MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 31 2017, 6:31 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Brian A. Karle Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Ball Eggleston, PC Attorney General of Indiana
Lafayette, Indiana
Jesse R. Drum
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Nykie C. Edwards, July 31, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
79A04-1701-CR-42
v. Appeal from the
Tippecanoe Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Randy J. Williams,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
79D01-1502-F1-1
Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Nykie Edwards appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his
plea of guilty to Child Molesting as a Level 1 felony1 contending that the trial
court abused its discretion when it denied his motion. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] When Edwards was twenty-two years old, he lived at his girlfriend’s house and
had sexual intercourse with her thirteen-year old sister, S.M. The State charged
Edwards with three counts of felony child molesting on February 19, 2015.
[3] Edwards signed a plea agreement by which he agreed to plead guilty to one
count, the State agreed to dismiss the two remaining counts, and the executed
sentence was capped at thirty years. In the plea agreement, Edwards
acknowledged that he was satisfied with his attorney, that he was entering his
plea “freely and voluntarily, having been fully advised of his rights,” and that
he was “pleading guilty because he is guilty.” Appellant’s App. Vol II at 56.
[4] On April 26, 2016, the trial court conducted a hearing on the plea and reviewed
the plea agreement with Edwards. At the hearing, Edwards confirmed that he
understood the terms of the agreement, that no one had forced or threatened
him, and that by pleading guilty he was admitting that he had committed the
charged crime. The court found that Edwards understood “the nature of the
charge” and “the possible penalty for the crime” and that his plea was “made
1
See Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-221.5.
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freely and voluntarily and that there was a factual basis for the plea.” The court
accepted Edward’s plea and entered judgment of conviction. Tr. Vol II at 16.
[5] On June 30, 2016, Edwards moved to withdraw his plea. Following a hearing,
the trial court found that Edwards made his plea “freely and voluntarily” and
that “he admitted to the crime.” Appellant’s App Vol II at 80. Finding “no
manifest injustice,” the court denied Edward’s motion and sentenced him to
thirty-two years with four years suspended to probation. Id.
Decision
[6] In ruling on defendant’s motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, the trial court
should grant the withdrawal whenever the defendant proves that withdrawal is
“necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41,
44 (Ind. 2001). The trial court’s ruling is reviewable on appeal only for an
abuse of discretion. Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4.
[7] An appellant seeking to overturn a trial court’s decision faces a high hurdle
under the current statute and its predecessors. Coomer v. State, 652 N.E.2d 60, 62
(Ind. 1995). The trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
arrives in this Court with a presumption in favor of that ruling. Id. A defendant
has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence and with specific
facts that he should be permitted to withdraw his plea. Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(e),
Smith v. State, 596 N.E.257, 259 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
[8] Here, Edwards has failed to demonstrate any such injustice. He pleaded guilty
pursuant to a written plea agreement. At the hearing on his guilty plea on April
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26, 2016, Edwards admitted that he reviewed the guilty plea before he signed it.
The plea agreement that was filed with the court contained both Edwards’
signature and that of his attorney. In the agreement, Edwards admitted that he
had committed child molesting and that the decision to plead guilty was his
decision based upon his free choice.
[9] The trial court held a hearing on Edwards’ motion to withdraw and found that
Edwards failed to “present specific facts” to justify the withdrawal of the plea
agreement. Tr. Vol II at 80. At the hearing, Edwards claimed that he did not
have time to analyze the text and Facebook messages before trial, but the record
shows that Edwards was on notice of such messages long before his guilty plea.
Indeed, the probable cause affidavit which was filed on February 19, 2015
disclosed that Edwards had sent text messages to S.M., and the State listed cell
phone and Facebook records in its March 24, 2015 discovery disclosures.
Edwards admitted that his attorney had the messages and that Edwards had
reviewed them before entering his guilty plea.
[10] Edwards signed a plea agreement which stated that he was “pleading guilty
because he is guilty.” At his plea hearing, he testified that he understood that
he was admitting that he committed the charged crime and that he understood
he was pleading guilty to Level 1 felony child molesting and was doing so
knowingly.
[11] Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Edwards has not overcome
the presumption of validity of the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw
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his guilty plea, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Edwards’ motion.
Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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