J-S13017-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: X.J.N., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: V.C., MOTHER
No. 1839 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered May 2, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000314-2015
*****
IN THE INTEREST OF: O.A.C., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: V.C., MOTHER
No. 1840 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered May 2, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000315-2015
*****
IN THE INTEREST OF: N.A.N., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: V.C., MOTHER
No. 1841 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered May 2, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000316-2015
*****
J-S13017-17
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.A.N., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: V.C., MOTHER
No. 1844 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered May 2, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000317-2015
*****
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.J.N., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: V.C., MOTHER
No. 1845 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered May 2, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000318-2015
*****
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.B.N., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: V.C., MOTHER
No. 1846 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered May 2, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000319-2015
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J-S13017-17
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MARCH 10, 2017
V.C. (Mother) appeals from the orders1 entered in the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which terminated her parental rights
as to her minor children, X.J.N., O.A.C., N.A.N., J.A.N., J.J.N., and A.B.N.
Upon careful review, we affirm.
The salient facts of this matter are as follows. X.J.N., at age 12, had
been excessively truant while residing with Mother, which led to the
Department of Human Services (DHS) becoming involved with the family
during the 2011 to 2012 school year. In July 2012, it was reported that
X.J.N. hit one of his brothers with a plastic golf club and that Mother took
the golf club and hit X.J.N. in the chest with it. Mother was allegedly
noncompliant with court-ordered therapy and lacked stable housing at that
time. In 2012, both X.J.N. and J.J.N. were adjudicated dependent with DHS
supervision based upon excessive truancy, although foster care was
recommended for all of the children.
In addition to facing mental health issues and unemployment, Mother
also used phencyclidine (PCP) and admitted to a history of alcohol abuse.
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Mother filed separate appeals regarding each order, all of which have been
consolidated in the instant appeal.
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Eventually, DHS fully committed X.J.N. and J.J.N. to DHS,2 and the other
four children were also placed in foster homes.3 Mother continued to test
positive for PCP and then began to test positive for benzodiazepines and
opiates beginning in 2014. Mother also became inconsistent with visits and
at times refused them during 2014 and 2015. Mother has not made
significant progress regarding her Family Service Plan (FSP) goals of
complying with treatment recommendations, including drug and alcohol
treatment, parenting classes, mental health treatment, obtaining a General
Equivalency Diploma or completing job training program, and appropriately
participating in visitation with her children.
After DHS filed a petition for termination of parental rights, on May 2,
2016, a hearing was held and the court determined that Mother’s parental
rights as to each child should be terminated. The court found it to be in the
best interests of the children that the goal for each child be changed to
adoption. This timely appeal followed, in which Mother raises the following
issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit[] legal
error in terminating Mother’s parental rights under [23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)], because no clear and convincing
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2
J.J.N. and X.A.N. were placed with their paternal grandmother.
3
A.B.N., N.N.N., and O.A.C. were placed with a foster family, and J.A.N. was
placed with paternal grandmother.
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evidence was presented to meet the statutory requirements
under this section?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit[] legal
error in terminating Mother’s parental rights under [23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5)], because no clear and convincing
evidence was presented to meet the statutory requirements
under this section?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit[] legal
error in terminating Mother’s parental rights under [23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8)], because no clear and convincing
evidence was presented to meet the statutory requirements
under this section?
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit[] legal
error in terminating Mother’s parental rights under [23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)],[4] because the Department of Human
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4
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 provides the following:
(a) General rule. — The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions
and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
...
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not
remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of
time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Services failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the needs and welfare of children would be served by
severing the parental bond with their Mother?
Brief for Appellant, at 6.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable
period of time and termination of the parental rights would
best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
...
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date
of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
and welfare of the child.
...
(b) Other considerations. — The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), and (b).
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In a proceeding involving the involuntary termination of parental
rights,
the burden of proof is on the party seeking termination to
establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of
grounds for doing so. The standard of clear and convincing
evidence is defined as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty
and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in
issue.” It is well established that a court must examine the
individual circumstances of each and every case and consider all
explanations offered by the parent to determine if the evidence
in light of the totality of the circumstances clearly warrants
termination.
In re Adoption of S.M., 816 A.2d 1117, 1122 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). As to our standard of review, “[w]e review a trial court’s decision
to involuntarily terminate parental rights for an abuse of discretion or error
of law. Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial
court’s order is supported by competent evidence. In re Adoption of
G.L.L., 124 A.3d 344, 346 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations omitted).
In considering termination under section 2511(a)(2), we note that the
party seeking involuntary termination must prove: “(1) repeated and
continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential parental
care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In re K.Z.S.,
946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. Super. 2008). These grounds
are not limited to affirmative misconduct; those grounds may
also include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform
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parental duties. Nevertheless, parents are required to make
diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full
parental responsibilities. A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a
long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or
availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or
disingenuous.
Id.
Instantly, Mother has failed to meet the needs of her children as would
be accomplished through meeting her FSP objectives. The trial court noted
that during the four-year life of this case, Mother has not progressed from
supervised to unsupervised visits. N.T. Termination Hearing, 5/2/16, at
102. The court also indicated concern “that during the life of this case[, the
children] put forth assertions that [Mother] was physically abusive and tried
to drown the[m,]” which were never recanted. Id.
Mother indicates in her argument that an agency worker testified to
observing that Mother’s interaction with one of the children was always
appropriate, that she was attentive and that they played together
appropriately. Brief for Appellant, at 13. However, this is ultimately not
nearly enough, since Mother was not able to provide housing or parental
care for her children. Indeed, she was not even able to progress to
unsupervised visits over the course of this case. Accordingly, the court
ultimately found that Mother had not “embraced [the] tools [to] empower
her to get her children back,” and we are constrained to agree. S.M.,
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supra. Accordingly, the grounds for termination have been met pursuant to
section 2511(a)(2).5
Before granting a petition to terminate parental rights under section
2511(b), we must:
carefully consider the intangible dimension of the needs and
welfare of a child—the love, comfort, security, and closeness—
entailed in a parent-child relationship, as well as the tangible
dimension. Continuity of relationships is also important to a
child, for whom severance of close parental ties is usually
extremely painful. The trial court, in considering what situation
would best serve the child[]’s needs and welfare, must examine
the status of the natural parental bond to consider whether
terminating the natural parents’ rights would destroy something
in existence that is necessary and beneficial.
In re K.J., 936 A.2d 1129, 1134 (Pa. Super. 2007). The court must
consider “whatever bonds may exist between the children and [parent], as
well as the emotional effect that termination will have upon the child[.]” In
re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 229 (Pa. Super. 2002).
In support of her argument on this issue, Mother contends that the
court failed to adequately examine the natural bond between Mother and her
children. Specifically, Mother cites to testimony indicating that X.J.N. has
indicated he would like to go home, but if he cannot, he would like to stay
with his grandmother. N.T. Termination Hearing, 5/2/16, at 54-55. Mother
also notes testimony that each of the other children would like to go home
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5
We need only agree with trial court’s decision as to any one subsection
under section 2511(a) in order to affirm termination of parental rights. In
the Interest of B.C., 36 A.3d 601, 606 (Pa. Super. 2012).
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with her. Brief for Appellant, at 25-26. See In re T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 743
(Pa. Super. 2004) (testimony presented should “separately address the
effect that the termination would have on each child individually.”)
However, as this Court has previously noted, “concluding a child has a
beneficial bond with a parent simply because the child harbors affection for
the parent is not only dangerous, it is logically unsound.” In re K.K.R.-S.,
958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008). Moreover, the statements that
Children were asking about coming home can be viewed as suspect since the
court found that Mother may have misleadingly told Children they were
coming home. See Termination Hearing, 5/2/16, at 103.
In determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interest, the court noted that Children have relationships with
their grandmother and have indicated that they have accepted that they
cannot go home if that decision is made. Id. at 106. A.C.H., supra. As in
G.L.L., supra, we uphold the ruling of the lower court since “we cannot re-
weigh the evidence or the credibility assessments made by the trial court.”
Id. at 348. Instantly, the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s
parental rights is supported by the record, and we discern no error or abuse
of discretion.
Order affirmed.
BENDER, P.J.E., Joins the memorandum.
FITZGERALD, J., Concurs in the result.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/10/2017
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