IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-1874
Filed August 2, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SHIRLEY PHILLIPS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William A. Price,
District Associate Judge.
The defendant challenges her sentences for two counts of operating while
intoxicated, in violation of Iowa Code 321J.2 (2015). AFFIRMED.
Raya D. Dimitrova of Carr & Wright, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.
Shirley Phillips pleaded guilty to two counts of operating while intoxicated,
in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2015). The record reflects the second
offense occurred after the defendant absconded after being charged with the first
offense. The district court sentenced the defendant to one year of incarceration
for each conviction, said sentences to be served consecutively. On appeal, the
defendant contends the district court abused its discretion in imposing sentence.
Specifically, the district court failed to take into consideration the nonviolent
nature of the offense and the fact the defendant took responsibility for her actions
by pleading guilty.
Where, as here, the sentences fall within statutory limits, the sentences
are cloaked with a strong presumption of regularity, and we will not vacate the
sentences absent an abuse of discretion. See State v. Floyd, 466 N.W.2d 919,
924 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). To establish an abuse of discretion, the defendant
must show the sentencing court exercised its discretion “on grounds or for
reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Privitt,
571 N.W.2d 484, 486 (Iowa 1997). “In exercising its discretion, the district court
is to weigh all pertinent matters in determining a proper sentence, including the
nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the defendant’s age,
character, and propensities or chances for reform.” State v. Johnson, 513
N.W.2d 717, 719 (Iowa 1994).
The defendant has failed to overcome the strong presumption of regularity
afforded the sentences. The sentencing proceedings were not reported. We
have no record regarding the mitigating factors actually presented to the district
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court at the time of sentencing. In any event, although “[a] sentencing court has
a duty to consider all the circumstances of a particular case,” it is not “required to
specifically acknowledge each claim of mitigation urged by a defendant.” State v.
Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (citing State v. Robbins, 257
N.W.2d 63, 70 (Iowa 1977)). “Furthermore, the failure to acknowledge a
particular sentencing circumstance does not necessarily mean it was not
considered.” Id. Here, the sentencing order provides the district court
considered the following in imposing sentence: the nature and circumstances of
the crime, the protection of the public, the defendant’s criminal history, the
defendant’s substance abuse history, the defendant’s propensity for further
criminal acts, and statutory sentencing requirements. These are all relevant and
permissible sentencing considerations. See Johnson, 513 N.W.2d at 719. The
district court was also required to provide reasons for the imposition of
consecutive sentences. See State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Iowa 2016).
Here, the district court stated it imposed consecutive sentences because of the
defendant’s criminal history (her third and fourth lifetime OWIs) and because the
defendant absconded after being charged. These are permissible reasons for
imposing consecutive sentences.
We affirm the defendant’s sentences without further opinion. See Iowa Ct.
R. 21.26(1)(a), (e).
AFFIRMED.