FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUN 08 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CAMERON G. ROUPE, No. 15-35063
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-02131-JCC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JAMES STRICKLAND and ADAM
VEACH,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 19, 2017
Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS, GOULD, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Cameron Roupe appeals the adverse summary
judgment grant to Officers James Strickland and Adam Veach. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except
as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
1. Summary judgment was correctly granted to Officer Strickland on Roupe’s
excessive force claim. Despite a liberal construction of his filings, Roupe did not
show that the circumstances of the tasing were genuinely in dispute for summary
judgment purposes. See Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2010).
Based on the undisputed material facts, Officer Strickland’s use of force was
objectively reasonable, and he was thus entitled to qualified immunity. See Kingsley
v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472-73 (2015); Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d
805, 823 (9th Cir. 2010).
2. Officer Veach was also entitled to qualified immunity because Roupe did not
allege or show facts that Officer Veach violated Roupe’s constitutional rights by not
reporting the tasing. See Bryan, 630 F.3d at 823. Accordingly, summary judgment
was correctly granted to Officer Veach.
3. As for Roupe’s claim that Officers Strickland and Veach unlawfully failed
to seek medical attention for him after the tasing, Roupe did not present evidence to
establish a genuine issue of material fact that the Officers were deliberately indifferent
to a serious medical need. See Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067-
68 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, this claim fails as well.
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4. The panel deems abandoned Roupe’s claim that the district court
erroneously ruled on the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as if it were a
motion to dismiss. See United States v. Loya, 807 F.2d 1483, 1487 (9th Cir. 1987)
(“Issues raised in a brief which are not supported by argument are deemed
abandoned.”). Finally, Roupe waived his remaining Washington state law claims by
not renewing them on appeal. See Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 738
(9th Cir. 1986).
AFFIRMED.
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