J-S19045-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ARTIS CARNEL CARROLL, JR. :
:
Appellant : No. 1256 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 12, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0001537-2015
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E. and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 29, 2017
Appellant, Artis Carnel Carroll, Jr., appeals pro se from the judgment
of sentence imposed on July 12, 2016, in the Lancaster County Court of
Common Pleas following the revocation of Appellant's parole on the charge
of defiant trespass.1 We quash this appeal.
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On March 27,
2015, Appellant was arrested and charged with one count of defiant trespass
on Millersville University (“Millersville”) property. The charge was docketed
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b)(1)(i). Appellant filed an appeal to this Court from
the imposition of his original judgment of sentence on December 1, 2015.
That appeal is docketed at 88 MDA 2016 and is being addressed in a
separate decision.
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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at 36-CR-0001541-2015, and following his arraignment, Appellant was
released on bail with a condition that he not return to Millersville.
On March 31, 2015, Appellant sat for a class at Millersville, and police
arrested him on site. Appellant was charged with a second count of defiant
trespass, which was docketed at CP-36-CR-0001537-2015, and his bail was
revoked with regard to the prior charge.
The cases were consolidated in the trial court, and on December 1,
2015, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial with Assistant Public Defender
Phillip Michael as standby counsel. At the conclusion of the trial, on
December 1, 2015, the jury acquitted Appellant of the defiant trespass
charge in connection with the March 27, 2015, incident; however, the jury
convicted Appellant of one count of defiant trespass for the March 31, 2015,
incident.
Appellant proceeded immediately to a sentencing hearing, at the
conclusion of which the trial court imposed a sentence of time served to
twelve months in prison. Due to the amount of time Appellant had already
served awaiting trial, the trial court indicated Appellant would be paroled
immediately without petition. N.T., 12/1/15, at 420. Additionally, as a
condition of his sentence, the trial court directed Appellant to undergo a
mental health evaluation, pay a fine of $300.00, perform fifty hours of
community service, and “have absolutely no contact with any employee of
Millersville, [ ] have absolutely no contact with [Millersville] whatsoever.” Id.
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at 421. The trial court clarified that if Appellant needed to communicate with
Millersville regarding any pending legal matters, he was permitted to have
contact only through Millersville’s legal counsel. Id. The trial court further
clarified that Appellant was to remain off of Millersville’s property. Id. at
421-22.
On December 15, 2015, Appellant, who was no longer in prison, filed a
pro se document entitled “Objection to Triple Jeopardy.” The trial court
treated this document as an untimely post-sentence motion and denied it.
On December 21, 2015, Appellant filed a timely pro se appeal from his
December 1, 2015, judgment of sentence.
Meanwhile, on December 18, 2015, the Lancaster County Probation
and Parole Office submitted to the trial court a petition to issue capias and a
bench warrant on the basis Appellant failed to report to the Central Intake
Unit of the Adult Probation and Parole Services upon his release from prison
as required. The petition further alleged that Appellant violated the trial
court’s December 1, 2015, no contact order by contacting Millersville via fax
on December 4, 2015. The trial court granted the petition, directing that a
capias and bench warrant be issued.
On January 13, 2016, following a hearing, Appellant was found to be in
violation of his parole, and Appellant was sentenced to time served, resulting
in him being paroled again immediately from prison. The sentencing order
noted that all previously imposed conditions remained in effect. Appellant
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did not file an appeal to this Court from the January 13, 2016, violation of
parole sentence.
On April 4, 2016, the Lancaster County Probation and Parole Office
submitted to the trial court a petition to issue capias and a bench warrant on
the basis that Appellant had violated a condition of his parole; to wit, on
March 3, 2016, he was charged with making terroristic threats, harassment,
and disorderly conduct for an offense occurring on or about March 2 to 3,
2016, in Upper Darby Township.
On July 12, 2016, after a thorough colloquy, Appellant waived his right
to counsel and proceeded pro se to a violation of parole hearing. At the
hearing, the parole officer indicated that Appellant’s new criminal charges
were held for court and such constituted a direct violation of his parole in the
instant case. N.T., 7/12/16, at 7. The lower court determined that
Appellant was in violation of his parole, revoked his parole, and remanded
him to the county jail to serve the balance of his unexpired term. The trial
court further noted all previously imposed conditions remained in effect.
On July 14, 2016, Appellant filed the instant timely pro se notice of
appeal to this Court. On July 15, 2016, and July 18, 2016, he purported to
file a motion for a new hearing and a motion challenging the weight of the
evidence, respectively. On July 27, 2016, the lower court directed Appellant
to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and noted that the trial court was
divested of jurisdiction as it related to Appellant’s July 15, 2016, and July
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18, 2016, motions. Appellant filed a timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement,
and the trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on August 8, 2016.
Appellant presents the following “Statement of Questions Involved,”
which we set forth verbatim:
[1.] Did the 104 day delay between Appellant[’]s detention and
Gagnon II Hearing violate his right to due process[?]
[2.] Did the 92 day delay between Appellant[’]s detention and
Preliminary Hearing violate his right to due process[?]
[3.] Did [the] Trial Court err and abuse its discretion by not
waiting until the outcome of the new charges as the Appellant
requested[?]
[4.] In light of the charges that brought rise to the order
revoking parole being dismissed is the [A]ppellant entitled to
have his sentence terminated[?]
[5.] Did [the] trial court err and abuse its discretion by revoking
parole without evidence of probative value[?]
Appellant’s Brief, Statement of Questions Involved.2
Although he has set forth five issues in his “Statement of Questions
Involved,” Appellant has not presented a coherent argument permitting
meaningful review of his issues. Appellant’s entire “Summary of Argument”
and “Argument” portion of his brief is set forth verbatim as follows:
Summary of argument
The Appellant[’s] parole was revoked without evidence of
probative value. Mere arrest and indictments without convictions
have no value as probative matter. Commonwealth v. Davis,
234 Pa. Super. [31] (1975). The Appellant opposed the fact that
he was arrested and held for court had no probative value.
Although it is constitutionally permissible for a probation/parole
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2
Appellant’s Brief is not paginated.
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revocation hearing to be held after arrest but before
determination of a criminal charge, Commonwealth v. Kates,
452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973),[3] it has been recognized that
“it may in many cases be preferable to defer that hearing until
end of trial, thus avoiding the possibility unjust result of revoking
probation/parole, only to find that later the probationer/parolee
has been acquitted of the charges that prompted the revocation
hearing.”
Argument for appellant
The rule of law is important in the stability of society.
Arbitrary actions in the revocation of parole can only impede and
impair the rehabilitative aspects of modern penology.
The appellant was acquitted of charges which gave rise to
revocation therefore a just result this court have to reverse[.]
Appellant’s Brief (bold in original) (footnote added).
It is well settled that this Court may not act as counsel for a party or
develop the analysis necessary to support a party’s position.
Commonwealth v. Fry, 41 A.3d 605 (Pa.Super. 2012). Additionally, while
we acknowledge Appellant has filed this appeal pro se, we note the
following:
While this Court is willing to liberally construe materials
filed by a pro se litigant, we note that Appellant is not entitled to
any particular advantage because [he] lacks legal training. As
our Supreme Court has explained, any layperson choosing to
represent [himself] in a legal proceeding must, to some
reasonable extent, assume the risk that [his] lack of expertise
and legal training will prove [his] undoing.
Consequently, [w]e decline to become the appellant’s
counsel. When issues are not properly raised and developed in
briefs...a Court will not consider the merits thereof.
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3
In Kates, our Supreme Court held that it is permissible to conduct a
revocation hearing before trial on the subsequent offenses giving rise to the
violation.
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Commonwealth v. Greenwalt, 796 A.2d 996, 997 (Pa.Super. 2002)
(quotation and quotation marks omitted). See Wilkins v. Marsico, 903
A.2d 1281, 1284 (Pa.Super. 2006) (holding that, although this Court is
willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status
confers no special benefit upon the appellant). Thus, while we are not
insensitive to the fact Appellant is proceeding pro se, his failure to develop a
coherent argument precludes us from conducting meaningful appellate
review. Consequently, we quash this appeal. Greenwalt, 796 A.2d at 997.
Appeal Quashed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/29/2017
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