [¶]Regulations indicated as above provided
shall be effective upon such days and during such hours
or times as may be prescribed by local ordinance."
(Stats. 1935, ch. 27, p. 169.)
4. 89-602
or certain hours of the day." (Stats. 1953, ch. 709, §
2, supra.)
The Legislature recodified the Vehicle Code in 1959, and
upon that recodification, "preempted the entire field covered by
[it] by substituting in place of section 458 the new section
21...." (City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 91
Cal.App.3d at 755.) As quoted above, it only permits local
authorities to enact ordinances on matters covered by the Code only
to the extent "expressly authorized therein." (Veh. Code, § 21,
supra.) Thus, to answer the question whether a city may prohibit
certain classes of vehicles from parking on residential streets,
under section 21 of the Vehicle Code we must look to its other
provisions to see the extent to which the Legislature has expressly
permitted local authorities to regulate parking. (Cf., Rumford v.
City of Berkeley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at 550; City of Lafayette v.
County of Contra Costa, supra, at 756; 67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 1, 4
(1984).)4
In several sections of chapter 9 (§ 22500 et seq.) of
division 11 of the Code, the Legislature has permitted local
authorities, such as cities, to adopt ordinances to regulate
parking within their jurisdiction in various situations.5 Most of
4
It should be noted that the regulation of vehicular use of
the public roads and highways by whatever means is outside the
"municipal affairs" constitutional grant of authority to chartered
cities, by which they are given power superior to that of the
Legislature to legislate on matters of "municipal" concern.
(Rumford v. City of Berkeley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at 550 fn. 3; 68
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 101, 102 fn. 2, supra; 67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 1, 4,
supra; cf., Cal.Const., art. XI, § 5; 72 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 180, 182
fn. 4, supra.) The regulation of parking is also not a "municipal
affair" in the sense of giving a chartered municipality control of
the matter in derogation of the power of the state. (County of Los
Angeles v. City of Alhambra, supra, 27 Cal.3d at 193; Siegel v.
City of Oakland, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d at 357; Mervynne v. Acker,
supra, 189 Cal.App.2d at 561-562, 564-565.)
5
A "local authority" is defined to mean "the legislative body
of every county or municipality having authority to adopt local
police regulations." (§ 385.) The terms "park" or "parking" are
defined to mean "the standing of a vehicle, whether occupied or
not, otherwise than temporarily for the purpose and while actually
engaged in loading or unloading merchandise or passengers." (§
463; see also, Fleming v. Flick (1934) 140 Cal.App. 14, 30 ["...the
term park ... [means] in substance, the voluntary act of leaving a
car on the main-traveled portion of the highway when not in use.
It means something more than a mere temporary or momentary stoppage
on the road for a necessary purpose."]; accord, 64
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 29, 34 & 34 fn. 4 (1981); 62 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 4
5. 89-602
the sections conferring that authority involve the adoption of
ordinances to address specific parking situations that are not
directly relevant because they do not involve the imposition of a
general restriction on parking in residential areas. 6 But two of
the sections of the chapter require analysis.
Section 22507, which derives from the aforementioned
section 459.8 that was added to the Vehicle Code of 1935 in 1953,
permits local authorities to adopt ordinances to prohibit or
otherwise restrict parking "on certain streets or highways, or
portions thereof, during all or certain hours of the day." And
section 22507.5 permits them to adopt ordinances prohibiting or
restricting the parking of vehicles on certain streets or highways
or portions thereof, between the hours of 2 a.m. and 6 a.m., and
ordinances to "prohibit or restrict the parking or standing, on any
street, or portion thereof, in a residential district, of
commercial vehicles having a manufacturer's gross vehicle weight
rating of 10,000 pounds or more."7 It is upon these sections that
(1979).)
6
(See e.g., §§ 22503.5 [ordinances providing special parking
regulations for two-wheeled or three-wheeled motor vehicles]; 22506
[ordinances prohibiting or restricting parking of vehicles on a
state highway within the jurisdiction]; 22507.6 [ordinances
prohibiting or restricting parking on designated streets or
highways for the purpose of street cleaning]; 22508 [ordinances
establishing parking meter zones and white-lined designated parking
spaces within which a vehicle must park]; 22509 [ordinances
requiring the blocking of wheels when vehicles are on hills in
business or residential districts]; 22510 [ordinances prohibiting
parking on highways, the width of which is restricted after snow
clearance]; 22511.7 and 22511.8 [ordinances designating special
parking for disabled persons and disabled veterans]; 22512
[ordinances reducing the state's 15 foot prohibited parking
distance from a fire hydrant]; 22519 [ordinances regulating,
prohibiting or restricting parking of vehicles in any offstreet
parking facility which the locality owns or operates].)
7
A "commercial vehicle" is "a vehicle of a type required to be
registered under the [Vehicle Code] used or maintained for the
transportation of persons for hire, compensation, or profit or
designated, used, or maintained primarily for the transportation of
property. (§ 260, subd. (a).) It does not include a "vanpool
vehicle." (Id., subd. (c); cf., § 668.)
The "manufacturer's gross vehicle weight rating" is "the
weight in pounds of the chassis of a truck or truck tractor with
lubricants, radiator full of water, full fuel tank or tanks plus
the weights of the cab or driver's compartment, body, special
chassis and body equipment and pay load as authorized by the
6. 89-602
a city would have to rely for authority to adopt the type of
ordinance contemplated in the question.
A. Section 22507.
We turn first to section 22507. It is the older of the
two sections and the one which gives local agencies the most
general authority to control parking. The section presently reads
as follows:
"Local authorities may, by ordinance or resolution,
prohibit or restrict the stopping, parking, or standing
of vehicles, including, but not limited to, vehicles
which are six feet or more in height (including any load
thereon) within 100 feet of any intersection, on certain
streets or highways, or portions thereof, during all or
certain hours of the day. The ordinance or resolution
may include a designation of certain streets upon which
preferential parking privileges are given to residents
and merchants adjacent to the streets for their use and
the use of their guests, under which the residents and
merchants may be issued a permit or permits which exempt
them from the prohibition or restriction of the ordinance
or resolution. With the exception of alleys, no such
ordinance or resolution shall apply until signs or
markings giving adequate notice thereof have been placed.
A local ordinance or resolution adopted pursuant to this
section may contain provisions which are reasonable and
necessary to ensure the effectiveness of a preferential
parking program." (Emphasis added.)
Section 22507 contains four parts: (i) a general grant
of authority to permit local authorities to prohibit parking on
certain streets and highways at all or certain hours of the day;
(ii) the specific inclusion of an authority to permit them to
prohibit or restrict the parking of vehicles over six feet in
height within 100 feet of an intersection; (iii) a grant of
authority for them to designate certain streets upon which
preferential parking privileges would be given to residents and
merchants; and (iv) a requirement that signs be posted to give
notice of any parking restriction imposed under the section. We
turn our attention to the first two of these components to
determine whether local authorities can prohibit the parking of
particular types of vehicles in residential areas.8 This will take
chassis manufacturer." (§ 390.)
8
It could not be successfully argued that such authority can
be eked from the authority found in the third component of the
section giving local authorities power to designate certain streets
upon which preferential parking privileges are given to residents
7. 89-602
us to a stepped analysis based on the chronological evolution of
the section.
1. The General Authorization To Prohibit Parking.
Section 22507 commences with a general grant for local
authorities to
"... prohibit or restrict the ... parking ... of
vehicles .... on certain streets or highways, or portions
thereof, during all or certain hours of the day."
As mentioned, this language dates almost verbatim from a 1953
addition to the Vehicle Code of 1935, and it was carried forward to
section 22507 when the Vehicle Code was recodified in 1959 (Stats.
1959, ch. 3, p. 1700, § 2). 9 To ascertain the intended scope of
this grant we look to its wording (cf., Moyer v. Workmen's Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230; People v. Knowles (1950) 35
Cal.2d 175, 182; Rich v. State Board of Optometry (1965) 235
Cal.App.2d 591, 604), and interpret it according to the usual,
ordinary and generally accepted meaning of the words used to frame
it. (Cf., People v. Craft (1986) 41 Cal.3d 554, 560; People v.
Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 884; Palos Verdes Faculty Assn. v.
Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650,
658; Great Lakes Properties Inc . v. City of El Segundo (1977) 19
Cal.3d 152, 155-156.) Reference to the dictionary is helpful to
understand the common generally accepted meaning of a term. (Cf.,
People v. Spencer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 563, 565; People v. Medina
(1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 473, 479.)
and their guests. That authority deals with "classes of persons,"
not "classes of vehicles" and it is inappropriate to extrapolate an
authority to restrict one from the authority to restrict the other.
(Cf., City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 91
Cal.App.3d at 756 fn. 2.)
9
As we have seen, in 1953 section 459.8 was added to the
Vehicle Code of 1935 to provide as follows: "The provisions of
this division shall not prevent local authorities, by ordinance or
resolution, from prohibiting the parking or standing of vehicles on
certain streets or highways, or portions thereof, at all or certain
hours of the day." (Stats. 1953, ch. 709, p. 1978, § 2.) Section
22507 of the Vehicle Code of 1959 provided: "Local authorities may
by ordinance or resolution prohibit the parking or standing of
vehicles on certain streets or highways, or portions thereof,
during all or certain hours of the day. (Stats. 1959, ch. 3, p.
1700, § 2.) In 1963 the Legislature added the words "or restrict"
to the sentence (Stats. 1963, ch. 1070, p. 2530, § 1), and in 1987
the word "stopping" was added. (Stats. 1987, ch. 455, p. ___, §
4.)
8. 89-602
Looking to the wording of the general grant of authority
found in section 22507 for local authorities to regulate parking,
we see that as added in 1953 and as it appears today, the
Legislature used the adjective "certain" to describe both the
places where ("streets and highways") and the times during which
("hours of the day") a city might prohibit or otherwise restrict
parking but that it did not use the term when referring to the
"vehicles" whose parking could be restricted. According to its
usual, ordinary and generally accepted meaning, the term "certain"
means, inter alia,
"2a PARTICULAR: of a character ... unwise to specify
-- used to distinguish a person or thing not otherwise
distinguished or not distinguishable in more precise
terms." (Webster's Third New Intn'l. Dict. (1971 ed.) at
p. 367.)
This would indicate that by using the term to describe the places
where, and the times during which, a city might prohibit vehicular
parking, the Legislature did not intend to particularize those
places and times on a statewide basis, but intended instead to
leave those matters to the exercise of local discretion as varying
local needs demanded. As such, the section would "authorize[]
local authorities to restrict parking, at hours and places to be
determined locally...." (Capolungo v. Bondi (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d
346, 350.)
In contrast, however, the Legislature did not similarly
use the word to modify what "vehicles" could be affected by the
exercise of that discretion. From that we believe the Legislature
did not intend local authorities to have discretion regarding the
kinds of vehicles covered by the ordinance. In other words we
believe that while the Legislature intended local authorities to
have discretion to designate the streets and highways on which
parking should be restricted, and the times of day during which
such restrictions would apply, they were not to have discretion to
designate particular types of vehicles for the purpose of applying
parking restrictions only to them. Any parking restrictions that
a local authority would choose to impose would have to apply to all
vehicles or none.10
10
It is interesting to note that the concept of having local
regulations affecting traffic apply to all vehicles or none finds
expression at least as early as 1919. Subdivision (d) of section
22 of the Vehicle Code as amended that year provided, inter alia:
"Local authorities shall have no power to enact, enforce or
maintain any ordinance, rule or regulation in any way in conflict
with, contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this act,
or of any section or other subdivision thereof, and no such
ordinance, rule or regulation of said local authorities shall have
any force or effect, excepting however, that (1) such powers as are
now or may hereafter be vested in local authorities to enact
9. 89-602
This perception of the purport of section 22507 finds
support when we compare the treatment accorded provisions of the
Vehicle Code where the word "certain" is present and where it is
not. It is present in subdivision (c) of section 21101, which
authorizes local authorities to prohibit "the use of particular
highways by certain vehicles...." (Emphasis added.) In 55
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 178 (1955) we noted that the phrase "certain
vehicles" was not defined (id. at 182), but said that it was broad
enough to permit a city or county to prohibit the use of particular
highways or streets by certain classes of vehicles, such as those
determined to be excessively noisy. (Id. at 183.) Our conclusion
was cited in City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 91
Cal.App.3d 749, in support of the proposition that subdivision (c)
would permit a city to prohibit certain classes of vehicles, "such
as trucks, or tractors, or oversize or `excessively noisy'
vehicles, or those lacking air-inflated tires," from using
particular highways. (Id. at 756 fn. 2.) In 67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen.
1, supra, we again considered the subdivision and concluded that
the phrase "certain vehicles" gave local agencies some limited
authority to restrict the roads on which certain cargoes, such as
hazardous material, might be transported in the jurisdiction. (Id.
at 5-7.)
In contrast to its subdivision (c), the modifier
"certain" is absent from subdivision (a) of section 21101, which
permits local authorities to adopt an ordinance "[c]losing any
highway [which includes streets (§ 360)] to vehicular traffic when
in [its opinion it] is no longer needed for vehicular traffic." In
Rumford v. City of Berkeley, supra, 31 Cal.3d 545 and City of
Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d 749, the
courts considered the issue of whether that grant of authority
permitted a city to partially close a public street to some traffic
but not to other. Each case held that subdivision (a) did not
provide that discretion, and that a city would have to close the
street equally to all traffic or none. (31 Cal.3d at 554-558; 91
Cal.App.3d at 756-757.) We reached a similar conclusion in 68
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 101, supra, finding that the subdivision did not
permit a city to adopt an ordinance authorizing "controlled access"
to the public streets in a residential neighborhood. (Id. at 103.)
By analogy to the foregoing, we find that while section
22507's general authorization for local agencies to "prohibit or
restrict the ... parking ... of vehicles ... on certain streets or
highways ... during all or certain hours of the day" might accord
ordinances and regulations, applicable equally and generally to all
vehicles and other users of the highways, and providing for traffic
or crossing officers or semaphores, to bring about the orderly
passage of vehicles and other users of the public highways on
certain portions thereof, where the traffic is heavy and
continuous...." (Stats. 1919, ch. 147, § 13, p. 223.)
10. 89-602
discretion to a city to designate certain streets or highways and
certain hours of the day for parking restrictions to be imposed, it
does not provide authority to prohibit or restrict the parking of
only certain types of vehicles.
2. The Specific Authorization To Restrict The Parking
of A Certain Class Of Vehicles.
In 1984 the Legislature amended section 22507 to add in
the just-discussed general authorization of its first sentence, a
specific authority for local authorities to restrict the parking of
vehicles more than six feet in height within 100 feet of an
intersection. (Stats. 1984, ch. 181, p. 555, § 2.) As amended,
the section then permitted local authorities to prohibit or
restrict "the parking or standing of vehicles, including vehicles
which are six feet or more in height (including any load thereon)
within 100 feet of any intersection , on certain streets or
highways, or portions thereof, during all or certain hours of the
day." (§22507, as amended by Stats. 1984, ch. 181, § 2, supra;
emphasis added.)
How was this meant to augment the existing general grant of
authority already found in the section?
"When determining the legislative purpose behind a
statutory amendment, [one] may properly consider committee reports
(Southland Mechanical Constructors Corp . v. Nixen (1981) 119
Cal.App.3d 417, 427), partisan caucus analyses (id. at p. 428), and
the digest of the Legislative Counsel. (People v. Superior Court
(Douglass) 1979 24 Cal.3d 428, 434)." (People v. Martinez (1987)
194 Cal.App.3d 15, 22; see also, People v. Aston (1985) 39 Cal.3d
481, 492-493; Hittle v. Santa Barbara County Employees Retirement
Assn. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 374, 387; California Teachers Assn . v.
Governing Board (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 606, 613; 68
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 23, 25-26, fn. 3; 66 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 382, 386
(1983).) This is because it will be presumed that the Legislature
adopted the subject legislation with the intent and meaning
expressed in those documents. (People v. Martinez, supra, citing
People v. Superior Court (Douglass) , supra at 434, People v.
Swinney (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 332, 342, and Maben v. Superior Court
(1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 708, 713.)
From such type of documents in the legislative history of
the Bill (AB 286) that enacted the 1984 amendment to section 22507,
we learn that "[t]he vehicle height prohibition provisions [were]
intended to provide better visibility at intersections." (See
e.g., Assembly Office Of Research, Concurrence in Senate Amendments
To AB 286; Senate Republican Caucus, Digest To AB 286, p. 2; Senate
Transportation Committee, Analysis Of AB 286, p. 2.) The amendment
was thus wrought with an overall purpose of promoting one aspect of
traffic safety. (Cf., Capolungo v. Bondi, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d
346, 351, 352.)
11. 89-602
But why was the amendment necessary at all to achieve
that end, when section 22507 already gave local authorities the
authority "to prohibit or restrict the parking or standing of
vehicles on certain streets or highways, or portions thereof, at
all or certain hours of the day"? The Legislative Counsel's Digest
to the Bill (AB 286) which amended the section --again, a valuable
aid in determining the Legislature's reasons for the legislation-
provides the answer. The Digest states:
"Existing law authorizes local authorities to
prohibit or restrict the parking or standing of vehicles
on certain streets or highways during all or certain
hours of the day. [¶] This bill would specifically
include vehicles which are 6 feet or more in height
(including any load thereon) within 100 feet of any
intersection as vehicles whose parking or standing may be
prohibited or restricted by local authorities ." (4
Stats. 1984, Sum. Dig. [AB 286], pp. 58-59; emphasis
added.)
We thus see that the amendment was enacted to specifically permit
local agencies to prohibit or restrict the parking of a particular
type of vehicle at a particular place - i.e., vehicles that are
more than six feet in height, within 100 feet of an intersection.
What we perceive that to mean is that without that specific
authorization, local authorities would have been without power to
single out such oversized vehicles in order to prohibit their
parking within 100 feet of an intersection, despite the broad
general language found in the introduction to section 22507. The
Legislature obviously considered the amendment necessary in order
to confer that authority on local agencies and permit them to
prohibit the parking of a specific type of vehicle because the
existing general authority to "prohibit or restrict the parking ...
of vehicles on certain streets" did not suffice to do so. Surely
if it already had, the Legislature's efforts to add the specific
authorization would have produced statutory surplusage, and that is
an interpretation of legislative efforts to be avoided. (Cf., City
and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47, 55;
California Mfgrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d
836, 844; Fields v. Eu (1976) 18 Cal.3d 322, 328.)
We are thus reinforced in our conclusion that the general
grant of authority found in the introduction to section 22507 did
not enable local authorities to single out particular types of
vehicles in order to restrict their parking.
This perception of the purport of the 1984 amendment is
consistent with the dictate that the delegation to local agencies
to make rules and regulations to regulate traffic is to be strictly
construed and that any grant of such authority must be expressly
declared by the Legislature in explicit and unmistakable terms.
(Cf., Rumford v. City of Berkeley , supra, 31 Cal.3d at 550, 553;
12. 89-602
City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d
at 756 & 756 fn. 3; People v. Moore (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 221, 228;
67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 1, 4, supra.)
The 1984 amendment to section 22507 also demonstrates
that when the Legislature has wanted to grant local authorities
power to enact an ordinance to prohibit the parking of a particular
type of vehicle for reasons of traffic safety, it knows how to do
so and has done so specifically. That it has not done so with
respect to other types of vehicles would indicate an intention that
local agencies were not to have authority to similarly prohibit or
otherwise restrict their parking. (Cf., Safer v. Superior Court
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 230, 236, 238; Board of Trustees v. Judge (1975)
50 Cal.App.3d 920, 927; see also, Wildlife Alive v. Chickering
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 190, 196; DeWeese v. Unick (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d
100, 106; Rich v. State Board of Optometry (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d
591, 607, discussing the doctrine of "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius," i.e., the rule that the expression of one thing in a
statute necessarily excludes other things not mentioned.)
In 1985 the Legislature again amended section 22507 to
add the phrase "but not limited to" after the word "including" in
the first sentence of the section. With that amendment local
authorities were given their presently worded authority to
"prohibit or restrict the parking ... of vehicles, including, but
not limited to, vehicles which are six feet or more in height ...
within 100 feet of any intersection, on certain streets or
highways, or portions thereof, during all or certain hours of the
day." (§ 22507 as amended by Stats. 1985, ch. 912, § 2. p. 2906;
emphasis added.) With the amendment, it now became clear that the
inclusion of the specific grant of authority to local agencies to
prohibit or restrict the parking of vehicles over six feet in
height within 100 feet of an intersection did not limit them to
enacting just that specified restriction. (Compare Television
Transmission v. Public Util. Com. (1956) 47 Cal.2d 82, 85; State
Compensation Ins. Fund v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (69 Cal.App.3d
884, 890; 11 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 11, 12 (1948), with People v.
Western Airlines (1954) 42 Cal.2d 621, 639; People v. Horner (1970)
9 Cal.App.3d 23, 27; Paramount Gen. Hosp. Co. v. National Medical
Enterprises, Inc. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 496, 501.) Local
authorities could now prohibit the parking of any vehicle within
100 feet of an intersection, if required by the needs of traffic
safety. Still, as we now see, this did not enable them to classify
vehicles by type or size in order to single out particular ones for
the sole purpose of restricting their parking in residential
11
areas.
11
It is suggested that the "but not limited to" language
wrought by the 1985 amendment not only modifies "vehicles which are
six feet or more in height" but also modifies "within 100 feet of
any intersection." It is thus suggested that after the 1985
13. 89-602
Ordinarily, a grant of authority as is presently found in
the wording of section 22507 would not be one of limitation (cf.,
People v. Western Airlines, supra, 42 Cal.2d at 639; People v.
Horner, supra, 9 Cal.App.3d at 27; Paramount Gen. Hosp. Co. v.
National Medical Enterprises, Inc., supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at 501),
and from it one might ordinarily imply an ability on the part of
local agencies to impose other types of parking restrictions on
oversized vehicles than the one specifically mentioned in the
section, when required by the needs of traffic safety. Indeed,
from the broadest consequence of the use of the phrase "including,
but not limited to" one might even be able to ordinarily imply an
ability on the part of local authorities to impose parking
restrictions on those vehicles for reasons compelled by factors
other than traffic safety --such as general safety considerations,
or those of aesthetics. (Cf. fn. 2, ante.) But we do not deal
with an "ordinary" grant of legislative authority.
The grant of authority found in section 22507 deals with
a facet of traffic regulation, and so when interpreting it we must
be ever mindful of the dictate that the Legislature's delegation to
local agencies of the power to make rules and regulations to
regulate traffic is to be strictly construed (Rumford v. City of
Berkeley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at 550, 553; City of Lafayette v. County
of Contra Costa, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at 756; People v. Moore,
supra, 229 Cal.App.2d at 228; 67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 1, 4, supra) and
that "such authority must be `expressly (not impliedly) declared by
the Legislature'." (City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa,
supra, quoting People v. Moore, supra (emphasis the court's);
accord, 67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra.) " Expressly means `"in an
amendment, local authorities were given authority not only to
restrict the parking of any sized vehicle within 100 feet of an
intersection, but to prohibit any sized vehicle being parked at
places other than intersections, if required by the needs of
traffic safety.
We reject the suggestion. It is more apparent from the
history of the added language than from the current sentence
structure, that the 1985 amendment was merely meant to clarify the
change that was made the year before. That as we have seen, was to
enable local agencies to provide better visibility at intersections
by prohibiting the parking of one particular size of vehicle within
the proximity of intersections. The 1985 amendment follows the
same structural pattern in the overall section and added an
authority to prohibit other categories of vehicles to the parking
ban within 100 feet of an intersection. Thus, following the rule
of strict construction for Vehicle Code provisions, we see this
added authority as being limited to restricting the parking of
additional categories of vehicles as would be reasonably calculated
to improve visibility at intersections, and not a carte blanche to
restrict their parking elsewhere.
14. 89-602
express manner; in direct or unmistakable terms; explicitly;
definitely; directly."' [Citations.]" (City of Lafayette v. County
of Contra Costa, supra at 756 fn. 3; emphasis the court's.)"
We have shown how the basic general authority for local
authorities to prohibit parking on certain streets and highways
that is found in section 22057, does not give them authority to
single out particular classes of vehicles for the imposition of
parking restrictions. We have also shown how the amendment to the
section in 1984 permitted local authorities to impose a parking
restriction or prohibition on one particular class of vehicle in a
particular situation involving parking near intersections, and how
that was augmented by the amendment to the section in 1985, to
permit them to impose the restriction on other types of vehicles in
the same situation. Nowhere in section 22057 has the Legislature
expressly, not impliedly, and in unmistakable language permitted
local authorities to designate a particular class of vehicle,
whether by type or size, solely to prohibit its parking in
residential areas. Accordingly, we conclude that the section does
not provide a basis for them to do so.
B. Section 22507.5.
In section 22507.5 the Legislature has addressed the
ability of local authorities to prohibit the parking of one
particular type of vehicle in residential areas. Indeed, in the
section the Legislature has permitted them to do so for
considerations other than traffic safety.
Like section 22507, section 22507.5 confers authority on
local agencies to restrict vehicular parking on its streets. The
section deals with the situation of overnight parking in general,
but it also specifically permits local authorities to totally
prohibit the parking of certain commercial vehicles on residential
streets at any time. The section reads as follows:
"(a) Notwithstanding Section 22507, local
authorities may, by ordinance or resolution, prohibit or
restrict the parking or standing of vehicles on certain
streets or highways, or portions thereof, between the
hours of 2 a.m. and 6 a.m., and may, by ordinance or
resolution, prohibit or restrict the parking or standing,
on any street, or portion thereof, in a residential
district, of commercial vehicles having a manufacturer's
gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or more.
The ordinance or resolution relating to parking between
the hours of 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. may provide for a system
of permits for the purpose of exempting from the
prohibition or restriction of the ordinance or resolution
handicapped persons and residents of high-density,
multiple-family dwelling areas or similar areas lacking
adequate offstreet parking facilities. The ordinance or
15. 89-602
resolution relating to the parking or standing of
commercial vehicles in a residential district, however,
shall not be effective with respect to any commercial
vehicle making pickups or deliveries of goods, wares, and
merchandise from or to any building or structure located
on the restricted streets or highways or for the purpose
of delivering materials to be used in the actual and bona
fide repair, alteration, remodeling, or construction of
any building or structure upon the restricted streets or
highways for which a building permit has previously been
obtained. [¶] (b) For the purpose of implementing this
section, each local authority may, by ordinance, define
the term `residential district' in accordance with its
zoning ordinance. The ordinance shall not be effective
unless the legislative body of the local authority holds
a public hearing on the proposed ordinance prior to its
adoption, with notice of the public hearing given in
accordance with Section 65090 of the Government Code."
(Emphases added.)
Examining the section, we see that it begins with the
phrase "Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 22507." That
indicates that section 22507.5 specifically controls over the
provisions of Section 22507. (Cf. In re Marriage of Dover (1971)
15 Cal.App.3d 675, 678 fn. 3; State of California v. Superior Court
(1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 637, 639-640; State of California v. Superior
Court (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 691, 693-695.) This may seem somewhat
puzzling because the relationship between the two sections is not
immediately apparent. But their interrelationship and the
established precedence of section 22507.5 is explained in their
history.
In 1969, section 22507 was amended to add the
requirement, now found in its third sentence, that signs or
markings giving adequate notice of a parking restriction first be
placed in order for the prohibition to apply. (Stats. 1969, ch.
541, p. 1168. § 1.) Section 22507.5 was adopted at the same time
to provide that "[n]otwithstanding [that provision], local
authorities may by ordinance ... prohibit or restrict the parking
or standing of vehicles on certain streets or highways ... between
the hours of 2 a.m. and 6 a.m." (Stats. 1969, ch. 541, p. 1168, §
2.) The Legislative Counsel's Digest to the Bill that enacted the
section tells that the "notwithstanding language" was used to
permit local authorities to restrict overnight parking "without
placing such signs or markings." (1969 (Reg.Sess.) Sum.Dig. [AB
699], p. 78.) Similarly, the Legislative Counsel's Digest to the
Bill that amended section 22507.5 in 1975 to provide specific
authorization for local authorities to exclude commercial vehicles
from parking in residential neighborhoods tells that that was done
to "permit[] local authorities to prohibit the parking ... of such
vehicles in a residential district without placing such signs or
markings...." (4 Stats. 1975, Sum.Dig. [AB 2272], p. 330; emphasis
16. 89-602
added.) Section 22507.5 thus understood, serves as a means by
which the Legislature has authorized local agencies to restrict
parking and to restrict the parking of certain vehicles without
having to post the signs or notices of the restrictions that would
otherwise be required by section 22507.
Looking now to the substance of the section we see that
it contains two basic authorizations for local authorities to
restrict parking. The first is general and permits them to
prohibit or restrict overnight "parking ... of vehicles on certain
streets or highways...." The second is more specific and pointed
for it authorizes a total ban on the parking of some commercial
vehicles in residential areas.
The wording of the first authorization follows that of
section 22507. In both sections, the Legislature has used the
adjective "certain" to modify the words "streets or highways" but
it has not used it to modify the word "vehicles." In our
discussion of section 22507, we showed how that construction was
indicative of an intent on the part of the Legislature to accord
local authorities authority to designate particular streets for a
parking restriction to apply, but not the authority to designate
particular types of vehicles to apply it to. The same result would
follow with the similarly worded authorization of section 22507.5.
While the section might authorize a city to prohibit all vehicles
from parking overnight on "certain streets or highways" in
residential areas, it would not provide them authority to apply
that restriction only to particularly designated types of vehicles.
As with section 22507, any overnight parking restriction imposed
for the streets of residential areas would have to equally apply to
all vehicles that might park there, or to none.
The second authorization of section 22507.5 permits local
authorities to totally prohibit the parking of commercial vehicles
having a manufacturer's gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000
pounds or more in residential districts. But other than
authorizing a blanket prohibition on the parking of such commercial
vehicles in residential districts, the section is silent as to what
other types of vehicles may be similarly excluded. Constrained as
we are to construe the authorization strictly and not imply things
not expressly stated by the Legislature (Rumford v. City of
Berkeley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at 550, 553; City of Lafayette v. County
of Contra Costa, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at 756; People v. Moore,
supra, 229 Cal.App.2d at 228; 67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 1, 4, supra), we
conclude that that silence is indicative of the Legislature's
intention that local agencies not have authority to prohibit or
otherwise restrict the parking of other types of vehicles on
residential streets. Moreover, even without the rule dictating
strict construction of Vehicle Code provisions, we would reach the
same result. As the 1984 amendment to section 22507 showed with
respect to the parking of oversized vehicles near intersections,
section 22507.5 demonstrates that when the Legislature has wanted
17. 89-602
to grant local authorities the power to enact an ordinance
prohibiting the parking of a particular type of vehicle in
residential areas, it has specifically done so. That it has not
with respect to other types of vehicles would indicate that local
agencies were not to have authority to similarly prohibit their
parking. (Cf. Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, supra, 18 Cal.3d at
196; Safer v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d at 236, 238; DeWeese
v. Unick, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at 106; Board of Trustees v. Judge,
supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at 927; Rich v. State Board of Optometry,
supra, 235 Cal.App.2d at 607.)
As our Supreme Court said in Rumford:
"Most traffic laws are to some extent
discriminatory. In large measure they determine which
traffic may use streets under what circumstances.
Nonetheless, localities have no carte blanche and, absent
express authority, may not determine which traffic shall
and which shall not use streets." ( Rumford v. City of
Berkeley, supra, 31 Cal.3d 545, 554.)
Under section 22507.5, a municipality could exclude commercial
vehicles from parking in residential neighborhoods; indeed, it
could do so purely for reasons of aesthetics. (See e.g., People v.
Tolman (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d Supp. 6, 10.) But "unless sanctioned
by some provision of state law" (Bentley v. Chapman, supra, 113
Cal.App.2d at 3), a city council would be without authority to
similarly prohibit other classes of vehicles from parking on those
streets as well. We have shown how neither section 22507 nor
section 22507.5 provides express authority for a city to designate
other classes of vehicles for the purpose of restricting their
parking in such areas, whether on public health grounds, on public
safety grounds, or on any other ground, and how no such authority
may be implied.
We therefore conclude that other than prohibiting or
otherwise restricting the parking of commercial vehicles having a
manufacturer's gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or
more, a California city has no authority to prohibit the parking of
particular categories of vehicles on its residential streets.
* * * * *
18. 89-602