J-A09017-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: R.N., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
IN THE INTEREST OF: F.N., A MINOR,
APPEAL OF: LUZERNE COUNTY
CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES
No. 1725 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered September 16, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Civil Division at No(s): CP-40-DP-0000012-2013, CP-40-DP-0000013-2013
BEFORE: SHOGAN, OTT, and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JUNE 05, 2017
Appellant, Luzerne County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”),
purports to appeal from two orders entered on September 16, 2016,
regarding the assignment of a caseworker to underlying dependency actions.
After careful review, we are constrained to quash this appeal.
The trial court summarized the troubling factual and procedural history
of this matter as follows:
On January 9, 2013, after [a] hearing addressing the
Dependency Petition filed by Luzerne County Children and Youth
Services (Children and Youth) the court, by clear and convincing
evidence, found the minor children, R.N. and F.N., to be
dependent children pursuant to the Juvenile Act. This case
involves an appeal taken by Children and Youth pursuant to an
Order entered by the [c]ourt dated September 12, 2016
(docketed on September 16, 2016) which ordered that a
Hazleton caseworker, rather than a Wilkes-Barre caseworker,
shall be assigned to the case. The case was to be supervised
from the Wilkes-Barre Office since there were no supervisors
available in the Hazleton office.
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There are two minor children in this case, R.N. and F.N.
R.N. is six (6) years old, born [in December of 2009], and F.N. is
(10) years old[,] born [in July of 2006]. The natural mother,
K.N. [(“Mother”)] had three (3) children and one of them is
deceased.
On December 23, 2014, [Mother] filed a Petition for
Emergency Special Relief requesting that Luzerne County
Children and Youth and the Guardian Ad Litem for the children
have no further involvement in the case and that the matter be
referred to Children & Youth’s regional headquarters.
Alternatively, the Mother requested that the Dependency
[proceeding] be dismissed and discontinued and the minor
children [be] returned to [Mother]. [Mother] averred in her
Petition that the Guardian Ad Litem had referred the matter
involving the deceased child to a personal injury attorney in
order to file a wrongful death action. Mother also averred that
the Guardian Ad Litem did not disclose her actions concerning
her referral to the [c]ourt, Master, other attorneys or parties
involved.
[Mother] also averred that one of the caseworkers from
Children and Youth also referred the wrongful death action to a
personal injury lawyer without disclosing her actions concerning
the referral to the [c]ourt, Master, other attorneys or parties
involved. Mother further alleged that the caseworker and/or the
Guardian Ad Litem provided confidential medical records of the
deceased minor child to a personal injury attorney without the
consent, knowledge or approval of [Mother] and without
disclosing that information to the [c]ourt, Master, Attorneys or
parties involved. [Mother] alleged that the Guardian Ad Litem
could not hold a neutral position in this case and that her actions
presented a conflict of interest and further presented an
appearance of impropriety. [Mother] further alleged in her
Petition that a wrongful death action was filed and that an
Administrator of the Estate was appointed which excluded
[Mother].
On December 30, 2014, Children and Youth filed
Preliminary Objections to [Mother’s] Petition for Special Relief.
On January 6, 2015[,] an agreement was reached among
[Mother], the Guardian Ad Litem of the minor children[,] and
Children and Youth. [Mother] agreed to withdraw her Petition
for Special Relief without prejudice in which she requested that
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the assigned Children and Youth personnel and the Guardian Ad
Litem be removed from the case. The Guardian Ad Litem agreed
to withdraw as the Guardian Ad Litem for the two children
without admission of any wrongdoing or liability. Thus, a new
Guardian Ad Litem was appointed for the minor children, R.N.
and F.N.
Luzerne County Children and Youth agreed to transfer the
case files to its office in Hazleton, Pennsylvania. It was agreed
that these files were to be handled by caseworkers, supervisors
and investigators who had no involvement with this case. More
specifically, Luzerne County Children and Youth agreed to
immediately transfer the file of the two minor children to the
Hazleton office for assignment to a new caseworker.
Melissa Rogers of the Wilkes-Barre Office was the only individual
permitted to meet with the Hazleton caseworker to provide the
case history and transfer of the file. After that initial meeting,
Ms. Rogers was not to have any further communication with any
Wilkes-Barre staff regarding the dependency actions of the minor
children. Furthermore, no other Wilkes-Barre caseworker or
staff member was to have any contact regarding the case with
the Hazleton caseworker.[1]
There was also a pending Petition for Contempt against
Children and Youth filed by [Mother] alleging that Melissa Rogers
and her supervisor, Donna Domiano, interfered with reunification
between [Mother] and her children by contacting Cornerstone
Counseling and advising that agency not to engage in
reunification services despite a [c]ourt Order which directed
Cornerstone Counseling to conduct therapeutic sessions between
Mother and the children. On September 9, 2016, Children and
Youth filed a Petition to Modify the existing Order relating to the
above-referenced caseworker and supervisor assignments. As
indicated, supra., [sic] said Order was entered upon agreement
of all the parties. The basis of the petition was to advise the
court that the assigned caseworker in the Hazleton office had left
her position and the only remaining employee working on the
case was the supervisor from the Hazleton office. However, at
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1
The terms of this agreement were placed on the record and entered as an
order by the trial court during the January 6, 2015 hearing. N.T., 1/6/15, at
1-28.
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the hearing, the court learned that the supervisor was also
leaving her position. Thus, a new caseworker and supervisor
would need to be assigned to the family. At the hearing, the
[c]ourt held that since there were no more supervisors available
at the Hazleton office, a supervisor from the Wilkes-Barre office
may be assigned as long as the supervisor had no connection to
the case or presented no appearance of impropriety.
Furthermore, the [c]ourt ordered that one of the Wilkes-Barre
supervisors, Jeanette Rosenau, who is the fiancée of one of the
caseworkers that originally worked on the case, would not be
permitted to be the supervisor for the Hazleton caseworker.
On October 17, 2016, Children and Youth filed an Appeal
to the Superior Court [from] the Order[s]. . . .
Trial Court Opinion, 12/20/16, at 1-4 (internal citations omitted).
CYS presents the following issue for our review:
Whether the Trial Court erred because it did not have jurisdiction
to order how Luzerne County Children and Youth Services should
allocate administrative resources pursuant to a dependency case
governed by the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301, et seq.?
CYS’s Brief at 1.
Before turning to the merits of CYS’s argument, we must determine if
we may exercise jurisdiction over this appeal. Initially, we acknowledge that
issues of jurisdiction may be raised sua sponte. In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330,
334 (Pa. Super. 2011). Moreover, “[w]hether an order is appealable as a
collateral order is a question of law; as such, our standard of review is de
novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Rae v. Pennsylvania Funeral
Directors Association, 977 A.2d 1121, 1126 n.8 (Pa. 2009).
First, of relevance is the fact that the September 16, 2016 orders
issued by the trial court were separate decisions for each child and were filed
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on separate dockets. Orders, 9/16/16, at 1. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 341 requires that where one or more orders resolves issues
arising on more than one docket or relating to more than one judgment, an
appellant must file separate notices of appeal from each order or judgment.
See Pa.R.A.P. 341, note (citing Commonwealth v. C.M.K., 932 A.2d 111
(Pa. Super. 2007)) (quashing joint notice of appeal filed by co-defendants
from separate judgments of sentence entered on different dockets).
Furthermore, in the civil context, the question of one appeal from multiple
orders has been specifically disapproved of by courts of this Commonwealth.
See General Electric Credit Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 263
A.2d 448, 452–453 (Pa. 1970) (holding that one appeal from several
judgments is discouraged as unacceptable practice and stating that the
Supreme Court has quashed such appeals where no meaningful choice
between them could be made); Egenrieder v. Ohio Casualty Group, 581
A.2d 937, 940 (Pa. Super. 1990) (holding separate appeals were required to
be filed by each appellant where trial court entered separate orders denying
each appellant’s motion on different grounds). Here, CYS filed only one
notice of appeal from the two separate orders that were entered on separate
dockets. Thus, quashal on this basis is appropriate.
Second, CYS has filed an appeal from an interlocutory order. While
CYS asserts that it is appealing a collateral order, we cannot agree.
Generally, only appeals from final orders are eligible for
appellate review. . . . The collateral order rule “permits an
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appeal as of right from a non-final order if it is separable from
and collateral to the main action, involves a right too important
to be denied review and, if the review is postponed, the right will
be irreparably lost.” The collateral order rule, codified at
Pa.R.A.P. 313, must be interpreted narrowly. All three elements
must be satisfied to permit review of an interlocutory appeal
under the collateral order rule.
Jacksonian v. Temple University Health System Foundation, 862 A.2d
1275, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
“In order to satisfy the second prong of the collateral order doctrine, it
is not sufficient that the issue be important to the particular parties.”
Spanier v. Freeh, 95 A.3d 342, 346 (Pa. Super. 2014). “Rather, the issue
must involve rights deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the particular
litigation at hand.” Id.
Additionally, we have described the third element for qualification as a
collateral order as follows:
The third of these requires the appellant to demonstrate
that the underlying claim will be “irreparably lost” should the
appellant be forced to forebear from appealing until after final
judgment in the litigation. To satisfy this element, an issue must
actually be lost if review is postponed. Orders that make a trial
inconvenient for one party or introduce potential inefficiencies,
including post-trial appeals of orders and subsequent retrials, are
not considered as irreparably lost.
Graziani v. Randolph, 856 A.2d 1212, 1225 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal
citations and some quotation marks omitted).
In support of its claim that the September 16, 2016 orders are
collateral orders, CYS contends first that the orders are separate from the
main cause of action in the dependency case. CYS’s Brief at 4-5. Second,
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CYS maintains that the right involved is too important to be denied review
because “[w]ithout review, the [t]rial [c]ourt can continue to order the
Agency how to handle [sic] administrative decisions even though it has no
statutory authority.” Id. at 5. Finally, CYS argues that the question before
the Court will be irreparably lost if review is postponed because “the decision
as to which caseworker would be working with this family would never be
reviewable.” Id.
We agree that the first prong has been met: the order regarding
assignment of the caseworker is separate from the main, underlying
dependency action. We cannot agree, however, that the second and third
prongs required for a collateral order have been satisfied.
With regard to the second prong, as outlined, CYS asserts that the
right involved is too important to be denied review because without review,
the trial court can continue to handle administrative decisions though it has
no statutory authority to do so. We first note that the parties came to the
initial agreement to prohibit staff from the Wilkes-Barre office from working
on Mother’s case in January of 2015. N.T., 1/6/15, at 1-14, 27-28. At that
point, it was agreed to by all interested parties, including CYS, that staff in
the Hazleton office would handle the matter. Id. As a result of this
agreement, Mother agreed to withdraw her petition for emergency special
relief. Id. at 8. CYS did not challenge the trial court’s authority to enter the
order reflecting that agreement at that time. N.T., 1/6/15, at 10, 27-28.
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CYS is now asking for a change in the status quo that was put into
effect by the order reflecting that agreement. Thus, we cannot agree with
CYS’s assertion that the court is continuing to “handle” administrative
decisions without authority. By agreement, the parties allowed the trial
court to manage this deemed “administrative decision.” CYS did not object
to or appeal from that order when it was entered. Accordingly, the trial
court’s authority to designate a caseworker in this matter was conceded by
all parties, including CYS. Moreover, while the issue may be important to
CYS in this particular case, we cannot agree that it involves rights deeply
rooted in public policy going beyond this particular litigation where the
parties agreed to the trial court’s authority in directing the administrative
handling of this matter. Spanier, 95 A.3d at 346. Accordingly, the second
prong is not met.
Furthermore, the third prong of the collateral order test has not been
met. Notably, CYS does not make an argument or assert facts relating to
the importance of a particular caseworker being with this family. Rather, it
argues that the trial court’s decision hinders CYS’s ability to effectively
allocate resources, thereby placing a heavy burden on CYS, and if review of
this issue is postponed, the claim will be irreparably lost. CYS’s Brief at 4, 7.
We find this argument unconvincing for several reasons.
First, CYS’s focus appears to be on the allocation of resources.
Regardless of which office supervises this case, the allocation of resources
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will be within Luzerne County CYS. As a result, we cannot agree that a
designation of which office will supervise this case places a “heavy burden”
on CYS, nor that the postponement of review will result in the claim being
irreparably lost. Arguably the designation of a Hazleton caseworker and
Wilkes-Barre supervisor in this matter may result in some inconvenience or
inefficiency for CYS. Those factors, however, are insufficient to meet the
criteria for the third prong. Graziani, 856 A.2d at 1225. Moreover, if it
were subsequently determined that the caseworker who worked with this
family was inappropriate, and that impacted the dependency determination
for example, then that issue could be addressed on appeal. Accordingly, the
third element for a collateral order has not been established, and the current
appeal lies from an interlocutory order. Thus, we are constrained to quash
this appeal.
Appeal quashed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/5/2017
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