Donnie Wayne Winningham, Kelly Annette Winningham, and Kristy Milburn v. The Supervised Estate of Keri L. Winningham and Interested Party Estate of Leigh Ann Schattner (mem. dec.)

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MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 30 2017, 5:22 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Richard Walker THE SUPERVISED ESTATE OF Anderson, Indiana KERI L. WINNINGHAM Julia Blackwell Gelinas Jeffrey S. Dible Maggie L. Smith Frost Brown Todd LLC Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR INTERESTED PARTY APPELLEE ESTATE OF LEIGH ANN SCHATTNER Mark Alan Bennett Anderson, Indiana IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA Donnie Wayne Winningham, August 30, 2017 Kelly Annette Winningham, and Court of Appeals Case No. Kristy Milburn, 48A04-1606-ES-1508 Appellants-Beneficiaries Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court v. The Honorable Mark K. Dudley, Judge The Supervised Estate of Keri L. The Honorable Jason A. Childers, Winningham and Interested Master Commissioner Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A04-1606-ES-1508 | August 30, 2017 Page 1 of 5 Party Estate of Leigh Ann Trial Court Cause No. Schattner 48C06-1507-ES-302 Appellees-Petitioner/Interested Party Baker, Judge. [1] Donnie Winningham, Kelly Winningham, and Kristy Milburn (collectively, the Appellants) bring this interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order that the proceeds from two wrongful death claims be distributed to the beneficiaries designated under the Adult Wrongful Death Act,1 rather than the beneficiaries designated under the intestate succession statute.2 We affirm and remand for further proceedings. [2] The Appellants are the half-siblings of Keri Winningham.3 On September 27, 2014, Winningham was walking in Anderson when she was struck by a vehicle driven by one person and then run over by a vehicle driven by another person; 1 Ind. Code § 34-23-1-2. 2 Ind. Code § 29-1-2-1. 3 The interested party, Leigh Ann Schattner, was Winningham’s mother. Schattner passed away after Winningham’s death but before the trial court authorized the distribution of Winningham’s assets. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A04-1606-ES-1508 | August 30, 2017 Page 2 of 5 she died as a result. At the time of her death, Winningham was a twenty-six- year-old unmarried adult who did not have a will. [3] Lori Rumreich, Winningham’s aunt, opened a supervised estate for Winningham and was appointed personal representative. As personal representative, Rumreich brought wrongful death claims against two insurance companies. Both companies agreed to settle the claims. [4] In her petition to open the estate, Rumreich listed the proceeds from the wrongful death claims as assets of the probate estate subject to distribution to the intestate beneficiaries. Sometime after receiving the trial court’s authorization to distribute those proceeds through intestate succession, but before the distribution actually took place, Rumreich became aware of the possibility that the proceeds were not assets of the probate estate and should not have been included in the assets to be distributed through intestate succession. [5] Rumreich filed a motion to stay the trial court’s order authorizing distribution of the proceeds from the wrongful death claims through intestate succession and requested that the trial court provide instructions on which statute should govern the distribution of the proceeds. The trial court stayed its prior order. On May 6, 2016, a hearing took place, and on May 24, 2016, the trial court entered an order providing that the proceeds from the wrongful death claims were to be distributed to the beneficiaries designated under the wrongful death statute. The Appellants now appeal. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A04-1606-ES-1508 | August 30, 2017 Page 3 of 5 [6] A probate estate includes the property transferred at the death of a decedent under the decedent’s will or under Indiana’s statute for an intestate decedent. I.C. § 29-1-1-3(a)(24). Our Court has long held the view that wrongful death proceeds are not included in the probate estate and therefore are not distributed under our intestate statute. Specifically, our Court has noted “that funds collected as a result of any wrongful death action beyond reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expense are not an asset of the decedent’s estate. They inure to the exclusive benefit of” the statutory beneficiaries. In re Estate of Hutman, 705 N.E.2d 1060, 1064 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also, e.g., Blusy v. Rugh, 476 N.E.2d 874, 876 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (“a wrongful death action is not an asset of the decedent’s estate”). In other words, the trial court did not err by ordering that the proceeds from the wrongful death claims be distributed pursuant to the adult wrongful death statute. [7] The Appellants also contend that the proceeds from the wrongful death claims should not be distributed under the Adult Wrongful Death Act because it has not been established that Winningham’s mother meets the statutory requirements. Specifically, the Appellants point to the requirement that a “parent or child who wishes to recover damages under this section has the burden of proving that the parent or child had a genuine, substantial, and ongoing relationship with the adult person before the parent or child may recover damages.” I.C. § 34-23-1-2(f). This argument is premature. The trial court did not order that the proceeds be distributed to any specific person; Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A04-1606-ES-1508 | August 30, 2017 Page 4 of 5 rather, the trial court ordered that the proceeds be distributed pursuant to the adult wrongful death statute. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 79. We therefore remand so that the trial court can determine who is entitled to the proceeds. [8] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A04-1606-ES-1508 | August 30, 2017 Page 5 of 5