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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
SHAQUILLE M. HENDERSON
Appellant No. 870 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 7, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division
at No(s):
CP-51-CR-0009569-2013
CP-51-CR-0009598-2013
BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED APRIL 28, 2017
Appellant, Shaquille M. Henderson, appeals from his judgment of
sentence of life imprisonment for first degree murder.1 Appellant argues
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his murder conviction, and that
the weight of the evidence entitles him to a new trial. We affirm.
The following evidence was adduced during trial. On March 8, 2013,
at approximately 2:00 p.m., the victim was shot and killed on the third floor
of a boarding house he owned, located at 1311 West Butler Street,
Philadelphia.
Denise Rahman lived on the second floor of the victim’s boarding
house. On March 8, 2013, she was at home waiting for a doctor’s
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).
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appointment when the victim came to collect rent. Rahman paid the victim,
who then went upstairs to the third floor. A few minutes later, he came
back down and knocked on Rahman’s door again. This time, he asked her if
she had seen Appellant, the third floor tenant. Appellant was the victim’s
nephew. Rahman replied that she had not. The victim informed Rahman
that he had to leave to take care of something but would return shortly.
N.T., 10/27/14, at 130-38.
While the victim was out of the house, Rahman heard Appellant
walking up to the third floor. Not long afterward, Appellant knocked on
Rahman’s door and asked her if anyone had gone through his room. She
answered that the only person who had been upstairs was their landlord, the
victim. Upset at Rahman’s response, Appellant went back upstairs to his
room. After some time had passed, the victim returned, and Rahman went
downstairs to inform him that Appellant was now home. When she got
downstairs, she discovered that Appellant had followed her downstairs. The
victim told Appellant that they needed to speak privately in Appellant’s room
on the third floor. Id. at 138-43.
From her room on the second floor, Rahman heard Appellant and the
victim arguing. After several minutes, the victim came back downstairs to
speak with Rahman. He seemed upset, but Rahman calmed him down, and
he returned to the third floor to resume speaking with Appellant. Shortly
thereafter, Rahman heard between four and five gunshots from above. She
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dove into her closet for cover and heard one person running down the stairs.
When she heard the front door open, she looked out of her window and saw
Appellant riding away on a bicycle. At no point before the shooting did
Rahman see, speak with or hear anyone other than the victim and Appellant.
The police arrived, and Rahman informed them that Appellant had shot and
killed the victim. Id. at 143-52.
Granville Worthington lived on the first floor of the victim’s boarding
house. On March 8, 2013, he was sleeping in his room when he was awoken
by four to five gunshots from above. As he got out of bed, he heard hurried
footsteps coming down the stairs, but by the time he exited his room, he did
not see anyone leaving. Worthington went upstairs because he heard
Rahman calling out to the victim. Worthington found the victim
unresponsive on the ground and called 911. Id. at 173-84.
The victim was pronounced dead at the scene, and an autopsy
revealed that he had been shot nine times. Dr. Sam Gulino, who performed
the autopsy, concluded that the victim suffered three independently fatal
wounds: one to the left side of the head, one near the base of the neck, and
one directly to the heart. The manner of death was homicide. N.T.,
10/29/14 at 17-24.
Officer Jacquelin Davis processed the crime scene for evidence and
found nine fired cartridge casings in the third floor hallway and an empty
lockbox for a Glock pistol in one of the third floor bedrooms. Id. at 60-81.
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Appellant managed to elude capture until April 25, 2013. On that
date, Officer Michael O’Brien and two of his colleagues were at a Starbuck’s
on the campus of Temple University when they saw Appellant sitting on a
bench outside. Knowing that he was wanted, the officers approached him
and attempted to make an arrest. N.T., 10/28/14, at 4-8. Appellant fled as
soon as he saw the officers. During the chase, he reached behind his back
and threw a pistol into a nearby alleyway. Officer O’Brien stopped his
pursuit to recover the pistol, and his colleagues apprehended Appellant a few
blocks away. A search incident to arrest revealed that Appellant was in
possession of several grams of crack cocaine. The pistol was a stolen, police-
issue Glock 17. Detective William Sierra concluded that the bullets and shell
casings recovered from the crime scene were fired by the Glock 17 pistol
found in Appellant’s possession. Id. at 8-22, 79-80.
The Commonwealth charged Appellant with first degree murder and a
violation of the Uniform Firearms Act (“VUFA”).2 On October 27, 2014, he
pleaded not guilty and proceeded to a jury trial, in which he testified in his
own defense. He admitted that he was present at the scene of the murder
but claimed that his friend, Wayne Wiggins, did the shooting. According to
Appellant, the victim had stolen their drugs, and Wiggins shot the victim out
2
18 Pa.C.S. § 6108. Appellant does not challenge this conviction in this
appeal.
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of anger. He explained his possession of the gun by saying that Wiggins
gave it to him following the murder. N.T., 10/29/14, at 47-60.
The jury convicted Appellant of first degree murder and the firearms
charge. On November 7, 2014, the court imposed the mandatory sentence
of life imprisonment without parole for murder and no further penalty on the
firearms conviction. Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions which
were denied by operation of law on March 16, 2015. This timely appeal
followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises two issues in this appeal:
I. Is [Appellant] entitled to an [a]rrest of [j]udgment on
the charge of [m]urder in the [f]irst [d]egree where the
evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict and where
the evidence did not establish that [Appellant] was a
principal, conspirator [or] an accomplice to the incident in
question and acted with premeditation, specific intent to
kill nor with malice?
Il. Is [Appellant] entitled to a new trial on the charge of
murder in the first degree where the greater weight of the
evidence did not support the verdict and where the verdict
was based on speculation, conjecture and surmise?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
Appellant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
conviction for first degree murder due to lack of evidence that he committed
the shooting or that the killing was premeditated. Id. at 11. We disagree.
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted
at trial the in the light most favorable to the verdict
winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-
finder to find every element of the crime beyond a
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reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not
weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the
fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts
regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-
finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn
from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above
test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence
actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder of
fact [,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all,
part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 542-43 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citation omitted), appeal denied, 138 A.3d 4 (Pa. 2016).
To sustain a conviction for first degree murder, the Commonwealth
must prove that the defendant “acted with the specific intent to kill, that a
human being was unlawfully killed, that the person accused did the killing,
and that the killing was done with premeditation or deliberation.”
Commonwealth v. Freeman, 827 A.2d 385, 404 (Pa. 2003) (citations
omitted). The specific intent to kill can be inferred from the use of a deadly
weapon on a vital part of the body. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 54
A.3d 332, 335-36 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted). The period of
premeditation necessary for first degree murder may be very brief: the
defendant can formulate intent to kill in a fraction of a second. See
Commonwealth v. Chambers, 980 A.2d 35, 47 (Pa. 2009) (citations
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omitted). Indeed, premeditation and deliberation exist whenever there is a
conscious purpose to bring about death. Id.
Construed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
evidence is sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for first degree
murder. The evidence clearly demonstrates that Appellant shot the victim.
Denise Rahman recounted that the victim and Appellant had an argument in
Appellant’s third floor apartment, which Appellant was renting from the
victim. The victim proceeded downstairs to Rahman’s second floor
apartment, spoke with Rahman and then proceeded back upstairs to resume
his argument with Appellant. Rahman then heard multiple gunshots and
saw Appellant fleeing the scene on his bicycle. The victim died on the third
floor. Six weeks later, police officers subsequently located Appellant, and he
ran away as the officers approached and threw a handgun into an alleyway.
The officers recovered the gun, and forensic analysis demonstrated that it
was the same gun that was used to kill the victim.
The evidence also shows that Appellant committed this murder with
specific intent to kill. Appellant concedes in his brief that his use of a deadly
weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body sufficiently proved a specific
intent to kill. Appellant’s Brief at 9; see also Thomas, 54 A.3d at 335.
Although he maintains that he shot the victim due to panic or rage, he did
not present any evidence during trial that he killed the victim due to panic,
rage. To the contrary, he remained adamant that he was not the person
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responsible for the murder, and a third person committed the murder in
retaliation for the victim’s theft of drugs. In any event, Rahman’s testimony
belies this defense by showing that Appellant was the only person with the
victim at the time of the shooting. Moreover, the shooting took place
following the victim’s conversation with Appellant and a hiatus during which
the victim proceeded downstairs to speak with Rahman. The evidence thus
demonstrates that Appellant premeditated the shooting and did not act out
of rage or panic.
For these reasons, we reject Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence.
In his next argument, Appellant claims that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence because nobody saw him shoot the victim. We
disagree.
“[A] trial court’s denial of a post-sentence motion based on a weight of
the evidence claim is the least assailable of its rulings.” Commonwealth v.
Nypaver, 69 A.3d 708, 717 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations and quotation
marks omitted). The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of
fact, who “is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to
determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949
A.2d 873, 879 (Pa. 2008). The trial judge may award a new trial only if the
fact finder’s “verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of
justice.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1225 (Pa. 2009)
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(citations omitted). “[A]ppellate review is limited to whether the trial
judge’s discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted
where the facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable abuse of
discretion.” Commonwealth v. Ratushny, 17 A.3d 1269, 1272 (Pa. Super.
2011) (citation omitted).
The fact that no one saw Appellant actually shoot the victim is of no
moment due to other circumstantial evidence tying Appellant to the murder.
Appellant was the last person with the victim mere moments before the
shooting. Immediately after the shooting, Rahman observed Appellant
fleeing the scene. When police officers arrested him six weeks later, he
attempted unsuccessfully to discard the murder weapon.
In response to the Commonwealth’s evidence, Appellant claimed that
he was present during the shooting, but that the perpetrator was Wayne
Wiggins—whom nobody else saw in the area. Appellant further alleged that
Wiggins gave him the murder weapon following the shooting, which is why
he was in possession of it some six weeks later. The jury discredited
Appellant’s account and chose to credit the testimony of the
Commonwealth’s witnesses, which was well within its rights as the finder of
fact. See Diggs, 949 A.2d at 879. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence.
Ratushny, 17 A.3d at 1272.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/28/2017
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