J-S19021-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
WILLIAM FREDERICK WINTERS, IV,
Appellant No. 987 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 20, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0001537-2015
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 19, 2017
Appellant, William Frederick Winters, IV, appeals from the judgment of
sentence of 2 to 5 years’ incarceration, imposed after he was convicted,
following a non-jury trial, of failing to comply with his registration
requirements under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41. On appeal, Appellant solely
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction. After
careful review, we affirm.
The trial court briefly summarized the facts and procedural history of
Appellant’s case, as follows:
Appellant is a sexual offender who is required to register
under … []SORNA[] for a period of 15 years due to a conviction
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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for sexual abuse of children based on the possession of child
pornography.
Appellant was charged with failing to comply with his
registration requirements1 by failing to notify the Pennsylvania
State Police (PSP) within three business days of his change of
address from 712 Grace Street to 321 Locust Street.
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1.
Appellant waived his right to a jury trial. A bench trial was
held on January 15, 2016. The court found Appellant guilty. On
April 20, 2016, the court sentenced Appellant to undergo
incarceration in a state correctional institution for a minimum of
2 years and a maximum of 5 years.
Appellant filed a timely post[-]sentence motion, which
included a claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court denied Appellant’s
post[-]sentence motion on May 27, 2015.
Appellant filed a timely appeal.
Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 12/15/16, at 1-2.
Herein, Appellant raises one issue for our review:
I. Did the lower court err when it denied Appellant’s motion for
judgment of acquittal when the Commonwealth failed to produce
sufficient evidence that Appellant failed to register a change of
address with in [sic] the three requisite business days when
[Appellant] registered on August 13, 2015 and was still in the
process of moving into the address of 321 Locust Street?
Appellant’s Brief at 11.
To begin, we note our standard of review of a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence:
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must
determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all
elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d
133 (Pa. Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the
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evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact
finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super.
2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it
links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreno, supra at 136.
Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
conviction for failing to comply with his registration requirements, which
mandate that he “verify his address or be photographed as required under
42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15….” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(2). Section 9799.15(g)(2)
directs that Appellant must “appear in person at an approved registration
site within three business days to provide current information relating to: …
(2) A commencement of residence, change in residence, termination of
residence or failure to maintain a residence, thus making the individual a
transient.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(g)(2). SORNA defines “residence” as “[a]
location where an individual resides or is domiciled or intends to be
domiciled for 30 consecutive days or more during a calendar year.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 9799.12. Additionally, as Appellant acknowledges, “[a] conviction
for failing to register can rest upon the failure of … Appellant to report an
additional residence.” Appellant’s Brief at 17 (citing Commonwealth v.
Hogentogler, 53 A.3d 866, 876 (Pa. Super. 2012)).
In this case, the trial court summarized the evidence presented at
Appellant’s trial, as follows:
The Commonwealth presented testimony from Rhonda
Jennings, Frances Stiber, Karen Schooley, Crystal Minnier, Jack
Winters, Officer Jason Bolt, Officer Debra Wasilauski and
Detective William Weber. The Commonwealth also presented
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several exhibits, including Commonwealth Exhibit 6, which
showed that Appellant did not register his address as 321 Locust
Street until August 13, 2015.
Ms. Jennings was the landlord for the residence at 321
Locust Street. She testified that Appellant and his girlfriend
signed the lease for 321 Locust Street on August 3, 2015. On
that same date, he paid his rent and security deposit and was
given the keys. As far as Ms. Jennings was concerned, Appellant
took possession on August 3, 2015.
Frances Stiber, an employee of Lycoming County Children
and Youth Services (CYS) testified that on July 30, 2015,
Appellant and his girlfriend came to the Sharwell Building for a
visit with their daughter and they were talking about all the work
they had to do to move. On July 31, 2015, Appellant told Ms.
Stiber that he would not be able to attend his visitation on
August 3, 2015 due to moving to Locust Street. On August 5,
2015, she also received a telephone call from Appellant
cancelling the visit for that day because the basement and some
other items still had to be moved and the landlord at 716 Grace
Street had given them a couple of days extension to get the rest
of those things.
Karen Schooley, another CYS employee, testified that
Appellant called her on August 4, 2015 to cancel his visit. He
told her that they were still moving and they needed to be
moved out of the Grace Street residence that day. On August 6,
2015, Ms. Schooley spoke with both Appellant and his girlfriend.
Appellant told her that they were still moving, and the landlord
had given them extra time because he had hurt his back. He
also told her that they would be attending their visit on Friday,
August 7. Later in the day on August 6, Ms. Schooley and
Crystal went to their new residence on Locust Street. There
were a lot of items in the living room and on the front porch.
Appellant also said that they only had cold water and they
weren't going to get their gas turned on until the 11 th. He also
said that his Grace Street landlord had hired people to move the
rest of their belongings and he was complaining that they had
broken some things.
Crystal Minnier testified that she was at the residence on
Locust Street on August 6. She saw fans running so the
electricity was on. There was clutter in the residence and on the
porch but it was no different from the Grace Street residence;
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that was just the way Appellant and his girlfriend lived. On
August 13, Appellant called and indicated he would not make his
visit that day because he was registering. Ms. Minnier chastised
Appellant. She told him that he knew he was moving on August
3, but he wasn't registering until August 13, which was way past
the deadline. She told him that “it was really a dangerous game
he was playing.” He had a daughter now and needed to be in
the community and able to do the things he needed to do to be
reunified with his daughter.
Appellant's brother, Jack Winters, testified that he resided
with Appellant at Grace Street and at Locust Street. He stated
that they started moving from Grace Street on August 3. They
began staying overnight at the Locust Street residence on
August 5. The water and electricity were on, but the gas was
not. After August 5, Appellant never returned to Grace Street to
sleep. Furthermore, he had a conversation with Appellant about
registering the new address. Appellant said he was watching a
movie and that was more important; he would just tell them he
moved on a later date and they would believe him.
Officer Jason Bolt of the Williamsport Police testified that
he was called to 321 Locust Street on August 9 for a disturbance
between Appellant and his girlfriend; they were having an
argument about the girlfriend not helping with the move. He
asked Appellant when he moved because he knew he was a
registered sex offender. Appellant told Officer Bolt that he
moved on August 3.
Officer Debra Wasilauski of the Williamsport Police testified
that on August 11, 2015, she was dispatched to 321 Locust
Street for a disturbance between Appellant and his girlfriend.
William Weber, the Chief County Detective, testified that
he responded to 321 Locust Street on August 5, 2015 and there
were lights on in the residence.
TCO at 3-5.
From this evidence, the trial court concluded:
It is patently obvious from the record that Appellant failed to
register within three days of moving to 321 Locust Street. On
August 3, 2015, Appellant signed the lease, paid the rent and
security deposit, received the keys, and took possession of the
residence at 321 Locust Street. He told Officer Bolt that he
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moved to that address on August 3. He began exclusively
sleeping at that address as of August 5, 201[5]. Both Ms.
Minnier and Appellant's brother had conversations with him
about his registration requirements. Despite being aware of the
requirement to register any change of address within three
business days, Appellant did not register his change of address
until August 13. Therefore, Appellant's assertion that the
evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt simply lacks merit.
Id. at 5.
We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction. The argument Appellant presents
on appeal does not convince us otherwise. Specifically, Appellant primarily
contends that he “could not have established [the] intent to reside at 321
Locust [Street] until he had completely moved all of his belongings to that
address.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. We disagree. The Commonwealth proved
that on August 3, 2015, Appellant signed a year-long lease at 321 Locust
Street, paid the rent and deposit, took possession of the keys, and began
moving his belongings into that residence. Appellant told Officer Bolt that he
moved into 321 Locust Street on August 3, 2015. Even if Appellant had not
completely finished moving out of the Grace Street residence, it is clear that
he was, at the very least, residing in both locations as of August 3, 2015.
Therefore, Appellant was required to report his moving into the residence on
Locust Street by August 6, 2015. See Hogentogler, 53 A.3d at 876.
In any event, we also point out that, according to Appellant’s brother,
Appellant began sleeping at the Locust Street residence on Wednesday,
August 5, 2015. Even if we consider that day as the start of Appellant’s
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residency on Locust Street, he was required to notify the PSP of his new
residence by Monday, August 10, 2015, yet he did not do so until August 13,
2015.1
In sum, the Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to demonstrate
that Appellant intended “to be domiciled for 30 consecutive days or more
during a calendar year” at the 321 Locust Street residence as of August 3,
2015 at the earliest, or August 5, 2015 at the latest. In either case, his
failure to register that new residence until August 13, 2015 constituted an
offense under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(2). Thus, the evidence was sufficient
to support Appellant’s conviction.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
____________________________________________
1
Appellant repeatedly states that he “attempted to register on August 11,
2015, but could not do so through no fault of his own.” Appellant’s Brief at
12; see also id. at 15, 16, 17. While Appellant claims the parties stipulated
to this fact, he fails to cite where in the record any such stipulation was
made. See id. at 12. Moreover, our review of the transcript reveals that
Detective Weber testified that Appellant only called “Central Processing, not
the [PSP,]” on August 11th “to set up an appointment” to register. N.T. Trial,
12/16/15, at 50. Because SORNA required Appellant to “appear in person
at an approved registration site within three business days” of commencing
his Locust Street residency, his August 11, 2015 call to schedule an
appointment to register does not satisfy this requirement. See 42 Pa.C.S. §
9799.15(g)(2) (emphasis added).
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/19/2017
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