NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4353-15T1
CHRISTOPHER L. RAUCCI,
Plaintiff-Respondent/
Cross-Appellant,
v.
JAMYE G. VALOTTA,
Defendant-Appellant/
Cross-Respondent.
____________________________
Submitted August 22, 2017 – Decided September 6, 2017
Before Judges Manahan and Gilson.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Gloucester
County, Docket No. FD-08-0876-15.
Weinberger Divorce & Family Law Group, LLC,
attorneys for appellant/cross-respondent
(Melissa O. Hoffman, of counsel and on the
brief).
Puff & Cockerill, LLC, attorneys for
respondent/cross-appellant (Barbara B. Moore,
of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Jamye Valotta, the mother, appeals from a May 6,
2016 order that addressed parenting time and child support issues.
Plaintiff Christopher Raucci, the father, cross-appeals from other
aspects of that order. Having considered the contentions of the
parties in light of our standard of review, we affirm.
The parties dated for approximately three years and they have
one child, a son born in 2014. Assisted by legal counsel and
mediation, the parties have resolved most of their parenting
issues.
In March and April 2015, the parties entered into two consent
orders, under which they agreed to share joint legal custody, to
a parenting time plan, and child support, with plaintiff paying
defendant $100 per week. Thereafter, the parties continued to
discuss parenting issues and attempted to work out a more
comprehensive custody agreement. Initially, their discussions
were not successful and, in early 2016, both parties filed motions
to address custody issues.
Ultimately, on May 5, 2016, the parties were successful in
working out a custody agreement that resolved all but two issues.
That agreement was memorialized in writing and was incorporated
into a consent order filed on May 5, 2016 (May 2016 custody
agreement). Under the May 2016 custody agreement, the parties
agreed (1) to share joint legal custody of their son; (2) that
"neither [p]arty shall be designated the [p]arent of [p]rimary
[r]esidence at this time[;]" and (3) to a parenting time schedule.
2 A-4353-15T1
The parties also resolved various other issues in the May 2016
custody agreement.
The parenting time schedule covered a fourteen-day cycle, and
states that plaintiff picks up the child on Thursday at 11:15 a.m.
and returns the child on Friday at 12:30 p.m., plaintiff picks up
the child on Monday at 11:15 a.m. and defendant picks up the child
on Tuesday between 12:15 and 12:30 p.m., plaintiff then has the
child for the weekend beginning Friday at 11:15 a.m. with defendant
picking up the child on Monday between 12:15 and 12:30 p.m. The
parties could not agree on the number of overnights that plaintiff
should be credited, nor could they agree on child support. Thus,
those two issues were presented to the court for resolution.
The court heard arguments on those two issues on May 5, 2016.
The following day the court entered an order (1) finding that the
parties shared a true 50/50 parenting time schedule; (2) finding
that a deviation from the New Jersey Child Support Guidelines was
appropriate; (3) denying both parties' requests for child support;
and (4) directing the parties to share the cost of the child's
healthcare, which was $21 per week.
Defendant appeals from the May 6, 2016 order and argues that
the Family court erred in (1) finding that the parties had a 50/50
parenting time schedule; (2) refusing to hold a plenary hearing
on the designation of a parent of primary residential custody; (3)
3 A-4353-15T1
crediting plaintiff with equal parenting time under the New Jersey
Child Support Guidelines; and (4) denying defendant's request for
child support. Plaintiff cross-appeals and argues that the Family
Part erred in failing to require defendant to pay him child support
based on his contention that he was exercising eight out of
fourteen overnights with the child.
Having considered both parties' arguments in light of the
record and law, we are not persuaded by any of the arguments and
we affirm the May 6, 2016 order.
Our scope of review of a Family Part decision is limited. We
review an application to modify a child support obligation for
abuse of discretion. See Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 594
(1995) (explaining, "trial courts have discretion in determining
child support"). Generally, we will not disturb the Family Part's
decision on support obligations "unless it is manifestly
unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly contrary to reason or to other
evidence, or the result of whim or caprice." Jacoby v. Jacoby,
427 N.J. Super. 109, 116 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Foust v. Glaser,
340 N.J. Super. 312, 316 (App. Div. 2001)).
While articulated in different ways, both defendant and
plaintiff really make one principal argument. They contend that
the Family Part erred in determining that the parties had a 50/50
parenting time schedule. The parties worked out and agreed to the
4 A-4353-15T1
actual schedule. The question presented to the family judge was
how many overnights plaintiff should be credited with during the
fourteen-day cycle. Plaintiff's contention that he is exercising
eight out of fourteen overnights is based on a highly technical
reading of the Child Support Guidelines. Specifically, he contends
that because of the pickup and drop off times, he has the child
for more than twenty-four hours and, thus, he should be given
credit for two overnights when he picks up the child before 12
noon and the child is returned after 12 noon the following day.
The family judge acted well within his discretion in rejecting
that argument. At the same time, the family judge had the
discretion to consider the parties contentions and to give
plaintiff some credit for the extra time spent with the child.
Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the family
judge's decision to treat the parenting time arrangement as a
50/50 arrangement.
We also discern no abuse of discretion in the family judge's
decision to deny both parties' request for child support. The
parties had stipulated that plaintiff's annual income was $65,000
and defendant's annual income was $49,920. Having determined that
the parents shared essentially equal parenting time, and given the
parties' relatively close annual incomes, the court acted within
its discretion in deciding not to adjust the child support for
5 A-4353-15T1
controlled expenses, as allowed in Wunsch-Deffler v. Deffler, 406
N.J. Super. 505 (Ch. Div. 2009).
We also reject defendant's argument that a plenary hearing
was necessary. In the May 2016 custody agreement, the parties
expressly agreed that, at this time, neither of them would be
designated the parent of primary residential custody. Thus, there
was no need for a plenary hearing on that issue. With regard to
the number of overnights, as we have already noted, the parties
themselves worked out the specific parenting time schedule.
Accordingly, there was no need for the court to hold a plenary
fact-finding hearing. Instead, the court had to exercise its
discretion in evaluating the parties' agreement and determining
the number of overnights to credit to each party.
In affirming the May 6, 2016 order, we note that the order
is a temporary order. At this time, the child is not attending
school. That will change. Accordingly, both parties recognize
that they will need to adjust the current parenting-time schedule
when the child begins attending school. Indeed, the May 2016
custody agreement expressly acknowledges that there will be a
future adjustment. Hopefully, the parties will be able to work
that issue out through discussions in the best interest of the
child. Such a resolution, whether reached through discussions,
mediation, or court order, will probably require some adjustments
6 A-4353-15T1
in the overnight parenting time schedule and may well result in
one of the parents being designated as the parent of primary
residential custody.
Affirmed.
7 A-4353-15T1