MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 19 2017, 5:29 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
APPELLANTS, PRO SE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE,
John and Pamela Scuefield Bey PENNY MAC
Hammond, Indiana Nathan H. Blaske
Graydon Head & Ritchey LLP
Cincinnati, Ohio
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
John Scuefield, July 19, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
45A03-1601-MF-135
v. Appeal from the Lake Circuit
Court
Penny Mac Corporation, The Honorable George C. Paras,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
45C01-1307-MF-201
Pyle, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] John Scuefield (“Scuefield”) appeals the trial court’s order denying his and his
wife’s, Pamela Scuefield (“Pamela”), (collectively, “the Scuefields”) motion to
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set aside a default judgment that foreclosed the mortgage on their property.1 He
argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the Scuefields’
motion, but does not cite the relevant standard of review or provide any cogent
argument. Due to this violation of the Indiana Appellate Rules, as well as other
Appellate Rule violations, we conclude that he has waived his claims on
appeal.
[2] We Dismiss.
Issue
Whether Scuefield waived his claims by failing to provide cogent
argument and abide by the Appellate Rules.
Facts
[3] On June 18, 2007, the Scuefields executed a mortgage note (“Note”) on
property in Hammond (“the Property”) to Citicorp Trust Bank, FSB
(“Citicorp”) in exchange for a loan of $175,642.18.2 The Note provided that the
Scuefields were required to pay monthly payments of $1,291.53 to Citicorp and
that they would be considered in default on the loan if they did not pay the full
monthly payment by each due date. In the event of a default, Citicorp had the
1
Both Pamela and the title holder of the property at the time of the foreclosure proceedings, the Moorish
Science Temple of America, were parties below. Pamela signed Scuefield’s Appellant’s Brief on appeal but
never filed an appearance. The Moorish Science Temple of America did not file an appearance or submit a
brief. However, pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 17(A), “A party of record in the trial court . . . shall be a
party on appeal.”
2
The mortgage was recorded on June 28, 2007.
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right, pursuant to the Note, to send the Scuefields a written notice of default
requiring them to pay the overdue amount by a specified date. If the Scuefields
did not pay the overdue amount by that date, Citicorp had the right to require
the Scuefields to immediately pay the full balance of the unpaid principal of the
loan and all interest owed on that balance. However, it could not enforce that
right until 30 days after it mailed or delivered the notice of default to the
Scuefields.
[4] The Scuefields subsequently transferred the title to the Property to the Moorish
Science Temple of America (“MSTA”) on February 29, 2012 but continued to
pay the monthly installments owed under the mortgage until April 22, 2012.
After April 22, 2012, neither the Scuefields nor the MSTA made any further
payments. The outstanding principal balance as of April 22, 2012 was
$168,212.16. On July 23, 2012, Citicorp sent a written notice to the Scuefields,
notifying them that they were in default on the mortgage and that if they
“continue[d] in default for thirty (30) more days,” Citicorp could initiate a
foreclosure on the Property. (Appellee’s App. 56).
[5] Thereafter, Citibank, who had acquired rights to the Note through a merger
with Citicorp, assigned the Note to PennyMac on February 28, 2013. On July
25, 2013, PennyMac filed a complaint seeking to foreclose the mortgage on the
Property. The Scuefields did not respond to PennyMac’s complaint. On May
28, 2014, almost a year later, PennyMac moved for a default judgment under
Indiana Trial Rule 55(A). The trial court granted PennyMac’s motion for
default judgment on May 29, 2014, finding that the Scuefields were in default
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on the mortgage and had failed to answer or otherwise respond to PennyMac’s
complaint. The trial court determined that PennyMac was entitled to a
foreclosure decree and ordered that the Property be sold at a Sheriff’s sale.
[6] Around a month later, the Scuefields, pro se, filed a “litigation package” that
included an affidavit containing questions for PennyMac titled “30 Days to
Respond Administrative Remedy Affidavit” and a number of documents
referencing the MSTA, including an MSTA “Fraudulent Claim Notice,” a
“Fraudulent Document Notice,” an MSTA “Charter,” an MSTA “Assignment
and Beneficial Interest,” and an MSTA “Affidavit of Office Found.”
(Appellee’s App. 79-99). In the MSTA “Fraudulent Document Notice,” the
Scuefields argued that the mortgage on the Property was fraudulent, that the
Scuefields had “tax exemption and exclusionary status under 501(c)1,” and that
“[a]ny petitioners that has [sic] or will file for a tax deed is [sic] considered
fraudulent which transfers the title and the right to possession of this said
property violates trust laws [sic].” (Appellee’s App. 85). The nature of the rest
of the Scuefields’ MSTA documents is not clear. Several documents contain a
title page with no argument or substance.
[7] PennyMac filed a motion to strike the documents in the Scuefields’ “litigation
package,” arguing that they were “factually irrelevant,” “procedurally
improper,” and did not “set forth a genuine issue” that was before the court.
(Appellee’s App. 100-01). The trial court granted the motion to strike on
November 17, 2014.
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[8] The following February, the Property was sold at a Sheriff’s sale to PennyMac,
who was the highest bidder. The Sheriff issued an Indiana Sheriff’s Deed for
the Property to PennyMac on February 6, 2015.
[9] Subsequently, the Scuefields again filed several documents with the trial court.
They filed a “Fraudulent Document Notice,” an MSTA “Charter,” and a
Moslem Missionary “Warrant and Dispensation Affidavit.” (Appellee’s App.
109-12). Except for the “Fraudulent Document Notice,” which was identical to
the “Fraudulent Document Notice” the Scuefields had previously filed, the
nature of these documents is again unclear. PennyMac moved to strike the
documents, arguing that they contained “an insufficient claim or defense” and
“redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter,” and the trial court
granted the motion. (Appellee’s App. 115).
[10] Around a week later, on May 13, 2015, the Scuefields filed a “Motion to Vacate
Eviction and Request a Hearing for Wrongful Adjudication.” (Appellee’s App.
120). The trial court construed the motion as a motion to set aside judgment
and to stay eviction. It granted a stay of the eviction and set a hearing on the
motion to set aside judgment for August 13, 2015. In the meantime, the
Scuefields filed several more documents, which they titled “Affidavit and
Notice of Recission for Fraud,” “Response to Foreclosure, Substitution of
Party, Summary Judgment; and Appointment of Selling Officer (“Response to
Foreclosure”),” and an “Affidavit to Support Response to Foreclosure,
Substitution of Party, Summary Judgment; and Appointment of Selling
Officer.” (Appellee’s App. 124, 142, 143). In their “Affidavit and Notice of
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Recission for Fraud,” the Scuefields requested to “rescind” their signatures on
the Note. (Appellee’s App. 124). According to the Scuefields, Appendage H of
the Mortgage allowed them to “request [their] payments back, [their] interest,
taxes and upkeep.” (Appellee’s App. 124). In their “Response to Foreclosure,”
the Scuefields argued that they had the right to rescind their mortgage pursuant
to Section 226.3(h)(1)(ii) of the federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631
et seq (“TILA”). PennyMac filed a motion to strike the “Affidavit and Notice of
Recission for Fraud” under Trial Rule 12(F).
[11] The trial court held a hearing on the Scuefields’ motion to set aside judgment
and PennyMac’s motion to strike on August 13, 2015. At the hearing, the
Scuefields argued that the default judgment should be set aside because they
had rescinded their mortgage in June 2015 under the TILA. At one point,
PennyMac’s attorney asked Scuefield whether he would agree that, after
PennyMac’s foreclosure complaint had been filed in July 2013, he had been
served on August 1. Scuefield replied that he “wouldn’t disagree.” (Tr. 17). At
the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matters under advisement.
Then, on January 12, 2016, the trial court entered a general denial of the
Scuefields’ motion to set aside judgment, as well as an order granting
PennyMac’s motion to strike. Scuefield now appeals.
Decision
[12] On appeal, Scuefield appears to argue that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the Scuefields’ motion to set aside judgment. Specifically, he argues
that the “judgment of the Lake County Circuit Court should be reversed,” that
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he should receive “$97,158.98 [] in recoupment,” and that he should be able to
keep the Property.3 (Scuefield’s Br. 35). However, he does not specify any
procedural grounds for reversing the court or a standard of review we should
use.
[13] At the outset, we note that Scuefield has chosen to proceed pro se. It is well-
settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed
attorneys. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g
denied. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules
of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to
do so. Id. at 983-84. These consequences include waiver for failure to present
cogent argument on appeal. Id. at 984. While we prefer to decide issues on the
merits, where the appellant’s noncompliance with appellate rules is so
substantial as to impede our consideration of the issues, we may deem the
alleged errors waived. Id. We will not become “‘an advocate for a party, or
address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed
to be understood.’” Id. (quoting Perry v. Anonymous Physician 1, 25 N.E.3d 103,
106 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied, cert. denied).
[14] PennyMac asks that we deem Scuefield’s arguments waived because he fails to
cite to the record in his brief. We agree with PennyMac that Scuefield’s Brief
fails to sufficiently cite to the record, and we have found Scuefield’s allegations
3
Scuefield does not explicitly challenge the trial court’s grant of PennyMac’s motion to strike.
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difficult to discern due to his numerous additional violations of the Appellate
Rules. First, Scuefield’s Statement of the Facts section includes excessive
argument and conclusions, in violation of Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(6),
which “limits the statement of facts to a narrative description of the relevant
facts stated in accordance with the appropriate standard of review.” Second,
Scuefield’s Statement of the Case does not lay out the relevant procedural
posture of the case as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(5). In both of these
sections, Scuefield fails to cite to relevant portions of the record, which violates
Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A), sections 5 and 6(a). The result of these errors is
that it is difficult to discern the history of the case and to understand Scuefield’s
arguments. For example, Scuefield asserts that: “[On] 8/1/2013, [the
Scuefields] filed a fraudulent document affidavit, which went unrebutted. . . .
12/30/2014, [the Scuefields] filed another fraudulent document affidavit that
went unrebutted.” (Scuefield’s Br. 8). However, he does not provide any
citations to the record to support these claims; nor have we found any evidence
of these filings in the Chronological Case Summary.
[15] In addition, pursuant to Appellate Rule 50(A)(2), Scuefield was required to file
an Appendix including the “pleadings and other documents from the Clerk’s
Record in chronological order that are necessary for resolution of the issues
raised on appeal.” Scuefield filed an Appendix but failed to include many of
the necessary pleadings and documents, including documents such as the
original complaint and many of the Scuefields’ motions and the trial court’s
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orders. He also fails to cite to the portions of the record and Appendix he relies
upon in his Argument section, in violation of Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).
[16] Finally, and most importantly, Scuefield’s arguments are not cogent. Appellate
Rule 46(A)(8) lists the requirements for the Argument section of an Appellant’s
Brief, stating:
(8) Argument. This section shall contain the appellant’s
contentions why the trial court or Administrative Agency
committed reversible error.
(a) The argument must contain the contentions of the
appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent
reasoning. Each contention must be supported by
citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or
parts of the Record on Appeal relied on, in accordance
with Rule 22.
(b) The argument must include for each issue a concise
statement of the applicable standard of review. . . . In
addition, the argument must include a brief statement of
the procedural and substantive facts necessary for
consideration of the issues presented on appeal, including
a statement of how the issues relevant to the appeal were
raised and resolved by an Administrative Agency or trial
court.
Scuefield fails to identify how the trial court committed reversible error in
denying his Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside default judgment. Indeed, he
does not even mention Trial Rule 60(B) in his Appellant’s Brief or provide the
standard of review for a denial of a Trial Rule 60(B) motion. In addition, he
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fails to cite to the portions of the record and Appendix he relies upon in his
Argument section, in violation of Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).
[17] Scuefield’s failure to comply with the Appellate Rules, and especially to provide
cogent argument, impedes our ability to provide a meaningful review of his
claims. As a result, we conclude that he has waived all issues in this appeal.
Dickes v. Felger, 981 N.E.2d 559, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“A party waives an
issue where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate
citation to authority and portions of the record.”); See Ramsey v. Review Bd. of
Ind. Dep’t Workforce Dev., 486, 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Accordingly, we
dismiss this appeal.
[18] Dismissed.
Baker, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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