IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0437
Filed February 22, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CAROL SWEAT a/k/a CAROL ENGLISH,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Karen A. Romano
(plea and sentencing) and William P. Kelly (revocation), Judges.
A defendant appeals her conviction for neglect of a dependent person and
possession of a controlled substance. AFFIRMED.
John C. Heinicke of Kragnes & Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kristin Guddall, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.
Following the revocation of her deferred judgment, Carol Sweat was
convicted of two counts of neglect of a dependent person, in violation of Iowa
Code section 726.3 (2011), and possession of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5). The district
court sentenced her to concurrent terms of incarceration not to exceed ten years
for the former offenses and a concurrent term of incarceration of one year for the
possession offense.
In her first claim of error, Sweat contends her guilty plea to possession of
a controlled substance was not knowing and voluntary because the district court
did not advise her of all penal consequences of her guilty plea. Specifically,
Sweat contends she was not advised of the applicable surcharges and driver’s
license suspension. See State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Iowa 2016).
Sweat has waived the challenge to her guilty plea. She did not file a
motion in arrest of judgment to challenge her guilty plea. A failure to file a motion
in arrest of judgment precludes a challenge to the adequacy of the guilty-plea
proceeding on appeal where the defendant was advised both of the necessity of
filing a motion in arrest of judgment and of the consequences for failing to do so.
See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a); Fisher, 877 N.W.2d at 680. Here, Sweat was
properly advised in the written guilty-plea form and during the plea colloquy.
Moreover, the district court explicitly advised Sweat to consult with her counsel if
she wished to obtain more information regarding the motion in arrest of
judgment. Sweat does not assert any claim her plea counsel was ineffective in
failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment. Her challenge to her guilty plea is
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thus waived. See State v. Worley, 297 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1980) (“Where
the trial court informs the defendant of this procedural requirement, we will not
hesitate to preclude challenges to plea proceedings on appeal.”).
In her next claim of error, Sweat contends the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing her to a term of incarceration rather than suspending her
sentences. She does not challenge the revocation of her deferred judgment.
“When a sentence imposed by a district court falls within the statutory
parameters, we presume it is valid and only overturn for an abuse of discretion or
reliance on inappropriate factors.” State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 554 (Iowa
2015). “An abuse of discretion will only be found when a court acts on grounds
clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” Id. at 553. “We give
sentencing decisions by a trial court a strong presumption in their favor.” Id.
Other than voicing mere disagreement with the sentencing court’s
decision, Sweat does not identify any abuse of discretion, and we find none. The
sentences are authorized by statute. The sentencing court recognized it had the
discretion to select among the statutory sentencing options, considered only
relevant factors in imposing sentence, and did not consider any impermissible
factors in imposing sentence. While the district court did not address each of the
claimed mitigating circumstances, the district court was not obligated to do so.
See State v. Siders, No. 15-1394, 2016 WL 3002784, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May
25, 2016). We thus affirm Sweat’s sentences. See, e.g., State v. Smith, No. 16-
0700, 2016 WL 6902854, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2016) (holding mere
disagreement with sentencing decision is insufficient to establish the district court
abused its discretion in imposing sentence); State v. Childs, No. 14-1950, 2016
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WL 1130283, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2016) (affirming challenge to
sentence where defendant merely disagreed with the sentence); State v. Pena,
No. 15-0988, 2016 WL 1133807, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2016) (stating
“mere disagreement with the sentence imposed, without more, is insufficient to
establish an abuse of discretion”).
AFFIRMED.