UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4493
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL BRYANT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:15-cr-00716-RBH-1)
Submitted: February 28, 2017 Decided: March 28, 2017
Before SHEDD, DIAZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kimberly H. Albro, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Beth Drake, Acting United States
Attorney, Alfred W. Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States
Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Bryant appeals his jury conviction for possession
of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),
924(a)(2) (2012). On appeal, Bryant contends the district court
should have granted his motions for a mistrial and for judgment
of acquittal. Specifically, he argues the Government breached a
pretrial agreement precluding evidence, and the prejudice could
not be cured by the district court’s curative instruction. He
further contends the evidence was insufficient to prove that he
possessed the firearm and to support his conviction. We affirm.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a
mistrial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Johnson, 587
F.3d 625, 631 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); United States
v. Wallace, 515 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 2008) (citations
omitted). “An abuse of discretion exists if . . . the defendant
[can] show prejudice; no prejudice exists, however, if the jury
could make individual guilt determinations by following the
court’s cautionary instructions.” Wallace, 515 F.3d at 330
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for
judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Hassan, 742
F.3d 104, 139 (4th Cir. 2014). “Applying that standard, it is
well settled that ‘[t]he verdict of a jury must be sustained if
there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to
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the [g]overnment, to support it.” Id. (quoting Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942)). “[S]ubstantial evidence
is that which a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). “Simply put, a defendant challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy burden.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“‘To show a § 922(g)(1) violation, the government must
prove three elements: (i) that the defendant was a convicted
felon at the time of the offense; (ii) that he voluntarily and
intentionally possessed a firearm; and (iii) that the firearm
traveled in interstate commerce at some point.’” United States
v. Adams, 814 F.3d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting United
States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 136 (4th Cir. 2001)).
“[Section] 922(g)(1) does not require proof of actual or
exclusive possession; constructive or joint possession is
sufficient.” Gallimore, 247 F.3d at 136-37 (citations omitted).
“The Government may prove constructive possession by
demonstrating that the defendant exercised, or had the power to
exercise, dominion and control over the item.” Id. at 137
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bryant’s motion
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for a mistrial, and the evidence was sufficient to support his
conviction. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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