In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-16-00217-CR
CLIFFORD JAMES GAYTON, JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 102nd District Court
Bowie County, Texas
Trial Court No. 16F0596-102
Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Burgess
MEMORANDUM OPINION
When police and emergency personnel responded to a 9-1-1 call seeking assistance at the
apartment of Frances Lucas, they found her two-year-old son, David,1 cold and not breathing.
While emergency personnel were unsuccessfully attempting to revive David, two of the police
officers learned from Lucas’ boyfriend, Clifford James Gayton, Jr., that Lucas’ one-year-old
daughter, Mary, was in a bedroom. When they checked on Mary, they found her awake, but not
responding normally. After removing a blanket, the officers saw that Mary had red bruises and
discoloration on her chest and entire abdomen, similar to the bruises found on David.
Consequently, Gayton, who was responsible for the children while Lucas was at work, was charged
with causing the death of David and with injuring Mary.
In a consolidated trial, Gayton was convicted by a Bowie County jury of capital murder 2
and injury to a child3 and was assessed punishments of life imprisonment without parole and ten
years’ imprisonment, respectively. In this appeal,4 Gayton challenges the legal sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his conviction of injury to a child. Because we find legally sufficient evidence
supports the jury’s verdict, we will affirm the trial court’s judgment.
1
We will refer to the minor victims and their immediate family members by pseudonyms pursuant to Rule 9.10(a)(3)
of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(a)(3).
2
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1) (West 2011), § 19.03(a)(8) (West Supp. 2016).
3
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(3) (West Supp. 2016).
4
In a separate appeal to this Court, Gayton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his capital murder
conviction. That appeal is addressed in an opinion released the same date as this opinion, under our cause number 06-
16-00218-CR. Gayton filed a consolidated brief addressing both appeals.
2
We set forth the evidence introduced at trial in our opinion addressing the appeal of
Gayton’s capital murder conviction, our case number 06-16-00218-CR, released the same date as
this opinion. Therefore, we will not repeat them in this opinion.
I. Legally Sufficient Evidence Supports the Jury’s Verdict
In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); Hartsfield
v. State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d). Our rigorous review
focuses on the quality of the evidence presented. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J.,
concurring). Legal sufficiency is reviewed under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving
deference to the responsibility of the jury “to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Hooper v. State,
214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19); Clayton v. State,
235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
In drawing reasonable inferences, the jury “may use common sense and apply common
knowledge, observation, and experience gained in the ordinary affairs of life.” Duren v. State, 87
S.W.3d 719, 724 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. struck) (citing Manrique v. State, 994 S.W.2d
640, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (Meyers, J., concurring)). Further, the jury is the sole judge of
the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony and may “believe all of
a witnesses’ testimony, portions of it, or none of it.” Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex.
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Crim. App. 2014). We give “almost complete deference to a jury’s decision when that decision is
based upon an evaluation of credibility.” Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008).
In our review, we consider “events occurring before, during and after the commission of
the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common
design to do the prohibited act.” Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (quoting Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d
107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). It is not required that each fact “point directly and
independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating
circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Id. “Circumstantial evidence and direct
evidence are equally probative in establishing the guilt of a defendant, and guilt can be established
by circumstantial evidence alone.” Ross v. State; 507 S.W.3d 881, 904 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2016, pet. granted) (Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)); Hooper, 214
S.W.3d at 13 (citing Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).
Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by
a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
The “hypothetically correct” jury charge is “one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by
the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict
the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the
defendant was tried.” Id. Under the indictment and the statute, the State was required to show
beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about January 27, 2016, (1) Gayton (2) intentionally or
knowingly (3) caused bodily injury to Mary, (4) who was fourteen years of age or younger. See
4
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(3). Gayton only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
showing he intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury to Mary.
Injury to a child is a result-of-conduct offense that requires a mental state relating to the
result of the conduct, as opposed to the conduct itself. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “A person acts intentionally . . . with respect to . . . a result of his conduct
when it is his conscious objective or desire to . . . cause the result.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 6.03(a) (West 2011). “A person acts knowingly . . . with respect to a result of his conduct when
he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 6.03(b) (West 2011).
In determining a defendant’s state of mind, the jury may consider all of the circumstances.
Smith v. State, 965 S.W.3d 509, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The jury may infer the requisite
mental state from the acts, words, and conduct of the defendant, from the extent of the injuries to
the victim, from the method used to produce the injuries, and/or from the relative size and strength
of the parties. Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Duren, 87 S.W.3d
at 724. Other facts in evidence may also support the jury’s inference of knowing conduct or an
intent to cause injury on the part of the defendant. See Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003); Duren, 87 S.W.3d at 724.
In this case, the jury heard testimony from the nurse performing the SANE examination
that Mary suffered extensive bruising and abrasions to her face, trunk, abdomen, genital area, and
inner thighs. The nurse expressed her opinion that Mary’s injuries were caused by blunt force
trauma and that they were consistent with the child being struck. In addition, the officers who first
5
saw Mary noted that her injuries were similar to the bruises and abrasions they observed on David.
As we observed in our opinion in cause number 06-16-00218-CR, Gayton’s companion
appeal, the jury also heard testimony of the extensive injuries suffered by David, including that
they were incurred near his time of death when the children were in the care of Gayton. The jury
members, who viewed photographs of the injuries to both David and Mary, could reasonably have
inferred that the injuries to both children were contemporaneous and inflicted by the same person.
Moreover, the jury viewed Gayton’s recorded statement in which he gave varying and
contradictory explanations of how Mary incurred her injuries, as well as his changing explanation
of David’s injuries. Considering the extent and nature of the injuries to the children, the jury
reasonably could have found that his explanations were implausible. Testimony also showed that
Gayton smoked synthetic marihuana three times that day while the children were in his care and
that during the timeframe when the injuries were inflicted and thereafter, Gayton was not acting
in his normal manner: he would not answer Lucas’ telephone calls, and immediately prior to
Lucas’ return home from work, he was nervously pacing and smoking synthetic marihuana.
The jury also heard testimony from Lucas, the responding officers, and a paramedic that
Gayton showed no emotion while they sought to revive David and that he made unsolicited
comments about his aversion to child abuse. The jury could also compare the photographs of Mary
and note the disparity between her size and Gayton’s, who was at trial. Finally, in his statement,
Gayton admitted that whatever happened to the children occurred while they were in his care.
When considering Gayton’s words and actions, his admission that the children’s injuries
occurred while they were in his care, his implausible explanation of their injuries, the disparity in
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the size and strength of Gayton and Mary, and the extent and nature of both David’s and Mary’s
injuries, the jury reasonably could have inferred either that Gayton intended to cause bodily injury
to Mary or that he was aware his conduct was reasonably certain to cause her injury. See Duren,
87 S.W.3d at 726. Therefore, we find that legally sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Ralph K. Burgess
Justice
Date Submitted: July 18, 2017
Date Decided: August 4, 2017
Do Not Publish
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