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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
JOHN L. ROBERTS, : No. 1104 EDA 2016
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, March 14, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0009992-2013
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MOULTON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED August 8, 2017
John L. Roberts appeals from the judgment of sentence of March 14,
2016, following revocation of his parole. After careful review, we vacate the
judgment of sentence and remand for further proceedings.
The trial court has aptly summarized the history of this matter as
follows:
[Appellant] previously plead guilty to
Possession with the Intent to Deliver (35 Pa.C.S.[A.]
§ 780-113(A)(30)) and Conspiracy (18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 903(c)). He was sentenced to a period of
incarceration of nine (9) to twenty-three (23)
months followed by three (3) years[’] probation. On
March 14, 2016, the Commonwealth argued a
“Daisey Kates” motion for a parole violation of
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[appellant].[1] Previously in the underlying case
which precipitated the “Daisey Kates” motion,
another court granted a motion to suppress with
regard to narcotics found on [appellant]. However
this court declined to extend that motion to the
parole revocation hearing and found [appellant] in
direct violation of his parole. He was sentenced to
serve the balance of his back-time.
[Appellant] filed a timely notice of appeal on
April 7, 2016. On July 1, 2016, this court entered an
order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. § 1925(b) giving
[appellant] twenty-one (21) days to file and serve
his response. [Appellant] timely filed his response
on July 22, 2016.
Trial court opinion, 10/31/16 at 1 (emphasis deleted).
The findings of fact contained infra relate to
the events that constituted the violation of
[appellant’s] parole and not the back case for which
he was already on parole. On November 19, 2014,
at around 7:30 p.m., Philadelphia Police
Officer [Jeffrey] Strubinger along with his partner,
Officer [Jason] Tomon, were on patrol in the area of
5200 Ogontz Ave., Philadelphia. Notes of Testimony,
March 14, 2016, p. 8-9. They stopped a vehicle
where [appellant] was the front seat passenger. Id.
Officers observed that the car had tinted windows.
Id., at 10. When the officers approached the
vehicle, they ordered the driver to roll down the
windows. Id. Officer Tomon then opened the driver
side door and observed narcotics in a soda bottle.
Id. [Appellant] was then detained and searched. Id.
at 12. In his right shoe officers found 35 packets of
crack cocaine. Id.
Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
1
Commonwealth v. Kates, 305 A.2d 701 (Pa. 1973) (no prohibition
preventing lower court from conducting probation/parole revocation
proceedings before conclusion of trial based on charges leading to revocation
claim).
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Appellant has raised the following issue for this court’s review:
Did not the revocation court err by proceeding
with a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v.
Daisey Kates and deny [appellant]’s motion to
exclude evidence obtained in violation of
[appellant]’s privacy rights under Article I, Section 8
of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and fail to apply
the suppression remedy to this evidence that was
previously granted at the criminal trial level; and
should not this Court exclude the previously
suppressed evidence pursuant to our Supreme
Court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Arter, [151]
A.3d [149] (Pa. December 28, 2016) and reverse the
parole revocation finding?
Appellant’s brief at 3.
Following a suppression hearing held on December 4, 2015, appellant’s
motion to suppress physical evidence with regard to the new charges was
granted. The trial court determined that there was no probable cause to
arrest appellant, the front-seat passenger of the vehicle. (Notes of
testimony, 12/7/15 at 3.) The Commonwealth did not appeal that decision.
Subsequently, appellant appeared for a parole revocation hearing at
which appellant argued that the narcotics found on his person had been
suppressed by a court of coordinate jurisdiction and should not be
considered. (Notes of testimony, 3/14/16 at 5-6.) Following the law in
effect at that time, the trial court denied the motion on the basis that the
exclusionary rule is not applicable to revocation proceedings. See
Commonwealth v. Lehman, 851 A.2d 941 (Pa.Super. 2004) (declining to
apply the exclusionary rule to parole and probation revocation proceedings
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under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution); see also
Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) (the federal
exclusionary rule does not apply in parole revocation proceedings).
Appellant noted that at the time of his parole revocation hearing, Arter was
pending on appeal before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. (Notes of
testimony, 3/14/16 at 5-6.) In denying appellant’s suppression motion and
finding appellant in violation of his parole, the trial court acknowledged the
pending decision in Arter but concluded that it was bound by existing
precedent:
THE COURT: Yes, I understand. And I understand
that there are Constitutional issues pending before
the Supreme Court, and I appreciate that, that the
state of the law now is, a violation of parole hearing,
it’s a different standard, different evidence comes in,
including evidence that has been suppressed,
because there are different considerations and
different standards.
So based on the state of the law that it is now,
the Court will conclude that [appellant] violated his
parole, and the Court will grant the Dais[e]y Kates
motion and find [appellant] in violation of his parole.
Notes of testimony, 3/14/16 at 17-18.
Subsequently, on December 28, 2016, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court handed down Arter, in which it decided that under Article I, Section 8,
the exclusionary rule applies to parole revocation proceedings. In Arter, at
the criminal proceedings on the new drug charges, the trial court granted
the defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding the search of the defendant,
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a parolee, was not supported by reasonable suspicion as required under
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9912(d)(1)(i). Arter, 151 A.3d at 152. As in this case, the
Commonwealth did not dispute that the evidence was properly suppressed in
the criminal proceedings. Id. At his parole revocation hearing, the trial
judge denied the defendant’s suppression motion, revoked his parole, and
resentenced the defendant to serve the balance of his sentence, relying on
this court’s decision in Lehman. Id.
This court affirmed, and our supreme court reversed, concluding that
application of the exclusionary rule to revocation
proceedings is in accord with this Court’s consistent
and repeated emphasis that the primary purpose of
the exclusionary rule under Article I, Section 8, is
protecting the individual privacy rights of our
citizens, as opposed to deterring police misconduct.
This purpose is equally applicable to criminal
proceedings and revocation proceedings.
Id. at 167 (citation omitted).
As it is undisputed that there was no reasonable
suspicion for the parole officer’s warrantless search
of Appellant, we hold that, pursuant to Article I,
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the
evidence seized as a result of the search was
inadmissible at Appellant’s parole revocation
proceedings, and, thus, Appellant’s motion to
suppress filed with respect to those proceedings
should have been granted.
Id.
The Commonwealth agrees that Arter controls the case sub judice
and does not oppose vacating the order revoking appellant’s parole and
remanding for further proceedings. (Commonwealth’s brief at 6.) The trial
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court is correct that based on the prevailing case law at the time of
appellant’s parole revocation proceeding, his suppression motion was
properly denied. (Trial court opinion, 10/31/16 at 3.) However, appellant is
entitled to the benefit of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Arter. See Blackwell v. Commonwealth State Ethics Comm’n, 589
A.2d 1094, 1099 (Pa. 1991) (“[W]e adhere to the principle that, a party
whose case is pending on direct appeal is entitled to the benefit of changes
in the law which occur before the judgment becomes final.” (quotation
marks and citations omitted)). Therefore, it is necessary to vacate the
judgment of sentence in this case and remand for a new parole revocation
hearing without consideration of the suppressed evidence.
Judgment of sentence vacated. Remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
JosephD.Seletyn,Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/8/2017
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