Opinion issued March 16, 2017
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-16-00350-CR
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ROBERT DEWAYNE LAURENT, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 230th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1453492
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After being charged with possession of methamphetamine in an amount
weighing more than one gram but less than four grams, with intent to deliver,
appellant Robert Dewayne Laurent filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine
police recovered from his car. Laurent argued that the police lacked probable cause
to make a traffic stop and that the basis the police articulated for the stop was merely
a pretext. The court denied Laurent’s motion and after Laurent pleaded guilty to the
offense enhanced by a previous felony conviction, the court sentenced him to 10
years’ imprisonment. In his sole issue on appeal, Laurent argues that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
Background
Officer B. Curtis testified at the pre-trial hearing on Laurent’s motion to
suppress. He stated that in January 2016, he was patrolling an area in north Houston
with his partner when he passed Laurent’s car and noticed that its window tint was
so dark he could not see the driver. Officer Curtis then noticed Laurent turn into a
private parking lot without signaling. Officer Curtis testified that, as he and his
partner pulled up, Laurent exited the car and began walking away. Officer Curtis
told Laurent to return to his car because he was conducting a traffic stop based on
Laurent’s failure to signal and illegal tint. He testified that he wanted Laurent to
return to his car because, from a safety standpoint, he was at a tactical disadvantage
while Laurent was out in the open. He wanted Laurent in one spot where he could
see him. According to Officer Curtis, Laurent became combative, flailing his arms,
and would not listen to him. Officer Curtis testified that Laurent recognized him
from a previous encounter and asked him why he kept stopping him. Officer Curtis
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testified that he did not initially recognize Laurent, but he recalled previously pulling
him over after Laurent reminded him when and where it had occurred.
Eventually, Laurent opened his car door to return to the driver’s seat, and
Officer Curtis noticed the “strong odor of marijuana coming from inside his
vehicle.” Officer Curtis testified that, because he smelled marijuana and saw a
Crown Royal bag on the front seat which, based on his past arrest experience, was
typically used to hide narcotics and weapons, he asked Laurent to step back out of
the car. Officer Curtis conducted a search of Laurent’s car and found marijuana,
methamphetamine, hydrocodone pills, muscle relaxers, and ecstasy tablets. Laurent
was arrested.
The trial court denied Laurent’s motion to suppress, and Laurent pleaded
guilty to the charged offense and an enhancement paragraph. The trial court
sentenced Laurent to 10 years’ imprisonment.
Discussion
In his sole issue, Laurent contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because the traffic stop and Officer Curtis’s request that Laurent
get back in his car were illegal. He argues that they were merely pretextual and
designed to allow the police to conduct an improper warrantless search of Laurent’s
car.
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A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress under a
bifurcated standard of review, giving almost total deference to the trial court’s
determination of historical facts that depend on credibility, and reviewing de novo
the trial court’s application of the law to those facts. Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d
554, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge
of the weight and credibility of the evidence and testimony. Wiede v. State, 214
S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “[T]he prevailing party is entitled to ‘the
strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be
drawn from that evidence.’” State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 465 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011) (quoting State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008)). A trial court’s ruling will be sustained if it is “reasonably supported by the
record and correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.” Laney v. State, 117
S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citing Wilover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841,
845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).
B. Applicable Law
A traffic stop is a detention and, therefore, must be reasonable. Magana v.
State, 177 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (citing
Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). The decision to stop
an automobile is reasonable when the police have probable cause to believe that a
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traffic violation has occurred. Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 542 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000). “[A]s long as an actual violation occurs, law enforcement officials are free
to enforce the law and detain a person for that violation . . . regardless of the officer’s
subjective reasons for the detention.” Id. at 543 (quoting Garcia v. State, 827
S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc)). Excessive tint and failing to
signal when turning are traffic violations. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 547.613
(providing that a person commits a misdemeanor if he attaches transparent material
to the side windows of a vehicle that reduces light transmission to less than 25%);
TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.104(b) (“An operator intending to turn a vehicle right or
left shall signal continuously for not less than the last 100 feet of movement of the
vehicle before the turn.”).
A police officer “may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if it is readily
mobile and there is probable cause to believe that it contains contraband.” Keehn v.
State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (first citing Pennsylvania v.
Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996), then citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,
393 (1985)). Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the
knowledge of the officer would lead a person of reasonable caution and prudence to
believe that an instrumentality of a crime or evidence will be found. Estrada v. State,
154 S.W.3d 604, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (first citing McNairy v. State, 835
S.W.2d 101, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), then citing Washington v. State, 660
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S.W.2d 533, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)); Dickey v. State, 96 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Texas courts have consistently held that
a strong odor of marijuana emanating from a car establishes probable cause to search
the car. See Miller v. State, 608 S.W.2d 684, 685–86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980);
Moulden v. State, 576 S.W.2d 817, 818–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); see also Rocha
v. State, 464 S.W.3d 410, 418 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d);
Jordan v. State, 394 S.W.3d 58, 64–65 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet.
ref’d)).
C. Analysis
1. Propriety of Traffic Stop
Laurent argues that the initial traffic stop was illegal and Officer Curtis’s
articulated reason for stopping Laurent was a mere pretext because, from the time
he saw Laurent, Officer Curtis intended to conduct a warrantless search of Laurent’s
car. The State responds that the traffic stop was justified because Officer Curtis had
probable cause to initiate a traffic stop once he observed Laurent commit a traffic
violation.
In Walter v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals reiterated that it has
expressly rejected the “pretext arrest” doctrine in favor of the prevailing, purely
objective approach adopted by other courts. Walter, 28 S.W.3d at 543 (citing
Garcia, 827 S.W.2d at 944). The Court noted that an arrest or stop is valid so long
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as an actual violation occurs and law enforcement officials detain the person for that
violation, regardless of the officer’s subjective reasons for the detention. Id.
(emphasis added). Accordingly, we must determine whether Laurent committed a
cognizable offense for which he was detained. Id.
Here, Officer Curtis provided uncontroverted testimony that he initiated the
traffic stop because the tint on Laurent’s car windows appeared to be illegal and
Laurent failed to signal when he turned into a private parking lot. Both offenses are
recognized traffic violations under Texas law. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE §§ 547.613;
545.104(a). Because Officer Curtis observed actual violations, he had probable
cause to conduct a traffic stop, regardless of his subjective intent. Thus, the traffic
stop was valid and we need not consider Officer Curtis’s subjective intent. See State
v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 469–70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (affirming grant of motion
to suppress and holding police had probable cause to stop and arrest when evidence
was undisputed that officers saw appellant commit traffic violation—turning without
signaling—despite officers’ subjective intent to search appellant for drugs); Walter,
28 S.W.3d at 542 (holding officer had objective reason for stop when he saw
appellant commit traffic violation of failure to signal within 100 feet of turn,
regardless of subjective intent); Garcia, 827 S.W.2d at 944 (holding that even if
arresting officer had second subjective reason for stopping vehicle, trial court erred
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in suppressing evidence because officer had objective reason for arrest when
appellant failed to stop at stop sign).
2. Propriety of Request to Return to Car
Laurent also argues that his motion to suppress should have been granted
because Officer Curtis’s request that Laurent get back into his car was not motivated
by Curtis’s stated desire to control the situation but actually was pretextual and
designed to permit Officer Curtis to observe the inside of Laurent’s car and thereby
justify a search for drugs. The State responds that Officer Curtis’s request was
justified by his concern for officer safety.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressly held that “officers at the scene
of a valid traffic stop [are] entitled to take sufficient measures to guarantee their
safety.” See Goodwin v. State, 799 S.W.2d 719, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en
banc) (superseded in part on other grounds); see also Cunningham v. State, 11
S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). The Goodwin
Court expressly noted that police officers are allowed to order drivers to get out of
their cars when they have been lawfully stopped for a traffic offense. See Goodwin,
799 S.W.2d at 727 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110–11, 98 S. Ct.
330, 333 (1977)). In so reasoning, the Court noted that “an officer is allowed to
establish a ‘face-to-face confrontation’ which ‘diminishes the possibility, otherwise
substantial, that the driver can make unobserved movements; this, in turn, reduces
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the likelihood that the officer will be the victim of an assault.’” Id. (quoting Mimms,
434 U.S. at 110–11, 98 S. Ct. at 333). Such reasoning applies with equal force when
an officer asks a person to reenter the car during a traffic stop in the interest of officer
safety. See, e.g., U.S. v. Sanders, 510 F.3d 788, 790 (8th Cir. 2007).
Here, Officer Curtis testified that upon his stopping him, Laurent became
combative and began flailing his arms. Officer Curtis testified that, in the interest
of officer safety, he asked Laurent to return to his car from 15 to 20 feet away so that
Laurent would be confined to one spot where he could see him. As when an officer
asks a driver to exit his car, Officer Curtis’s safety was a legitimate and weighty
justification for allowing this de minimis intrusion. See Goodwin, 799 S.W.2d at
727 (recognizing need to protect officers during investigative detentions and noting
that officer’s request that driver return to car was de minimis intrusion); see also
Sanders, 510 F.3d at 790 (holding officer’s request that passenger return to car
during traffic stop was minimal intrusion on his liberty interest and that gun found
during detention was not product of illegal search). Thus, we conclude that the trial
court reasonably could have found that Curtis’s request that Laurent return to and
get back in his car was not improper.
3. Propriety of Search
Laurent contends that Officer Curtis’s warrantless search of his car was illegal
because he lacked probable cause. The State responds that Officer Curtis had
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probable cause to search once he smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from
Laurent’s car. It is well-established under Texas law that “[a] strong odor of
marijuana emanating from a car establishes probable cause to search the car and its
occupants.” Rocha, 464 S.W.3d at 418 (citing Jordan, 394 S.W.3d at 64–65); see
also Parker v. State, 206 S.W.3d 594, 597 n.11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Miller, 608
S.W.2d at 685–86.
Here, Officer Curtis testified that he detected a strong odor of marijuana when
Laurent opened the car door. Because the record supports the trial court’s finding
that Officer Curtis had probable cause to search Laurent’s car upon smelling
marijuana, we conclude that Laurent’s motion to suppress was properly denied. See
Rocha, 464 S.W.3d at 418 (holding where officer testified he smelled marijuana as
soon as he approached appellant’s window he had probable cause to search the car
and its occupants); Jordan, 394 S.W.3d at 64–65 (holding officers were authorized
to search car and passengers after smelling odor of marijuana emanating from car);
Dickey, 96 S.W.3d at 613 (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding probable cause existed for search of car where officer smelled odor of
raw marijuana upon opening appellant’s car door).
We overrule Laurent’s sole issue.
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Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Rebeca Huddle
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Huddle.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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