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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ROBERT L. HOWARD
Appellant No. 1275 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered July 26, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County
Criminal Division at No: CP-65-CR-0000645-2015
BEFORE: PANELLA, STABILE, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JUNE 22, 2017
Appellant, Robert L. Howard, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on July 26, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland
County after a jury convicted him of simple assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2701(a)(1). Following review, we affirm.
Appellant was arrested on January 24, 2015, and was charged with
aggravated assault, disarming a law enforcement officer, and resisting
arrest. Following a hearing on his petition for habeas corpus relief and his
motion to quash the arrest and suppress evidence, the trial court determined
that the arresting officers lacked both reasonable suspicion and probable
cause to arrest Appellant. Therefore, the charge of resisting arrest could not
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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be sustained and Appellant’s motion to quash and suppress was granted as
to that charge. Trial Court Order, 9/16/15, at 1; Trial Court Opinion,
9/16/15, at 2-4. However, his motion was denied with respect to the
remaining charges. Id.
On April 8, 2016, the Commonwealth filed an amended information,
removing the resisting arrest charge and adding a charge of simple assault.
At the conclusion of a May 2, 2016 trial, the jury found Appellant not guilty
of aggravated assault and disarming a law enforcement officer, but guilty of
simple assault. On July 26, 2016, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a
total of one to two years in prison. This timely appeal followed. Both
Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.1
Appellant presents two issues for our consideration:
I. Whether the verdict of guilty of simple assault was supported by
sufficient evidence.
II. Whether the trial court erred in determining that the dismissal of
Appellant’s [r]esisting [a]rrest charge was not relevant, where []
Appellant claims that his resistance to the illegal arrest, without
use of force, was lawful.
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
In his first issue, Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction of simple assault. As defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A.
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1
We remind Appellant’s counsel of the requirement to attach a copy of the
Rule 1925(b) statement of errors complained of and the trial court’s Rule
1925(a) opinion to an appellant’s brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111.
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§ 2701(a)(1) (Simple Assault), “a person is guilty of assault if he [] attempts
to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to
another[.]”
In Commonwealth v. Rahman, 75 A.3d 497 (Pa. Super. 2013), this
Court instructed:
We are guided by the following standard of review when
presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting a defendant’s conviction:
As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency
claims requires that we evaluate the record “in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution
the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from
the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308,
744 A.2d 745, 751 (2000). Evidence will be deemed
sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each
material element of the crime charged and the commission
thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt
to a mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the
defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless
the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter
of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the
combined circumstances.
Id. at 500-01 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pettyjohn,
64 A.3d 1072, 1074 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal citations and quotations
omitted)).
Testimony presented at trial revealed that on January 24, 2015, at
approximately 2:00 p.m., Police Sergeant Marcia Cole and Officer Wes
Biricocchi from the Arnold, Pennsylvania Police Department separately
responded to a 9-1-1 dispatch call. According to the dispatch call, an
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individual who may have robbed a New Kensington grocery store had been
observed at a local intersection in a high crime area. Both officers located
Appellant based on the description provided, with Officer Biricocchi arriving
just before Sergeant Cole. Sergeant Cole pulled her patrol vehicle alongside
Appellant and asked if she could speak with him. He agreed and provided
his name.
Sergeant Cole asked Appellant for identification and testified that
Appellant turned a little bit and started to reach his hand down inside his
pants, putting Sergeant Cole on alert because, as she explained, “that’s not
where someone would keep their ID.” Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), Trial,
5/2/16, at 51. She instructed Appellant to wait until she had patted him
down for weapons. She then lifted his left arm to prevent him from putting
it into his pants. Id. As she initiated the pat down, Appellant began to take
flight. Id. at 52. Sergeant Cole grabbed his jacket and he dragged her
about four feet down the sidewalk. Id. As Officer Biricocchi attempted to
restrain Appellant, Appellant shoved Sergeant Cole and she “went flying into
the street.” Id. at 53. She informed Appellant she was going to tase him
but when she deployed her taser, it did not make contact. Id. at 54.
As Appellant and Officer Biricocchi scuffled, Sergeant Cole attempted
to aid her colleague. Appellant grabbed her taser and tried to pull it from
her hand. Id. at 55-56. She and Officer Biricocchi eventually tackled
Appellant to the ground and handcuffed him. Id. at 57-58. When she tried
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to handcuff Appellant, Sergeant Cole realized she could not bend the middle
finger on her right hand. Id. at 59. The finger, ultimately diagnosed as
sprained, was swollen and caused her substantial pain. Id. While she could
not pinpoint exactly when the injury occurred, she believed it happened
during her struggle to control Appellant. Id. at 61, 78.
Appellant testified that he and a friend were walking to a convenience
store when they were approached by the officers. Id. at 109. Appellant
stated that he was reaching for identification at Sergeant Cole’s request
when she grabbed his arm and tried to grab his wallet. Id. at 112. She
informed him that she wanted to search him for weapons and he said “no.”
Id. at 115. He denied attempting to flee, saying he was trying “to move
myself from the situation.” Id. at 116. He attempted to leave but was
grabbed by the collar. Id. He stated he did not kick, hit or punch either
officer. Id.
The trial court, addressing the sufficiency of evidence, determined:
Although [Sergeant] Cole was unable to pinpoint the moment
when her finger was sprained, [Appellant’s] actions were
sufficient for a jury to convict him of simple assault. While
[Appellant] denied that he purposely harmed Sergeant Cole, the
jury, while passing upon the credibility of witnesses, is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence. See
Comm[onwealth] v. Cousar, 928 A.2d 1025, 1032-33 (Pa.
2007); see also Comm[onwealth] v. Laird, 988 A.2d 618,
[625] (Pa. 2010). The jury chose to believe the testimony of
Sergeant Cole and Officer Biricocchi, and it is not the [c]ourt’s
province to reexamine the factual determinations made by the
jury. Therefore, the testimony presented at trial was sufficient
for a conviction of Simple Assault.
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Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 10/13/16, at 6.
Based on our review of the record, we agree with the trial that the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
verdict winner, supports the verdict and establishes, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Appellant intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caused bodily
injury to Sergeant Cole. Appellant’s sufficiency claim fails.
In his second issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred by
excluding as irrelevant the fact Appellant’s resisting arrest charge was
dismissed prior to trial. As such, Appellant presents a challenge involving
admissibility of evidence. This Court has recognized that:
The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and we will not disturb an evidentiary ruling absent
an abuse of that discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely
an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or
misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will
or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.
Commonwealth v. Semenza, 127 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
The trial court explained:
[Appellant’s counsel] is correct in stating that in order to be
convicted for resisting arrest, the underlying arrest must be
lawful. Comm[onwealth] v. Biagini, 655 A.2d 492, 497 (Pa.
1995). However, the Court in Biagini stressed that physical
resistance to an arrest, whether or not it is supported by
probable cause, is not protected under the law. It held:
The determination that a police officer placed an individual
under arrest without probable cause is a legal
determination; it is an issue to be resolved in a courtroom,
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not on a street corner. Within a civilized society rules exist
to resolve disputes in an orderly and peaceful manner.
Physical resistance to a police officer is not only counter-
productive to the orderly resolution of controversy, but it is
also specifically prohibited by statute. 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 505(b)(1)(i). (The use of force is not justifiable to resist
an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace
officer, although the arrest is unlawful). Therefore,
defendants’ secondary premise, that an unlawful arrest
justifies physical resistance, is invalid. Id. at 497-98.
Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 10/13/16, at 7-8.
The trial court discussed relevance under Pa.R.E. 401 and concluded
that the legality of the underlying arrest was not relevant because Appellant
was not facing a resisting arrest charge at trial. Id. at 8. The trial court
determined:
The fact that the [resisting arrest] charge was dismissed had no
bearing on the legality of the remaining charges. The ultimate
issue in this case was whether [Appellant] used physical force
against officers, which would not have been warranted
notwithstanding the legality of the arrest. The fact did not tend
to make the ultimate issue any more or less probable, and even
if it was relevant, its introduction would only act to distract the
jury’s attention to a collateral issue which had no bearing on the
present charges.
Id. at 8-9.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling that excluded
evidence of the dismissed resisting arrest charge. Appellant’s second issue
fails.
Judgment affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/22/2017
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