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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
VICTOR BLANT
Appellant No. 2020 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order June 3, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1011251-1994
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and MOULTON, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED MAY 25, 2017
Victor Blant appeals, pro se, from the June 3, 2016 order of the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his third petition filed
under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46, as
untimely. We affirm.1
On November 1, 1995, a jury convicted Blant of second-degree
murder, robbery, conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of crime. 2 On
January 4, 1996, the trial court sentenced Blant to life imprisonment for
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1
On January 4, 2017, the Commonwealth filed with this Court a
motion to accept its brief as timely filed. The Commonwealth’s brief was due
on November 23, 2016 but was not filed until January 4, 2017. Although we
generally do not condone untimely filings, we understand the present
situation in the Appeals Unit of Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, as
outlined in its motion. Therefore, having found no prejudice to Blant, we
grant the Commonwealth’s motion and accept its brief as timely filed.
2
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(b), 3701(a), 903, and 907(a), respectively.
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murder and a concurrent term of 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment for robbery.
Blant timely appealed to this Court, which affirmed his judgment of sentence
in part on January 31, 1997.3 Blant filed a timely petition for allowance of
appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied on June 24,
1997.
Blant filed the instant PCRA petition, his third, on August 2, 2012. On
April 27, 2016, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the
petition under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907. Blant filed a
response to the Rule 907 notice on May 9, 2016. On June 3, 2016, the
PCRA court dismissed Blant’s petition as untimely.
On appeal, Blant raises the following issues:
1. Did the imposition of [Blant’s] life without parole
sentence for a homicide offen[s]e violate the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments under the United States
Constitution and Article I § 13 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution? Did the imposition of [Blant’s] life without
parole sentence for a homicide offen[s]e violate the
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights found in
Obergefell v. Hodges[]?
2. Did the PCRA court commit reversible legal error when
it denied [Blant’s] PCRA Petition when it did not
recognize that the United States Supreme Court’s ruling
in Miller v. Alabama, and Jackson v. Hobbs, applies
to the instant life without parole sentence, for juveniles
and those with less developed brains?
Blant’s Br. at 4.
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3
On direct appeal, this Court vacated Blant’s robbery sentence but
affirmed the remainder of his judgment of sentence.
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Our review of an order denying PCRA relief is limited to determining
“whether the decision of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of
record and is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Melendez-Negron,
123 A.3d 1087, 1090 (Pa.Super. 2015). We will not disturb the PCRA court’s
factual findings “unless there is no support for [those] findings in the
certified record.” Id.
We must first address the timeliness of Blant’s PCRA petition, which is
a jurisdictional requisite. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171,
175 (Pa.Super.), app. denied, 125 A.3d 1197 (Pa. 2015). A petitioner must
file a PCRA petition within one year of the date his or her judgment of
sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Here, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied Blant’s petition for allowance of appeal on June 24,
1997. Because Blant did not seek review with the United States Supreme
Court, his judgment of sentence became final 90 days later, on September
22, 1997. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); U.S. S. Ct. R. 13. Blant had one
year from that date, or until September 22, 1998, to file a timely PCRA
petition. Thus, the instant PCRA petition, filed on August 2, 2012, was
facially untimely.
To overcome the one-year time bar, Blant was required to plead and
prove one of the following exceptions: (i) unconstitutional interference by
government officials; (ii) newly discovered facts that could not have been
previously ascertained with due diligence; or (iii) a newly recognized
constitutional right that has been held to apply retroactively. See 42
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Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). To invoke one of these exceptions, Blant must
have filed his petition “within 60 days of the date the claim could have been
presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
In his PCRA petition, Blant averred that his petition was timely filed
because he asserted a newly recognized constitutional right that was held to
apply retroactively. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). Blant relied on Miller
v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012), in which the United States
Supreme Court held that a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole was unconstitutional when imposed on defendants who
were “under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes.”4 Subsequently, in
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718, 736 (2016), the Supreme Court
held that Miller applied retroactively to cases on state collateral review.
Here, Blant was 20 years old at the time he committed the offenses for
which he was convicted.5 This Court has held that Miller’s prohibition of
life-without-parole sentences does not apply to defendants who were 18
years of age or older at the time of their offenses. See Commonwealth v.
Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa.Super. 2013) (where appellants were 19 and
21 at time of their offenses, “the holding in Miller [did] not create a newly-
recognized constitutional right that can serve as the basis for relief”);
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4
Blant filed the instant PCRA petition within 60 days of the Miller
decision, thereby satisfying the requirement of section 9545(b)(2).
5
Blant was born on December 6, 1973 and committed the offenses on
July 31, 1994.
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accord Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 94 (Pa.Super. 2016)
(reaffirming Cintora’s holding that petitioners who were 18 or older “at the
time they committed murder are not within the ambit of the Miller decision
and therefore may not rely on that decision to bring themselves within the
time-bar exception in Section 9545(b)(1)(iii)”). Therefore, because Blant
was 20 years old at the time of his offenses, Miller does not apply.
In his brief, Blant contends that even though he was older than 18 at
the time of his crimes, Miller’s holding should apply to him because his
brain was as immature as that of a juvenile. According to Blant, “the
adolescent process does not end at the age of 17, but 25.” Blant’s Br. at 24.
However, we rejected this precise argument in Cintora. In Cintora, the
appellants had argued that Miller should apply to defendants who were
under the age of 25 at the time of their offenses “because Miller created a
new Eighth Amendment right, that those whose brains were not fully
developed at the time of their crimes are free from mandatory life without
parole sentences, and because research indicates that the human mind does
not fully develop or mature until the age of 25.” 69 A.3d at 764. We stated
that the “contention that a newly-recognized constitutional right should be
extended to others does not render their petition timely pursuant to section
9545(b)(1)(iii).” Id. (emphasis in original).
Finally, Blant argues that his sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of parole violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). In
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Obergefell, the United States Supreme Court held that state prohibitions on
same-sex marriage violate the Fourteenth Amendment. We agree with the
PCRA court that “Obergefell in no way bears upon [Blant’s] own situation of
being an adult at the time he committed the murder, and does not
demonstrate [his] entitlement to relief under Miller.” PCRA Ct. Op., 6/3/16,
at 2 n.5.
Accordingly, because Blant failed to plead and prove an exception to
the one-year time bar, the PCRA court properly dismissed his petition as
untimely.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/25/2017
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