J-A15033-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
KELSI JEAN ROBERTS : No. 966 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Dated May 10, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,
Criminal Division, No(s): CP-22-CR-0005992-2015
BEFORE: MOULTON, SOLANO and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JULY 31, 2017
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the Order granting
the Omnibus Pretrial Motion filed by Kelsi Jean Roberts (“Roberts”) to
suppress evidence obtained after her arrest. We reverse and remand.
The trial court set forth the relevant factual history as follows:
On June 27, 2015, at approximately 9:00 p.m.,
Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Robert E. Minnich [(“Trooper
Minnich”)] received a call to respond to a single vehicle crash in
the area of Grandview Avenue and Hoernerstown Road in South
Hanover Township, Dauphin County. Upon his arrival at the
scene, Trooper Minnich observed a disabled vehicle with right
front[-]end damage. Trooper Minnich observed a fresh mark on
the concrete wall [of] the nearby bridge[,] and debris in the
vicinity. Based upon his observations, Trooper Minnich
concluded that the vehicle had left its lane of travel on a curve
which approached the roadway and struck the bridge. The
driver of the vehicle, [] Roberts, was on a stretcher in the back
of an ambulance receiving treatment by medical personnel who
had placed her in a neck brace.
Trooper Minnich spoke to [Roberts] at the back of the
ambulance. He observed a golf ball-sized gouge on [Roberts’s]
head. In speaking with [Roberts], Trooper Minnich smelled a
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strong odor of alcohol. [Trooper Minnich] asked [Roberts] i[f]
she had been drinking, to which she responded affirmatively by
nodding her head. Trooper Minnich testified that [Roberts] was
crying, her response time [was] sluggish[,] and her speech
slightly slurred. Trooper Minnich was unable to speak with
[Roberts] further or perform field sobriety tests because the
ambulance transported her to the hospital.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/27/16, at 2-3 (unnumbered, citations omitted).
Roberts was subsequently arrested and charged with three counts of
driving under the influence (“DUI”), and the summary offense of failing to
safely operate her vehicle.1 On March 29, 2016, Roberts filed an Omnibus
Pretrial Motion wherein she argued that the police lacked probable cause to
arrest her for suspicion of DUI.2 Roberts requested that the trial court
suppress all additional evidence obtained by police as fruit of the poisonous
tree. On May 10, 2016, following a suppression hearing, the trial court
granted Roberts’s Motion.
The Commonwealth filed a timely Notice of Appeal. On June 21, 2016,
the trial court ordered the Commonwealth to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal within 21 days. The
Commonwealth did not comply with the trial court’s Order. On September
27, 2016, the trial court issued its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, without the
benefit of a concise statement. The Commonwealth thereafter filed a Motion
1
See 75 P.S. §§ 3802(a)(1), (b), (d)(1)(i) and 3309(1).
2
Roberts filed an amended Omnibus Pretrial Motion on April 20, 2016.
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for an extension of time to file a concise statement,3 and on October 20,
2016, filed its untimely Concise Statement. However, on October 21, 2016,
the trial court entered an Order returning the Concise Statement to the
Commonwealth based on the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following issues for our
review:
1. Whether the Commonwealth preserved its suppression issue
where it filed a [Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(b) [Concise] Statement, the
trial court addressed the merits of the issue in its [Pa.R.A.P.]
1925(a) Opinion, and there is no substantial impediment to
meaningful and effective appellate review?
2. Whether the [trial] court erred in granting [Roberts’s]
suppression Motion where law enforcement possessed
probable cause that [Roberts] was driving under the
influence[,] as she crashed her vehicle, admitted to drinking,
exhibited slow and sluggish movements, slurred speech, and
there was a strong odor of alcohol emanating from her
person?
Brief for the Commonwealth at 4 (some capitalization omitted).
In its first issue, the Commonwealth contends that, although it filed its
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement in an untimely manner, the trial court
addressed the issue raised therein in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion. Brief for
the Commonwealth at 10. The Commonwealth asserts that, because the
trial court provided meaningful review of the issue raised in its Concise
Statement, it has been properly preserved for our review. Id.
3
Our review of the docket reflects that the trial court did not rule on the
Commonwealth’s Motion.
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Here, as the trial court addressed the sole issue raised by the
Commonwealth in its untimely Concise Statement, we decline to find waiver,
and it is unnecessary to remand. See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 81
A.3d 103, 104 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding that, “if the trial court accepts
an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement and addresses the issues raised in its
Rule 1925(a) opinion, we will not determine the issues to be waived.”); see
also Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 433 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en
banc) (holding that “[w]hen counsel has filed an untimely Rule 1925(b)
statement and the trial court has addressed those issues[,] we need not
remand and may address the merits of the issues presented.”).
In its second issue, the Commonwealth contends that Trooper Minnich
possessed probable cause that Roberts was driving under the influence of
alcohol based on the following: the occurrence of a single-vehicle accident
during the night-time hours on a clear road; the odor of alcohol on Roberts’s
breath and person; Robert’s crying and disheveled appearance, slurred
speech and sluggish speech; and Roberts’s admission to consuming alcohol.
Brief for the Commonwealth at 13.
Our standard of review of a trial court’s order granting a motion to
suppress evidence is well established. When the Commonwealth appeals
from a suppression order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and
consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the
evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the record,
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remains uncontradicted. See Commonwealth v. Petty, 157 A.3d 953, 955
(Pa. Super. 2017). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has clarified that the
scope of review for a suppression issue is limited to the record available to
the suppression court. See In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1085, 1089 (Pa.
2013). Moreover, “[t]he suppression court’s findings of fact bind an
appellate court if the record supports those findings. The suppression
court’s conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court,
whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law
to the facts.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 56 A.3d 1276, 1278-79 (Pa.
Super. 2012) (citations omitted).
Probable cause for a DUI arrest is present when a police officer has
sufficient facts at his disposal to warrant a prudent person to believe that
the driver of a vehicle is under the influence of alcohol. See
Commonwealth v. Angel, 946 A.2d 115, 118 (Pa. Super. 2008). The
probable cause determination is made based upon the totality of the
circumstances, and “a police officer may utilize both his experience and
personal observations to render an opinion as to whether a person is
intoxicated.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 27 (Pa. Super.
2008) (citation omitted).
Here, Trooper Minnich testified that, on the evening in question, he
was called to respond to a single-vehicle accident in which Roberts’s vehicle
had left the roadway and struck a bridge. See N.T., 5/10/16, at 4-5.
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Trooper Minnich testified that, upon his arrival at the accident scene, Roberts
was in the back of an ambulance receiving medical attention. See id. at 9.
When Trooper Minnich approached the ambulance to speak with Roberts, he
smelled a strong odor of alcohol emanating from her person. See id. at 11,
12-13; N.T., 10/26/15, at 20. Trooper Minnich testified that Roberts
admitted to consuming alcohol prior to the accident. See N.T., 5/10/16, at
13; N.T., 10/26/15, at 21. Furthermore, Trooper Minnich testified that,
when responding to his questions, Roberts’s responses were slow, and her
speech was slurred. See N.T., 5/10/16, at 28. Based on his observations,
and his standardized field sobriety training, Trooper Minnich determined that
Roberts was impaired, and not capable of safely operating a motor vehicle.
See N.T., 10/26/15, at 20, 36.
Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Trooper
Minnich had probable cause to arrest Roberts for suspected driving under
the influence. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1), (b); see also Angel, 946
A.2d at 118 (holding that probable cause existed to arrest a driver for DUI
where the driver emitted an odor of alcohol, and had slurred speech and
glassy eyes); Commonwealth v. Hilliar, 943 A.2d 984, 994 (Pa. Super.
2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest a driver for DUI where
the driver smelled of alcohol and his speech was slurred). Accordingly, the
trial court’s conclusion to the contrary was an error of law. We therefore
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reverse the Order granting Roberts’s Omnibus Pretrial Motion, and remand
for further proceedings.4
Order vacated; case remanded for further proceedings. Superior Court
jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/31/2017
4
Upon remand, we further direct the trial court to conduct an analysis,
pursuant to Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), to
determine whether Roberts’s consent to have her blood drawn at the
hospital was knowing and voluntary.
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