IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 15–1585
Filed April 14, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
JAMES ROBERT DOWNEY,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County,
Douglas S. Russell, Judge.
A defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals decision
affirming his conviction for making a false statement on an application to
acquire a weapon permit in violation of Iowa Code section 724.17 (2015).
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.
Robert G. Rehkemper of Gourley, Rehkemper & Lindholm, P.L.C.,
West Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Genevieve Reinkoester,
Assistant Attorney General, Janet Lyness, County Attorney, and Jude
Pannell, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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WIGGINS, Justice.
A defendant appealed his conviction and sentence following a
bench trial on one count of making a false statement on an application to
acquire a weapon permit in violation of Iowa Code section 724.17 (2015),
a class “D” felony. We transferred the appeal to the court of appeals.
The court of appeals found the district court correctly interpreted the
statute and substantial evidence supported the conviction. Thus, it
affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence for making a false
statement on the application to acquire a weapon permit. The defendant
petitioned for further review, which we granted. On further review, we
find that the district court misinterpreted the statute. In applying the
correct interpretation, we find that section 724.17 does not criminalize
the defendant’s act of falsely answering an unauthorized question on the
application to acquire a weapon permit.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On January 14, 2015, James Downey submitted an application to
acquire a weapon permit to the Johnson County sheriff’s department.
The purpose of the application was to obtain the state’s permission to
purchase a handgun as required under Iowa law. See Iowa Code
§ 724.15. On the application, Downey provided his name, birthdate, sex,
phone number, residence address, driver’s license number, place of
birth, and country of citizenship. In addition to providing the
identification information, Downey authorized and gave his consent for a
sheriff’s department or the department of public safety (DPS) to obtain all
of the necessary records and background checks to verify that he meets
the requirements of the State of Iowa and the United States for the
acquisition and possession of a firearm.
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Downey then signed and dated the application. The paragraph
above his signature states,
I certify that all information, including supporting
documentation, provided in this application is true and
correct, and I understand that I may be convicted of a class
“D” felony pursuant to Iowa Code section 724.17 if I make
what I know to be a false statement of material fact on this
application or if I submit what I know to be any materially
falsified or forged documentation in connection with this
application.
At the end of the first page of the application, below Downey’s
signature, the application stated, “Answer all questions on reverse side.”
On the reverse side of the application, a heading provides, “All of the
following questions must be answered.” Ten questions followed with
check boxes to answer either yes or no to each question. There was no
space provided for a narrative or explanatory statement in regards to the
yes or no answer given in the check box.
The second question on the reverse side of the application asked,
Have you ever been convicted in any court of a felony, or any
other crime involving a firearm or explosives for which the
court could have sentenced you to imprisonment for more
than one year, even if you received a shorter sentence
including probation?
Downey answered “No” by checking the box next to that question. After
Downey submitted the application, the Johnson County sheriff’s office
ran a background check. The background check revealed the state
convicted Downey of operating while intoxicated (OWI) third offense, a
class “D” felony. The sheriff denied his application on January 19.
Thereafter, Captain Wagner of the sheriff’s office began an
investigation into what the sheriff’s department believed to be a false
answer to the second question on the application in light of the
background check revealing Downey’s felony OWI conviction. As a result
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of the investigation, the State charged Downey with making a false
statement on an application to acquire a weapon permit. After a bench
trial, the district court found Downey was guilty of the offense of making
a false statement on an application to acquire a weapon permit in
violation of section 724.17. The district court sentenced Downey to five
years in the custody of the department of corrections, suspended the
sentence, and placed him on two years of probation.
Downey appealed. We transferred the appeal to the court of
appeals. The court of appeals affirmed Downey’s conviction and
sentence. Downey asked for further review, which we granted.
II. Issue.
Downey raised various issues on appeal. We find that the issue
interpreting section 724.17 is dispositive of this appeal.
III. Scope of Review.
We review issues of statutory interpretation for correction of errors
at law. State v. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 540 (Iowa 2006).
IV. Analysis.
The United States Supreme Court determined the Second
Amendment protects the rights of District of Columbia residents to keep
and bear arms in a person’s home for the purpose of self-defense.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821–
22 (2008). Two years later, the Court extended this right to all residents
to whom the Constitution applied. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.
742, 791, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010).
As with all federal constitutional rights, our state constitution can
provide greater rights to Iowans. State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 264–
68 (Iowa 2010). The framers of the Iowa Constitution chose not to
include any language in our constitution concerning the right to bear
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arms. However, our legislature has expanded the rights of gun owners in
chapter 724 of the Iowa Code beyond the right to keep and bear arms in
a person’s home for the purpose of self-defense as recognized in Heller.
See, e.g., Iowa Code § 724.7 (authorizing persons to carry guns outside of
their residence); id. § 724.15 (authorizing persons to acquire pistols or
revolvers).
This case requires us to interpret one of those expanded rights
found in section 724.17. Section 724.17 outlines the requirements for
an application for an annual permit to acquire a weapon and criminalizes
false statements of material fact on the application. It provides,
The application for an annual permit to acquire pistols
or revolvers may be made to the sheriff of the county of the
applicant’s residence and shall be on a form prescribed and
published by the commissioner of public safety. The
application shall require only the full name of the applicant,
the driver’s license or nonoperator’s identification card
number of the applicant, the residence of the applicant, and
the date and place of birth of the applicant. The applicant
shall also display an identification card that bears a
distinguishing number assigned to the cardholder, the full
name, date of birth, sex, residence address, and brief
description and colored photograph of the cardholder, or
other identification as specified by rule of the department of
public safety. The sheriff shall conduct a criminal history
check concerning each applicant by obtaining criminal
history data from the department of public safety which shall
include an inquiry of the national instant criminal
background check system maintained by the federal bureau
of investigation or any successor agency. A person who
makes what the person knows to be a false statement of
material fact on an application submitted under this section
or who submits what the person knows to be any materially
falsified or forged documentation in connection with such an
application commits a class “D” felony.
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Id. § 724.17 (emphasis added). The commissioner of the DPS provides
the form for an application to acquire a weapon permit to Iowa sheriffs.
Iowa Admin. Code r. 661—91.2. 1
In 2010, the general assembly amended section 724.17 and
replaced the word “state” with the phrase “require only.” 2010 Iowa Acts
ch. 1178, § 13 (codified at Iowa Code § 724.17 (2011)). The relevant
portion of the Code now provides, “The application shall require only the
full name of the applicant, the driver’s license or nonoperator’s
identification card number of the applicant, the residence of the
applicant, and the date and place of birth of the applicant.” Iowa Code
§ 724.17 (2015).
Downey maintains that by using the phrase “shall require only,”
the legislature intended to prohibit the DPS from requesting additional
information beyond the full name of the applicant, the driver’s license or
nonoperator’s identification card number of the applicant, the residence
of the applicant, and the date and place of birth of the applicant. The
State contends that the phrase “shall require only,” sets the floor for
what the application must at least include, but does not limit nor forbid
the DPS from including more questions on the application.
“Absent a statutory definition or an established meaning in the
law, we give words used by the legislature their ordinary and common
meaning by considering, among other things, the context in which they
are used.” State v. Tarbox, 739 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Iowa 2007).
Considering the ordinary and common meaning of the phrase “shall
require only” and the context in which the legislature used it, the phrase
1The credits of rule 661—91.2 provide, “These rules are intended to implement
Iowa Code chapter 724 as amended by 2010 Iowa Acts, Senate File 2357 and Senate
File 2379.”
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is clearly narrower than the phrase “shall state.” “Require” is commonly
defined as “to demand as necessary or essential” or “impose a
compulsion or command on.” Require, Merriam–Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary (10th ed. 2002). “Only” commonly means “solely” or
“exclusively,” but can also mean “at the very least.” Only, Merriam–
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary.
Additionally, when “only” is used as a modifier, it should be placed
as close as possible to the word or words it modifies. Great care must be
taken when using the adverb as the placement of the word can affect the
entire meaning of a sentence. Texas Law Review Manual on Usage &
Style 72 (12th ed. 2011). It is a general rule that “ ‘[o]nly’ emphasizes the
word or phrase that immediately follows it.” The Chicago Manual of Style
5.182, at 250 (16th ed. 2010).
In the case of In re N.V., the state urged us to construe the transfer
sections of the Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act broadly “to provide the
court with discretion to deny the parents’ demand to transfer jurisdiction
to the tribal court because they did not present good cause to excuse
their untimely transfer request.” 744 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Iowa 2008). The
statute at issue provided in relevant part that “the court shall find good
cause to deny the petition only if one or more of the” circumstances
contained in the statute are shown to exist. Id. (quoting Iowa Code
§ 232B.5(13) (2005)). The statute then “lists the circumstances that
constitute good cause to allow a court to deny a request to transfer a
case.” Id.
We found that by using “the word ‘only,’ the legislature made it
clear that only those causes listed in section 232B.5(13) constitute good
cause to deny the request for a transfer to a tribal court.” Id. In other
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words, we interpreted the word “only” to put a limit on the court’s ability
to deny a request to transfer a case to the tribal court. Id.
Similarly, in this case, we find that the word “only” in section
724.17 modifies the words that follow it in the statute—the full name of
the applicant, the driver’s license or nonoperator’s identification card
number of the applicant, the residence of the applicant, and the date and
place of birth of the applicant. See Iowa Code § 724.17 (2015). Thus, an
applicant is required to provide only that information. Other
jurisdictions have interpreted the word “only” in the same limiting
fashion in different contexts. See State ex rel. Fatzer v. Anderson, 299
P.2d 1078, 1084 (Kan. 1956) (holding “[o]nly” is a word used for
restrictive purposes, and means “alone, simply, merely, barely, solely,
singly without more exclusiveness”); Hiner v. Hugh Breeding, Inc., 355
P.2d 549, 551 (Okla. 1960) (holding the words “can only” as used in the
statute are words of limitation and exclusion); White Stores, Inc. v.
Atkins, 303 S.W.2d 720, 726 (Tenn. 1957) (per curiam) (holding “[o]nly”
is a word of restriction as to that which it qualifies and a word of
exclusion as to other things).
This interpretation is also consistent with the legislative scheme of
chapter 724. Section 724.10 concerns an application to carry a
concealed weapon. It provides in relevant part,
A person shall not be issued a permit to carry weapons
unless the person has completed and signed an application
on a form to be prescribed and published by the
commissioner of public safety. The application shall require
only the full name, driver’s license or nonoperator’s
identification card number, residence, place of birth, and
date of birth of the applicant, and shall state whether the
applicant meets the criteria specified in sections 724.8 and
724.9. An applicant may provide the applicant’s social
security number if the applicant so chooses.
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Iowa Code § 724.10(1) (emphasis added).
In section 724.10(1) the legislature authorized the DPS to require
additional information on an application to carry a concealed weapon
than on an application to acquire a weapon permit under section 724.17.
The additional information required under section 724.10(1) include
matters concerning alcohol use, prior convictions of serious or
aggravated misdemeanors, prior felony convictions, and crimes of
domestic violence. Id. § 724.8; see also id. § 724.26 (incorporated by
reference in section 724.8(4)). It is clear from comparing section
724.10(1) with section 724.17, the legislature intended to require
different information on an application to carry than on an application to
acquire. The second question on the reverse side of the application to
acquire regarding a felony conviction is required on the application to
carry but not on the application to acquire.
Accordingly, we hold, the legislature did not authorize the
questions on the reverse side of the application to acquire a weapon
permit nor did it require Downey to answer the question concerning his
prior felony conviction. Next, we must determine if Downey can be guilty
of violating section 724.17 when he answered the felony question in the
negative. We think not.
The Iowa legislature has the power to define a crime. State v.
Fuhrmann, 261 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Iowa 1978). When the legislature
enacted section 724.17, it decided that the only items the DPS could
require an applicant to provide on an application to acquire were the full
name of the applicant, the driver’s license or nonoperator’s identification
card number of the applicant, the residence of the applicant, and the
date and place of birth of the applicant. Iowa Code § 724.17. The
legislature criminalized the act of making “what the person knows to be a
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false statement of material fact on an application submitted under this
section.” Id. (emphasis added). The DPS added a series of questions not
authorized by this section. If we were to find a violation of section
724.17 occurs when a person falsely answers a question not authorized
by the legislature, we are in fact allowing the executive branch, through
the actions of the DPS, to define the crime. For example, under the
statutory interpretation urged by the State, the DPS could ask on the
application to acquire a weapon permit the color of the applicant’s
vehicle and if the person answered falsely, the applicant could be
convicted of a class “D” felony in violation of section 724.17. We think
such result would be absurd. See In re Det. of Swanson, 668 N.W.2d
570, 574 (Iowa 2003) (“We read the statute ‘as a whole and give it “its
plain and obvious meaning, a sensible and logical construction,” ’ which
does not create an ‘impractical or absurd result.’ ” (quoting Gardin v.
Long Beach Mortg. Co., 661 N.W.2d 193, 197 (Iowa 2003)). Accordingly,
an unauthorized question on the application to acquire a weapon permit
cannot be the basis for a criminal conviction.
For these reasons, we find section 724.17 does not criminalize
Downey’s act of falsely answering an unauthorized question on the
application to acquire a weapon permit.
V. Disposition.
We vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the
judgment of the district court finding Downey guilty of violating section
724.17 of the Iowa Code, and remand the case back to the district court
to vacate its judgment and dismiss the case.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.