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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ARMAD ELDRIDGE,
Appellant No. 2189 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of June 14, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0012486-2012
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JUNE 14, 2017
Appellant, Armad Eldridge, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on June 14, 2016. We affirm.
Appellant was arrested in 2012 and charged with involuntary deviate
sexual intercourse (“IDSI”), unlawful contact with a minor, endangering
welfare of children, corruption of minors, indecent assault of a person less
than 13 years of age, indecent exposure, and sexual assault.1
Commonwealth’s Information, 11/1/12, at 1-2. On December 2, 2014,
Appellant entered into a negotiated guilty plea, wherein Appellant agreed to
plead guilty to IDSI with a child (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(b)) and corruption of
minors (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(ii)), in exchange for the Commonwealth’s
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(a)(1), 6318(a)(1), 4304(a)(1), 6301(a)(1)(i),
3126(a)(7), 3127(a), 3124.1, respectively.
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agreement to drop all remaining charges and to recommend a sentence of
not more than four-and-a-half to nine years in prison, plus ten years of state
supervised sex offender probation. See Written Guilty Plea Colloquy,
12/2/14, at 1.
During the guilty plea colloquy, the Commonwealth summarized the
factual basis for the plea:
Your Honor, had this case gone to trial, the Commonwealth
would have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that between
the period of January 1, 2012 through June 30, 2012, the
complainant in this case, [S.G.], was approximately 11 to
12 years old. . . .
[S.G.’s] mother’s boyfriend [was Appellant and Appellant]
did, on multiple occasions, tell [S.G.], after school, to go
take a shower[,] . . . [a]t which point he would follow her
into the bathroom. While the complainant was in the
shower, as he would sit outside on the toilet, he would
fondle himself by putting his hand on his penis and
masturbating.
After the complainant would exit out of the shower,
[Appellant] would touch the complainant’s breast and
vagina with his hands.
The complainant also states that [Appellant] had come into
her room on multiple occasions at night where [Appellant]
would perform oral sex on the complainant by licking the
complainant’s vagina.
N.T. Guilty Plea, 12/2/14, at 12-13.
Following the summation, Appellant declared that he was “pleading
guilty to the charges of [IDSI] and [corruption of minors] because [he is], in
fact, guilty of those two offenses.” Id. at 14. The trial court accepted
Appellant’s plea and it immediately sentenced Appellant to a term of four-
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and-a-half to nine years in prison, plus ten years of state supervised sex
offender probation, for the IDSI conviction. The trial court deferred
sentencing on the corruption of minors conviction and continued the
sentencing hearing, pending a Megan’s Law and sexually violent predator
(“SVP”) assessment. Id. at 38-40 and 43-44.
On June 14, 2016, the trial court held an SVP hearing, where the
“Commonwealth [] submitted a report indicating that [Appellant] meets the
criteria for [SVP status and Appellant submitted] an independent evaluation
which . . . indicates that [Appellant] does not meet the criteria.” N.T.
Sentencing, 6/14/16, at 6-7. The parties stipulated to the respective reports
and the trial court heard oral argument on the parties’ respective positions.
At the conclusion of the argument, the trial court accepted the conclusions in
the Commonwealth’s report and determined that the Commonwealth had
proven that Appellant is a SVP. Id. at 20-21. The trial court then sentenced
Appellant to serve a concurrent term of seven years’ reporting probation for
his corruption of minors conviction. Id. at 21.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and the trial court ordered
Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal,
pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). Trial Court
Order, 7/13/16, at 1. Appellant raised one claim in his Rule 1925(b)
statement: “[t]he [c]ourt erred in ruling that Appellant should be classified
as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP).” Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement,
7/26/16, at 1. Appellant now raises one claim on appeal:
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Whether the trial court erred in determining that Appellant
be classified as a [SVP].
Appellant’s Brief at 7.
Within the argument section of Appellant’s brief, Appellant contends
that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s SVP
determination because: “[t]he Commonwealth and their expert misstated
that Appellant was a recidivist because he repeated the actions alleged in
the case with S.G.;” “[t]he Commonwealth failed to allege any factors that
would contribute to Appellant’s possible recidivism after being punished for
his actions;” “[t]he Commonwealth failed to establish and conceded on the
record that there was not enough information to make specific findings
about any particular mental illness or clinical diagnosis of Appellant;”
“[t]here was a lack of multiple victims;” “[t]here was no evidence that the
means necessary to achieve the offense was exceeded;” and, there was
“[n]o record of a display of unusual cruelty in the instant situation.”
Appellant’s Brief at 13-14.
We are constrained to conclude that Appellant’s claim on appeal is
waived, as Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement does not sufficiently identify
the error or errors that Appellant intended to challenge on appeal.
As this Court has continuously held:
If Appellant wants to preserve a claim that the evidence was
insufficient, then the 1925(b) statement needs to specify
the element or elements upon which the evidence was
insufficient. This Court can then analyze the element or
elements on appeal. [Where a] 1925(b) statement [] does
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not specify the allegedly unproven elements[,] . . . the
sufficiency issue is waived [on appeal].
Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2008),
quoting Commonwealth v. Flores, 921 A.2d 517, 522-523 (Pa. Super.
2007).
In this case, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement vaguely declares:
“[t]he [c]ourt erred in ruling that Appellant should be classified as a Sexually
Violent Predator (SVP).” Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 7/26/16, at 1.
This statement fails to “specify the element or elements upon which the
evidence was insufficient” to support the trial court’s SVP determination –
and we must conclude that Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim is
waived on appeal. Williams, 959 A.2d at 1257.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/14/2017
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