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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ROGER H. WILLIAMS
Appellant No. 1950 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order May 10, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0607531-1999
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED APRIL 18, 2017
Roger H. Williams appeals from the order entered in the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing as untimely his petition
filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546
(“PCRA”). Upon review, we affirm.
On February 23, 2000, Williams was convicted in a non-jury trial of
robbery, burglary and related counts stemming from an incident in which he
and another man forced their way into a home and robbed the occupants at
gunpoint. The Honorable Rayford Means imposed an aggregate sentence of
36 to 72 years’ imprisonment. After filing a PCRA petition, the court
reinstated Williams’ direct appellate rights nunc pro tunc. This Court
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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affirmed Williams’ judgment of sentence on June 4, 2002 and the Supreme
Court denied allowance of appeal on October 10, 2002. Thereafter, Williams
sought relief in two PCRA petitions, both of which were denied.
On November 4, 2010, Williams filed a third, facially untimely1 PCRA
petition in which he alleged, inter alia, the application of the newly-
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1
A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed
within one year of the date the underlying judgment of sentence becomes
final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); see also Commonwealth v. Bretz,
830 A.2d 1273, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2003). A judgment of sentence is deemed
final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
or at the expiration of time for seeking review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
See also Commonwealth v. Pollard, 911 A.2d 1005, 1007 (Pa. Super.
2006).
Here, Williams’ judgment of sentence became final no later than January 8,
2003, upon the expiration of the ninety-day period for filing a writ of
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13. Thus, he had one year from that date, or
until January 8, 2004, to file a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b). Williams did not file the instant petition until March 10, 2016,
more than 13 years after his judgment of sentence became final.
Accordingly, the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to entertain Williams’ petition
unless he pleaded and offered to prove one of the three statutory exceptions
to the time bar within sixty days of the date the claim could have been
presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). The statutory exceptions are as
follows:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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discovered-facts exception to the PCRA time bar set as forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(1)(ii). Specifically, Williams asserted that, at two pretrial
conferences in July and August of 1999, the Commonwealth offered
favorable plea deals to his defense counsel, who rejected them without
consulting Williams. In support of this claim, Williams attached an “internal
criminal docket entry,”2 which contained two entries, dated July 29, 1999
and August 12, 1999, stating “offer rejected.” Williams claimed that he had
written to numerous individuals in an attempt to obtain transcripts from the
pretrial conferences, but to no avail. Then, in 2010, on the advice of a
fellow inmate, Williams wrote to someone in the Clerk of Quarter Sessions
office, who sent him the “docket entry.”
The PCRA court denied relief and Williams appealed. In rejecting his
claim, this Court concluded that Williams had failed to exercise due diligence
in obtaining the document and failed to explain why he could not have
written to the Clerk of Quarter Sessions sooner. The Court also found that,
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
2
The document to which Williams refers is actually a Quarter Sessions
status sheet.
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“[w]hile the document indicates plea offers were rejected prior to trial, it
does not prove that counsel failed to communicate those offers” to Williams.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 890 EDA 2013, at 7 (Pa. Super. filed
1/14/14) (unpublished memorandum decision).
Subsequently, Williams filed the instant pro se PCRA petition, his
fourth, on March 10, 2016. Once again, he alleged an exception to the time
bar under section 9545(b)(1)(ii). This time, he presented a document
obtained from the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office through a “right-to-
know law” request, setting forth the terms of the plea deal allegedly rejected
by counsel without consulting Williams. Williams stated that he first filed a
“right-to-know” request in or about October 2012, but it was denied. He
filed a second request in October 2015 and, on January 11, 2016, received
the plea offer document in response. He filed the instant PCRA petition
within sixty days of receiving the document. The PCRA court again denied
relief on the basis that Williams failed to exercise due diligence in
discovering the written plea offer.
This timely appeal follows, in which Williams raises the following
claims, verbatim, for our review:
1. Whether the PCRA court erred as a matter of law and
constitution in denying [Williams’] third motion for post
conviction collateral relief (PCRA) as untimely filed, when
[Williams] raised genuine issues of material facts that warranted
develop[]ment, and established that his newly[-]discovered[-]
evidence claim was within the plain language of the timeliness
exception set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) and 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2)?
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2. Whether [Williams] is entitled to a new trial, or remand for an
evidentiary hearing based upon the personal documents of the
District Attorney, located only in the District Attorney’s case file,
revealing that a memorandum plea offer sheet was proffered to
trial counsel, Edward C. Meehan, Jr., Esquire, for the sole
purpose of being communicated to [Williams], for the
opportunity to resolve the charges against him with a lesser
sentence of 8 to 20 years, to be considered at the scheduled
pre-trial conference hearing before the late, Honorable Anthony
J. DeFino, by [Williams,] who did not know about nor
participate[] in the pre-trial conference hearing proceedings in
this case, in which newly-discovered evidence was not public
record and could only be provided to [Williams] by the District
Attorney’s Office?
3. Whether prior trial counsel, Edward C. Meehan, Jr.,
Esquire[’s] failure to communicate the newly-discovered
evidence, the District Attorney’s memorandum plea offer sheet
and its content, its term of 8 to 20 years, which [Williams] would
have accepted, violates trial counsel’s obligation under the Sixth
Amendment’s assistance of counsel, effective[] assistance of
counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause?
Brief of Appellant, at 4.
Our standard and scope of review for the denial of a PCRA petition is
well-settled. We review the PCRA court’s findings of fact to determine
whether they are supported by the record, and review its conclusions of law
to determine whether they are free from legal error. Commonwealth v.
Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014). The scope of our review is limited to
the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. Id.
As stated above, Williams invokes the “newly-discovered fact”
exception to the time bar set forth in section 9545(b)(1)(ii).
The timeliness exception set forth in [s]ection 9545(b)(1)(ii)
requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts
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upon which he based his petition and could not have learned
those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.
Commonwealth v. Bennett, [] 930 A.2d 1264, 1271 ([Pa.]
2007). Due diligence demands that the petitioner take
reasonable steps to protect his own interests. Commonwealth
v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1168 (Pa. Super. 2001). A petitioner
must explain why he could not have learned the new fact(s)
earlier with the exercise of due diligence. Commonwealth v.
Breakiron, [] 781 A.2d 94, 98 ([Pa.] 2001); Commonwealth
v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080 (Pa. Super. 2010)[.] This rule
is strictly enforced. Id. Additionally, the focus of this exception
“is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or
newly willing source for previously known facts.”
Commonwealth v. Marshall, [] 947 A.2d 714, 720 ([Pa.]
2008).
Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015). “Due
diligence requires neither perfect vigilance nor punctilious care, but rather it
requires reasonable efforts by a petitioner, based on the particular
circumstances, to uncover facts that may support a claim for collateral
relief.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 121 A.3d 1063, 1071 (Pa. Super.
2015), appeal granted, 134 A.3d 446 (Pa. 2016).
Here, the PCRA court properly concluded that Williams did not
demonstrate why he could not have discovered the new facts earlier with the
exercise of due diligence. As far back as June 2004, Williams was aware of
the pre-trial conference hearings at which trial counsel allegedly rejected the
Commonwealth’s plea offer without consulting him. See Memorandum of
Law in Support of Amended PCRA Petition, 3/10/16, at 17 (detailing letter
written to trial counsel on June 12, 2004, seeking information regarding pre-
trial conference hearings). Thus, Williams could have contacted the District
Attorney’s office seeking information regarding plea offers as early as 2004.
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However, Williams did not file his “right-to-know” request until eight years
later, in 2012. Moreover, after his initial request was denied on November
2, 2012, Williams inexplicably waited another three years to file a second
request, which was ultimately granted on January 6, 2016. Although
Williams baldly asserts that he exercised due diligence, he does not explain:
(1) the delay between the time he initially became aware that plea offers
had allegedly been rejected on his behalf (not later than 2004) and his first
“right-to-know” request to the District Attorney’s office; or (2) the nearly
three-year delay between the denial of his first “right-to-know” request and
his second, successful, request.
In addition, as we previously noted with regard to Williams’ earlier
newly-discovered-fact claim, see Williams, 890 EDA 2013, at 7, while the
plea offer document Williams obtained indicates that a plea offer was
rejected prior to trial, it does not tend to prove that counsel failed to
communicate that offer to him.
Williams failed to demonstrate the necessary due diligence in
uncovering the facts upon which he based his newly-discovered-fact claim.
Brown, supra. Accordingly, the PCRA court properly denied relief.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/18/2017
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