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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
LUIS M. SOTO
Appellant No. 61 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 4, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007170-2013
CP-51-CR-0007171-2013
CP-51-CR-0007172-2013
CP-51-CR-0007173-2013
BEFORE: MOULTON, J., RANSOM, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: Filed August 1, 2017
Luis M. Soto appeals from the December 4, 2015 judgment of
sentence entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas
following his convictions for third-degree murder, carrying a firearm without
a license, carrying a firearm on the streets of Philadelphia, possessing an
instrument of crime ("PIC"), and three counts of aggravated assault -
causing serious bodily injury.' Soto's appellate counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and a petition to
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c), 6106(a)(1), 6108, 907(a), and 2702(a)(1),
respectively.
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withdraw from representation. We affirm and grant counsel's petition to
withdraw. We also dismiss Soto's claims for ineffective assistance of counsel
without prejudice.
The trial court summarized the factual history of this matter as
follows:
On April 9, 2013, in the late afternoon hours, a large
crowd of people gathered at Water and Somerset Streets
in Philadelphia. A fight subsequently broke out between
several female members of this crowd, when three
unknown women attacked Ashley Soberal. Amanda
Martinez, the decedent, was amongst the crowd, watching
the fight. After the fight, [Soto] and an unnamed friend
had a conversation in a nearby lot on Somerset Street with
Madeline Soberal, the mother of the girl who had been
attacked.2 There was a large crowd of people in the lot at
this time. While [Soto], his friend and Madeline Soberal
were talking, [Soto] had his hands in the area of his waist,
as if he was in possession of a firearm. Madeline Soberal
believed that [Soto] and his friend were responsible for the
three women attacking her daughter. After she asked
[Soto]'s friend multiple times whether he got the three
women to "jump" Madeline Soberal's daughter, [Soto]'s
friend admitted that he did so. Right after that admission,
someone from the crowd came from behind her and
punched [Soto]'s friend in the face. After his friend was
punched, [Soto] drew a firearm and began shooting
multiple times at the crowd. As [Soto] fired, the crowd
began to flee the area. Madeline Soberal took cover
behind a Buick where she encountered Amanda Martinez,
who had been struck by a bullet and who asked Soberal to
stay with her. Soberal told Martinez that she would stay
with her until an ambulance arrived. As [Soto] left the
area, he was still in possession of the firearm.
2 [Soto] was also identified as "Bebe."
Police responded at approximately 5:50 p.m. Upon
arriving at the scene, police encountered a chaotic crowd
of over 100 people and attempted to locate any victims,
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finding Martinez laying in a pool of blood. Martinez was
placed into a private vehicle and rushed to Episcopal
Hospital. Martinez was later pronounced dead at the
hospital, having suffered a gunshot wound which
penetrated her chest, heart, and lungs. Police also
identified Jose Torres, Carl Walden and Larry Robinson as
shooting victims. Torres had been shot twice in the groin
area. Walden had been shot in his right leg.3 Both Torres
and Walden were transported to Temple University
Hospital for medical care. Robinson was transported to
Episcopal Hospital by private vehicle, where he was treated
for a gunshot wound to his stomach.
3 Walden was also identified as "Panama."
Seven .40 caliber Smith & Wesson fired cartridge
casings were recovered at the scene. Police also recovered
two bullet specimens, a bullet jacket, and a bullet core.
Subsequent analysis showed that the bullets and bullet
jacket were all fired from the same firearm. All seven
cartridge casings were also fired from the same weapon.
Opinion, 2/24/16, at 2-4 ("1925(a) Op.") (internal citations omitted).
On August 31, 2015, a jury convicted Soto of the aforementioned
charges. On December 4, 2015, the trial court sentenced Soto to an
aggregate term of 50 to 100 years' incarceration. On December 9, 2015,
Soto filed a timely notice of appeal.2
2 On December 18, 2015, Soto filed a statement of matters
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(b). On May 13, 2016, Soto's counsel, who also represented
him at trial, filed a motion to withdraw. On June 6, 2016, this Court granted
the motion, and directed the trial court to determine Soto's eligibility for
court -appointed counsel within 60 days. On July 15, 2016, the trial court
appointed Gary S. Server, Esquire, as Soto's appellate counsel.
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Because counsel has filed a petition to withdraw pursuant to Anders
and its Pennsylvania counterpart, Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d
349 (Pa. 2009), we must address counsel's petition before reviewing the
merits of Soto's underlying claims. Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d
287, 290 (Pa.Super. 2007). We first address whether counsel's petition to
withdraw satisfies the procedural requirements of Anders. To be permitted
to withdraw, counsel must:
1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that,
after making a conscientious examination of the record,
counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous;
2) furnish a copy of the brief to the defendant; and 3)
advise the defendant that he or she has the right to retain
private counsel or raise additional arguments that the
defendant deems worthy of the court's attention.
Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en
banc).
Here, appellate counsel has stated that after a "thorough and
conscientious examination of the record," he believes "that this appeal in its
present procedural posture is wholly frivolous and without support in the law
or the facts." Mot. to Withdraw, 11/3/16, at 1. Appellate counsel furnished
a copy of the Anders brief to Soto, as well as a letter advising him that he
had "the right to personally participate in the appeal and to file a writing of
your own with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. You may also hire
counsel to represent you and to file whatever is deemed appropriate to
protect your interests." Ltr. to Soto, 10/31/16. We conclude that counsel's
petition to withdraw has complied with the procedural dictates of Anders.
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We next address whether counsel's Anders brief meets the
requirements established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago.
The brief must:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts,
with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the
record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal;
(3) set forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is
frivolous; and (4) state counsel's reasons for concluding
that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the
relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or
statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the
appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
Here, appellate counsel has provided a summary of the procedural
history and the facts with appropriate citations to the record. Anders Br. at
8-19. Counsel's brief states that he conducted a thorough and objective
review of the record and concluded that the record does not support the
appeal and that the appeal is frivolous, while setting forth his reasons for his
conclusion. Anders Br. at 22. Accordingly, appellate counsel has
substantially complied with the requirements of Anders and Santiago.
Soto has not filed a pro se brief or a counseled brief with new,
privately -retained counsel. We, therefore, review the issues raised in the
Anders brief.
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The following issues3 were raised in the Anders brief:
Specific issues raised by [Soto] on direct appeal
[1.] Whether the court erred mistrial
by not granting a
when the Commonwealth's witness referenced the criminal
history and dangerousness of [Soto].
[2.] Whether the Commonwealth's evidence and
argument about fear and danger was inappropriate and
prejudicial since there was absolutely no evidence that
[Soto] or anyone associated to him had any contact with
any witness or engaged in any intimidation.
[3.] Whether the admission of a text to a witnesses]
daughter was error because it was not related to [Soto] or
to anyone associated with [Soto].
[4.] Whether Detective [David] Schmidt's testimony
regarding a 911 recording that said the "man responsible
for the shooting owned the vehicle" where the vehicle in
question was [Soto]'s vehicle should have been excluded
as inadmissible hearsay.
Issues that could have been raised by [Soto] on direct
appeal but were not
[5.] Whether [Soto] was provided with ineffective
assistance of counsel where trial counsel:
1. Failed to file post sentence motions
challenging the weight of the evidence or the
discretionary aspects of sentencing;
2. Conducted cross-examinations of
Commonwealth witnesses that had them
Soto also raises a "global question" that reads as follows: "Whether
3
there is anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal that
obviates a conclusion that the appeal is frivolous." Anders Br. at 6. We will
not address Soto's "global question" as it does not raise a specific issue for
our review.
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repeat damaging inculpatory evidence over
and over again;
3. Engaged in conduct that was disrespectful
and disobedient to the court before the jury;
4. Engaged in loud, arrogant, angry and
badgering examinations of witnesses.
[6.] Whether [Soto]'s convictions for third degree murder
and aggravated assault -causing serious bodily injury were
against the weight and credibility of the evidence.
[7.] Whether [Soto]'s convictions for third degree murder
and aggravated assault -causing serious bodily injury were
based upon insufficient evidence.
Anders Br. at 6-7 (full capitalization and answers below omitted).
First, Soto contends the trial court erred in denying his request for a
mistrial after one of the Commonwealth's witnesses referenced Soto's
criminal history and "dangerousness."
Our standard of review of a trial court's refusal to grant a motion for a
mistral is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Commonwealth v.
Savage, 602 A.2d 309, 312 (Pa. 1992). The Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he remedy of a mistrial is an extreme one. .It is
. .
primarily within the trial court's discretion to determine
whether Appellant was prejudiced by the event that forms
the substance of the motion. Finally, it must be
remembered that a mistrial is required only when an
incident is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to
deprive the appellant of a fair and impartial trial.
Commonwealth v. Lease, 703 A.2d 506, 508 (Pa.Super. 1997) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 626 A.2d 109, 112-13 (Pa. 1993)).
Furthermore,
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[a] trial court may remove taint caused by improper
testimony through curative instructions. Courts must
consider all surrounding circumstances before finding that
curative instructions were insufficient and the extreme
remedy of a mistrial is required. The circumstances which
the court must consider include whether the improper
remark was intentionally elicited by the Commonwealth,
whether the answer was responsive to the question posed,
whether the Commonwealth exploited the reference, and
whether the curative instruction was appropriate.
Commonwealth v. Manley, 985 A.2d 256, 266-67 (Pa.Super. 2009)
(quotation and internal citations omitted).
Here, while on cross-examination, Commonwealth witness Madeline
Soberal asked Soto's counsel whether he had checked Soto's background.
1925(a) Op. at 5. She then stated that she feared for her family and
children. Id. Soto's counsel requested a mistrial at the next break, claiming
that Soberal had effectively revealed Soto's criminal background with her
statements. Id. at 6. The trial court found:
The record establishes that a mistrial was not required.
Soberal's question about [Soto]'s background was not
elicited by the Commonwealth, but by [Soto]'s attorney
during a heated cross-examination. Additionally, the
Commonwealth did not exploit the challenged testimony in
any manner. Finally, the Court immediately gave a
curative instruction to the jury, directing them to disregard
the statement. Under these circumstances, it is clear that
Soberal's brief reference to [Soto]'s "background" did not
have the unavoidable effect of denying [Soto] a fair trial.
Accordingly, the Court correctly denied [Soto]'s motion for
mistrial.
Id. at 6 (internal citations omitted). We agree. Accordingly, we conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Soto's request for
a mistrial.
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Next, Soto contends that "the Commonwealth's evidence about fear
and danger was inappropriate and prejudicial since there was absolutely no
evidence that [Soto] or anyone associated to him" contacted or intimidated
witnesses. Anders Br. at 34. Specifically, this claim refers to evidence
regarding a post to the social media website Instagram.
The trial court described the post as follows:
During the first day of testimony, the Commonwealth
informed the Court that its witness Madeline Soberal had
seen a copy of an online posting, which she believed to be
threatening in nature. N.T. 8/26/15 at 193-194. In
particular, Soberal's daughter forwarded to Soberal a
posting on Instagram by [Soto]'s brother-in-law stating
the following:
On my way to support my boy, bebesky
[[Soto]'s nickname]!!! Its crazy how they
charging my boy 4suming [sic] he aint even
do, its cool doe [sic] cuz we about to rumble n
god [sic] his BACK...
N.T. 8/26/15 at 223, Commonwealth Exhibit C-87.
Because of the alleged threat, the Commonwealth
requested that the Court exclude all spectators from the
courtroom for the duration of Soberal's testimony. The
defendant objected to any members of the public being
excluded. Therefore, the Court held an in camera hearing
to determine if closure of the courtroom during Soberal's
testimony was permissible. Following the hearing, the
Court denied the Commonwealth's request to close the
courtroom.
1925(a) Op. at 7-8 (internal citations omitted) (some alterations in original).
Soberal then testified, during which the Commonwealth inquired about the
post. After some discussion between counsel and the trial court, the court
allowed the assistant district attorney ("ADA") trying the case to read the
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Instagram post into the record. N.T., 8/26/15, at 300-04. Defense counsel
requested that the entirety of the post be read aloud. Id. at 302. After the
ADA began to read, defense counsel objected to his "mannerisms" and
requested that another party read the post; however, defense counsel made
clear that he was not objecting to the contents of the post being read. Id.
at 304. Thereafter, the court allowed the ADA to read the remainder of the
post.
Because defense counsel did not make a contemporaneous objection
to the admission of the Instagram post into evidence, this issue is waived.
See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) ("Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."). Soto's similar claim
regarding the Commonwealth's closing argument, in which "the prosecutor
referred to the Instagram posting and Soberal's fearful reaction to it[,]"
1925(a) Op. at 9, is also waived, because defense counsel did not make a
contemporaneous objection. Commonwealth v. Powell, 956 A.2d 406,
423 (Pa. 2008) ("The absence of a contemporaneous objection below
constitutes a waiver of appellant's current claim respecting the prosecutor's
closing argument.").
Soto next contends that the trial court erred in admitting a text
message sent to Soberal's daughters. Appellate counsel concedes in his
Anders brief that he "has absolutely no idea what [Soto] is raising here."
Anders Br. at 36. It appears the "text" in question may be the same thing
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as the Instagram post. In any event, because Soto did not object to the
admission of any text messages at trial, he has waived this claim. See
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
Soto next claims that the police detective's testimony regarding a 911
call, which identified the shooter as the owner of a vehicle found at the
scene, should have been excluded. The trial court stated:
To the extent that [Soto] is claimingthat the admission
of the testimony regarding the 9-1-1 caller was error, his
claim is frivolous. [Soto] objected to this testimony and
the Court immediately sustained the objection, struck the
evidence, and directed the jury to disregard it. N.T.
8/27/15 at 161-162. Accordingly, the challenged
evidence was never admitted by the Court.
Later in the trial, [Soto] moved for a mistrial based on
the Detective's testimony regarding the 9-1-1 statement.
N.T. 8/27/15 at 217-218. To the extent that [Soto] is
attempting (without saying so) to challenge the Court's
decision denying his motion for a mistrial, his claim is
without merit. As stated above, a mistrial is only required
"when an incident is of such a nature that its unavoidable
effect is to deprive defendant of a fair trial." Here, the
Detective made a momentary reference to an out -of -court
statement on a 9-1-1 tape to explain his course of
conduct, that is, why the police searched the vehicle at the
scene of the shooting in which evidence was recovered
that tended to prove that [Soto] was in the area at the
time of the shooting. An out -of -court statement offered
not for its truth, but rather to explain the course -of -
conduct of police, is admissible, particularly where, as
here, the defense had attacked the adequacy of the police
investigation. See Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d
501, 532-534 (Pa. 2005). However, under the
circumstances presented, the Court deemed the potential
for the jury to consider the statement for an improper
purpose, that is, as proof that the shooter was seen driving
a Buick, to outweigh its non -hearsay probative value. For
that reason, the Court immediately not only struck the
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evidence, but explicitly admonished the jury to disregard
it. Under these circumstances, the jury's brief exposure to
the arguably admissible evidence could not have deprived
defendant of a fair trial. No relief is due. See
[Commonwealth v. Manley, 985 A.2d 256 266-67
(Pa.Super. 2009)]; [Commonwealth v. Freeman], 827
A.2d 385, 409 (Pa. 2003).
1925(a). Op. at 9-10 (emphasis added). Because the trial court, in fact,
excluded the detective's testimony, we conclude that Soto's claim lacks
merit.
Next, Soto claims that his trial counsel was ineffective on four separate
bases. However, it is well -settled that "absent certain circumstances, 'claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be deferred to [Post Conviction
Relief Act] review; trial courts should not entertain claims of ineffectiveness
upon post -verdict motions; and such claims should not be reviewed upon
direct appeal.' Commonwealth v. Harris, 114 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa.Super. 2015)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 576 (Pa. 2013)); see
also Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002) ("[A]s a
general rule, a petitioner should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel until collateral review."). Accordingly, because circumstances
warranting review of Soto's ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal do not
exist, we dismiss Soto's ineffectiveness claims without prejudice. See
Grant, 813 A.2d at 739 (dismissing appellant's claims of ineffectiveness of
counsel without prejudice).
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Finally, we conclude that Soto has waived his weight of the evidence
and sufficiency of the evidence claims because he did not raise them in his
Rule 1925(b) statement. Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa.
1998) ("Any issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed
waived."). In addition, Soto did not raise his challenge to the weight of the
evidence with the trial judge. Commonwealth v. Gillard, 850 A.2d 1273,
1277 (Pa.Super. 2004) ("As noted in the comment to [Pennsylvania Rule of
Criminal Procedure] 607 [regarding challenges to the weight of the
evidence], '[t]he purpose of this rule is to make it clear that a challenge to
the weight of the evidence must be raised with the trial judge or it will be
waived.") (some alterations in original)..
Even if Soto had not waived his challenge to the weight of the
evidence supporting his convictions for third-degree murder and aggravated
assault, this challenge is meritless. This Court reviews a weight of the
evidence claim for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Clay, 64
A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013). "One of the least assailable reasons for
granting or denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that the
verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence . . . ." Id.
(quoting Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000)).
"Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the
evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to
the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial
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court's determination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence."
Id. (quoting Widmer, 744 A.2d at 753).
In the Anders brief, counsel offers two bases for challenging the
weight of the evidence: 1) that the "eyewitnesses were not in a good
position to make an identification" or "were so overcome with fear as to be
incapable of making an accurate identification"; and 2) that the witnesses
who identified Soto made an excessive amount of inconsistent statements.
Anders Br. at 24. However, as the fact -finder, the jury was free to credit
the witnesses' testimony as they saw fit. See Commonwealth v. Page, 59
A.3d 1118, 1130 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Price, 616
A.2d 681, 685 (Pa.Super. 1992)) ("A determination of credibility lies solely
within the province of the factfinder."); Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 860
A.2d 102, 107 (Pa.Super. 2004) ("The weight of the evidence is exclusively
for the finder of fact, which is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence, and to assess the credibility of the witnesses.").
Further, even if Soto had not waived his challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting his convictions for third-degree murder and
aggravated assault, we would find it meritless. We apply the following
standard when reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim:
[W]hether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the
light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is
sufficient evidence to enable the fact -finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for the fact -finder. In
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addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact -finder unless
the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain
its burden of proof or proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above
test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence
actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of
fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Lehman, 820 A.2d 766, 772 (Pa.Super. 2003) (quoting
Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574, 582 (Pa.Super. 2001)).
This Court has previously discussed the elements of third-degree
murder:
The elements of third-degree murder, as developed by
case law, are a killing done with legal malice but without
the specific intent to kill required in first -degree murder.
Malice is the essential element of third degree murder and
is the distinguishing factor between murder and
manslaughter. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
defined malice in the following terms:
"The distinguishing criterion of murder is
malice aforethought. But it is not malice in its
ordinary understanding alone, a particular ill -
will, a spite or a grudge. Malice is a legal term,
implying much more. It comprehends not only
a particular ill -will, but every case where there
is wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart,
cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a
mind regardless of social duty, although a
particular person may not be intended to be
injured. Murder, therefore, at common law
embraces cases where no intent to kill existed,
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but where the state or frame of mind termed
malice, in its legal sense, prevailed."
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 527 Pa. 511, 514, 594 A.2d
300, 301 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Drum, 58
Pa. 9, 15 (1868). Accordingly, it has been observed that
malice may be found where the actor consciously
disregard[s] an unjustified and extremely high risk that his
actions might cause death or serious bodily harm. Malice
may be inferred from the attending circumstances of the
act resulting in the death. Malice is properly implied when
a deadly weapon is directed to a vital part of the [victim's]
body. Indeed, the inference from the use of a deadly
weapon upon a vital part of the body alone is sufficient to
establish malice.
Commonwealth v. Cruz -Centeno, 668 A.2d 536, 539-40 (Pa.Super.
1995) (some internal quotations omitted) (alterations and emphasis in
original).
The evidence shows that Soto intentionally drew a firearm and began
shooting into a large crowd of people, killing one person and injuring three
others. His actions demonstrate a disregard for the unjustified and
extremely high risk that those actions might cause death or serious bodily
harm, thereby satisfying the requirement of malice. Thus, the evidence was
sufficient to support his conviction for third-degree murder.
We next turn to Soto's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his convictions for aggravated assault - causing serious bodily
injury. This Court has stated:
Under the Crimes Code, a person may be convicted of
aggravated assault, . .if he or she "attempts to cause
.
serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
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life." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). Serious bodily injury is
further defined by the Crimes Code as "bodily injury which
creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious,
permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment
of the function of any bodily member or organ." 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.
Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 661 (Pa.Super. 2007). Here, the
evidence shows that Soto shot Jose Torres once in the right groin and once
in the left buttocks, Carl Walden once in the right femur, and Larry Robinson
once in the stomach. Because these are all serious bodily injuries, we
conclude the evidence was sufficient to support Soto's aggravated assault
convictions.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Ineffective assistance of counsel
claims dismissed without prejudice. Petition for leave to withdraw as
counsel granted.
Judgment Entered.
J seph D. Seletyn,
Prothonotary
Date: 8/1/2017
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