MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 06 2017, 7:47 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Alan D. Wilson Matthew J. Elkin
Kokomo, Indiana Kokomo, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In re the Guardianship of: July 6, 2017
Helen Kinney Morris, Court of Appeals Case No.
34A02-1702-GU-264
Mary M. Kinney and Appeal from the Howard Superior
Patrick Kinney, Court
The Honorable Brant J. Parry,
Appellants-Respondents,
Judge
v. Trial Court Cause No.
34D02-1407-GU-23
Paul Kevin Kinney,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1702-GU-264 | July 6, 2017 Page 1 of 11
Case Summary and Issue
[1] Helen Kinney Morris is a ninety-year-old widow with six adult children:
Michael Kinney, Bridget Aaron, Paul Kevin Kinney (“Kevin”), Patrick Kinney,
Mary Kinney (“Molly”), and Gabrielle Kinney. In 2004, Helen executed a
durable power of attorney appointing Kevin and Molly as her attorneys in fact.
Years later, Helen developed dementia leading four of her children, Kevin,
Michael, Bridget, and Gabrielle, to believe a guardianship was necessary to care
for Helen. The trial court found Helen to be incapacitated and appointed all six
siblings as co-guardians over different areas of her life. Following a first appeal
by Molly and Patrick, we affirmed the trial court’s determination that Helen is
incapacitated but reversed and remanded with instructions for the trial court to
determine whether a guardianship is necessary in light of Helen’s 2004 durable
power of attorney, and, if so, to give consideration to the matters listed in
Indiana Code section 29-3-5-5 and Helen’s wishes. On remand, the trial court
entered a new order affirming its prior order establishing a guardianship. Molly
and Patrick again appeal, raising two issues for our review, which we
consolidate and restate as: whether the trial court abused its discretion in
establishing a guardianship. Concluding the trial court abused its discretion in
determining a guardianship is necessary, we reverse and remand with
instructions for the trial court to vacate its order establishing a guardianship
over Helen.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1702-GU-264 | July 6, 2017 Page 2 of 11
Facts and Procedural History
[2] We succinctly summarized the facts of this case in its prior appeal:
In March 2004, Helen executed a durable power of attorney
appointing two of her children—Kevin “or” Molly—as her
attorneys in fact. Helen selected Kevin because he had always
helped her with her business affairs and Molly because the two of
them were close. The power of attorney gave Kevin and Molly
powers with regard to real-property transactions; tangible
personal-property transactions; bond, share, and commodity
transactions; banking transactions; business-operating
transactions; insurance transactions; beneficiary transactions; gift
transactions; fiduciary transactions; claims and litigation; family
maintenance; benefits from military service; records, reports, and
statements; estate transactions; health-care powers; consent or
refusal of health care; delegating authority; and all other possible
matters and affairs affecting Helen’s property. The power of
attorney specifically provided that it was “not affected by the fact
that [Helen] might become incompetent hereafter, but shall
remain in full force and effect.”
Helen was later diagnosed with mild to moderate dementia.
Helen’s dementia has remained stable since around 2011 due to
medication. Helen has been able to stay in her home because of
around-the-clock help from family. This help has included
providing all meals for Helen, taking care of her home, helping
her bathe, doing her laundry, taking her to doctor appointments,
doing her shopping, paying her bills, and having someone spend
every night with her.
For most of Helen’s children’s lives, the family was close knit,
with each child having a good relationship with their mother.
But things changed after a tornado damaged Helen’s house in
November 2013 and the siblings disagreed on whether to
remodel Helen’s bathroom. The siblings took sides, with Molly
and Patrick believing that Helen’s bathroom did not need to be
remodeled and Michael, Bridget, Kevin, and Gabrielle believing
that it did. After speaking with Molly, Helen decided not to have
her bathroom remodeled. . . .
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1702-GU-264 | July 6, 2017 Page 3 of 11
On July 28, 2014, Kevin filed a petition to appoint guardians for
Helen because she “cannot care for herself nor make decisions on
her own behalf.” He asked the trial court to appoint him and
three of his siblings—Michael, Bridget, and Gabrielle—as co-
guardians. The trial court appointed a guardian ad litem, who
met with Helen as well as all six siblings. In its report, the
guardian ad litem noted that Helen did not want a guardian.
Although Helen recognized that she needed assistance, she was
“happy with Molly and Pat[rick] and the way they are caring for
her.” The guardian ad litem concluded that a guardianship was
not necessary because there was a valid power of attorney that
“seem[ed] to be working appropriately as it relates to Helen’s
care and her overall well being.” In the event that the court
appointed a guardian, however, the guardian ad litem
recommended “Molly and/or Pat[rick].”
The trial court held a hearing on Kevin’s guardianship petition in
August 2015. . . . Molly testified that although her mother had
memory problems and could not do a lot of things by herself—
like bathing, driving, yard work, shopping, cooking, and
laundry—she could take care of her affairs with assistance and do
other things by herself, like change her clothes, use the restroom,
brush her hair and teeth, and put on her glasses and hearing aids.
In contrast, the other four siblings testified that Helen’s memory
problems were worsening and had placed her in situations in
which she was endangered, that she could not take care of herself
or her business affairs by herself, that Molly and Patrick were
isolating Helen from them, and that they did not know anything
about their mother’s finances or health. The guardian ad litem
testified that although Helen was not able to take care of herself
or her business affairs without assistance, Helen was getting that
assistance from Molly and Patrick. . . .
In October 2015, the trial court issued an order in which it found
that Helen was incapacitated. Specifically, the court found that
Helen “is incapacitated for [the] reason that she cannot
adequately care for her person and estate without assistance.”
The court also found that guardians were necessary. In
determining what sibling to appoint as guardian, the court found
that the “foremost” consideration was Helen’s best interests and
welfare. The court also considered “Helen’s happiness in her
remaining years” and “the best way to attempt to repair the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1702-GU-264 | July 6, 2017 Page 4 of 11
family dynamic and the children’s relationships with Helen and
with each other.” Based on these considerations, the court found
that co-guardians—as opposed to one guardian—were necessary.
Accordingly, the court appointed all six siblings as co-guardians.
Each sibling was appointed guardian over a specific area of
Helen’s life. . . .
Molly and Patrick declined their appointments, and in January
2016 the trial court transferred Patrick’s guardianship
responsibilities to Kevin and Molly’s guardianship
responsibilities to Bridget, Gabrielle, and Michael.
In re Guardianship of Morris, 56 N.E.3d 719, 721-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
Thereafter, Molly and Patrick appealed. This court upheld the trial court’s
determination Helen is incapacitated but reversed and remanded with
instructions for the trial court to determine whether any guardians are necessary
in light of the 2004 power of attorney. Id. at 725. On remand, the trial court
held a hearing and later issued its order leaving its prior orders in full force and
effect. The trial court’s order stated as follows:
ORDER FOLLOWING APPELLATE DECISION
***
1. The Court of Appeals remanded this cause for the Court to
consider the priority of who may be considered for
appointment as guardian pursuant to I.C. 29-3-5-5,
including Helen’s wishes and her existing attorneys in fact
(Kevin and [Molly]).
2. The following are entitled to consideration for
appointment as a guardian under section 4 [IC 29-3-5-4] of
this chapter in the order listed:
(1) A person designated in a durable power of attorney.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1702-GU-264 | July 6, 2017 Page 5 of 11
***
(4) An adult child of an incapacitated person.
***
3. With respect to persons having equal priority, the court
shall select the person it considers best qualified to serve as
guardian. . . .
4. I.C. 20-3-5-4 indicates that “the Court shall appoint as
guardian a qualified person most suitable and willing to
serve . . .”
5. The first person to be considered would be a person who
has been appointed a power of attorney for the
incapacitated person. A person who has been appointed
power of attorney shall be appointed guardian unless good
cause or disqualification is shown.
6. In this case, Helen executed a durable power of attorney
naming both Kevin and [Molly] as her attorneys in fact.
Helen appointed both children as her attorneys in fact. It
is the Court’s opinion that Helen appointed them together
with the intention that they would work together as the
attorneys in fact.
7. Kevin and [Molly] are opposing parties in this cause of
action. Kevin indicated that he could attempt to
communicate with [Molly]. [Molly] indicated that she did
not believe that she and Kevin could communicate.
8. Additionally, since the initial disagreement concerning
Helen’s restroom and the subsequent fallout between the
siblings, Helen had virtually no contact with four of the
children. During this time, Helen was in the most contact
with [Molly] and Patrick. [Molly] and Patrick had
“control” over Helen, and during that period, Helen
ceased contact with her children that she had been very
close to for many decades.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1702-GU-264 | July 6, 2017 Page 6 of 11
9. It would not be in the best interest of the ward to force
Kevin and [Molly] to serve a[s] co-guardians over all
aspects of Helen’s life. Therefore, although they had been
named as co-attorneys in fact by Helen, the Court declines
to appoint them as co-guardians over Helen.
10. After considering Helen’s wishes and the existing
attorneys in fact, the Court determines that the Court’s
prior Orders of October 14, 2015 and January 25, 2016
shall remain in full force and effect.
Appendix to Appellants’ Brief, Volume II at 21-23 (citation omitted). Molly
and Patrick now appeal.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[3] All findings and orders of the trial court in guardianship proceedings are within
its discretion. In re Guardianship of V.S.D., 660 N.E.2d 1064, 1066 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1996). Thus, we will review those findings under an abuse of discretion
standard. Id. We will find an abuse of discretion only when the decision of the
trial court is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before the court, or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Id.
II. Necessity of the Guardianship
[4] As an initial matter, we address Molly and Patrick’s argument the trial court
failed to follow this Court’s decision on remand. See In re Guardianship of
Morris, 56 N.E.3d at 724-25. In Morris, the trial court established a
guardianship over Helen and appointed all six of her children as co-guardians.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1702-GU-264 | July 6, 2017 Page 7 of 11
Molly and Patrick appealed the trial court’s determination a guardianship was
necessary. We affirmed the trial court’s determination that Helen was
incapacitated; however, we also recognized “if an incapacitated person’s
attorney in fact is different than the person’s guardian, the attorney in fact
remains in control unless the trial court holds a hearing and orders the guardian
to revoke the power of attorney.” Id. at 724 (internal quotation and citation
omitted). On this point, we remanded the case for the trial court to determine
whether guardians are necessary in light of the fact Helen executed a valid
power of attorney and the “[co-]guardians do not have any power with respect
to Helen’s property and health care.” Id.
[5] On remand, the trial court issued an order stating, “The Court of Appeals
remanded this cause for the Court to consider the priority of who may be
considered for appointment as guardian . . . .” App. to Appellants’ Br., Vol. II
at 21. The trial court’s order only addresses who may be appointed guardian
and their priority, not whether a guardianship is necessary. Although the
priority of who may be appointed guardian is a determination the trial court
eventually may have to make, our opinion remanded this case for the trial court
to determine whether a guardian is necessary at all in light of the fact Helen
already executed a valid power of attorney and her attorneys in fact held all
authority with respect to her property and health care. The record and the trial
court’s order do not demonstrate the trial court considered whether a
guardianship is necessary consistent with our prior opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1702-GU-264 | July 6, 2017 Page 8 of 11
[6] In any event, we conclude a guardianship is not necessary in this case. Indiana
Code section 29-3-5-3(a) provides a trial court “shall appoint a guardian” if it
finds that (1) the person for whom the guardian is sought is an “incapacitated
person” and (2) the appointment of a guardian “is necessary as a means of
providing care and supervision of the physical person or property of the
incapacitated person.” However, in regard to the appointment of a guardian
when a power of attorney has already been executed, Indiana Code section 30-
5-3-4 states:
A guardian does not have power, duty, or liability with respect to
property or personal health care decisions that are subject to a
valid power of attorney. A guardian has no power to revoke or
amend a valid power of attorney unless specifically directed to
revoke or amend the power of attorney by a court order on behalf
of the principal. A court may not enter an order to revoke or
amend a power of attorney without a hearing. Notice of a
hearing held under this section shall be given to the attorney in
fact.
Ind. Code § 30-5-3-4(b) (1991). Therefore, if an incapacitated person’s attorney
in fact is different than that person’s guardian, the “attorney in fact remains in
control unless the trial court intervenes[,]” holds a hearing, and orders the
guardian to revoke the power of attorney. In re Guardianship of L.R., 908 N.E.2d
360, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
[7] The trial court’s order establishing a guardianship over Helen appointed all six
of her children as guardians. The trial court appointed Bridget as guardian over
Helen’s “health care needs and personal hygiene”; Molly as guardian over
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1702-GU-264 | July 6, 2017 Page 9 of 11
Helen’s personal finances; Michael, a priest, as guardian over Helen’s “spiritual
needs and affairs”;1 and Kevin and Patrick as co-guardians over Helen’s
“personal care and business affairs.” App. to Appellants’ Br., Vol. II at 45-46.
However, pursuant to Helen’s power of attorney, Molly and Kevin already hold
all authority and power with respect to Helen’s health care and property.
Helen’s power of attorney further states, “this Power of Attorney shall continue
in full force and effect until revoked. I further state that this Power of Attorney
shall not be affected by the fact that I might become incompetent hereafter, but
shall remain in full force and effect.” Id. at 24. Although the trial court had the
authority to order the guardians to revoke or amend Helen’s power of attorney
following a hearing, it did not do so, leaving Helen with two attorneys in fact
and six co-guardians, a situation which will only serve to create confusion and
further division among Helen’s children as to who holds actual authority with
respect to Helen’s needs and care. The current state of affairs essentially defeats
the purpose of a guardianship, as it would not serve the welfare of Helen.2
[8] Finally, we note the trial court was concerned with Molly’s testimony she did
not think she could work with Kevin as Helen’s co-attorneys in fact. Molly did
not resign or decline her designation as an attorney in fact, but stated she did
1
Gabrielle was appointed co-guardian over Helen’s spiritual needs and affairs because Michael lives in
Texas. See App. to Appellants’ Br., Vol. II at 46.
2
We note, as we did in our prior opinion, that it appears Helen sent a letter to Kevin in May of 2014
revoking his power of attorney. See In re Guardianship of Morris, 56 N.E.3d at 724 n.4. Helen then allegedly
executed a new power of attorney naming only Molly as her attorney in fact. However, both parties proceed
in this appeal as if the 2004 power of attorney naming Kevin or Molly as attorneys in fact is controlling.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1702-GU-264 | July 6, 2017 Page 10 of 11
not think she could work with Kevin “as a result of him bullying, trying to
intimidate, antagonizing me anytime we have an encounter.” Transcript,
Volume II at 17. Indiana Code section 30-5-4-3 authorizes the appointment of
more than one attorney in fact. It provides that unless the power of attorney
states otherwise, “if more than one (1) attorney in fact is named, each attorney
in fact may act independently of the other attorney in fact in the exercise of a
power or duty.” Ind. Code § 30-5-4-3(a). Therefore, unless and until Helen’s
2004 power of attorney is revoked or amended, all authority regarding her
property and health care lies with Kevin and Molly, who may act
independently of each other.
[9] We conclude the trial court’s determination that a guardianship is necessary,
without first revoking or amending Helen’s power of attorney, and appointment
of all six of Helen’s children as co-guardians is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.
Conclusion
[10] The trial court abused its discretion in establishing a guardianship over Helen.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to
vacate its order establishing a guardianship.
[11] Reversed and remanded.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1702-GU-264 | July 6, 2017 Page 11 of 11