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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-15326
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:15-cv-00469-WKW-TFM
STEVEN MARK HAYDEN,
individually and as trustee for William B.
Cashion Nevada Spendthrift Trust and
William B. Cashion Family Trust,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ROBERT S. VANCE, JR.,
in his individual capacity,
ANNE-MARIE ADAMS,
in her individual capacity,
J. SCOTT VOWELL,
in his individual capacity,
HOUSTON BROWN,
in his individual capacity,
JAMES ALLEN MAIN,
in his individual capacity,
Associate Justice of Alabama Supreme
Court,
Defendants-Appellees,
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ROY MOORE,
in his individual capacity, et al.,
Defendants.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
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(September 7, 2017)
Before WILSON, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Steven Mark Hayden, proceeding pro se,1 appeals the district court’s award
of attorneys’ fees to Defendants Western Steel Incorporated, Merchants
Commercial Bank, and William B. Cashion in this civil action filed pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and Alabama law. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
This civil action arises out of Defendants’ involvement in an underlying
Alabama court case (the “Jefferson County Action”), in which Cashion sued
1
We construe liberally pro se pleadings. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263
(11th Cir. 1998).
2
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Plaintiff for declaratory and injunctive relief. 2 Briefly stated, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants conspired to have the Jefferson County Action assigned to an
unconstitutional Commercial Litigation Docket (“CLD”), in violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and Alabama law. The district court
dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s federal claims and declined to exercise
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims.
The district court then referred the case back to the magistrate judge for a
determination about attorneys’ fees. The magistrate judge recommended that
Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees be granted in part based on the district
court’s authority under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and pursuant to the court’s inherent
powers. In doing so, the magistrate judge made this observation:
It is obvious from Hayden’s multiple filings, a review of the state
court docket, and the prior case filed in the Northern District of
Alabama that Plaintiff simply will not accept the state court judgment
and keeps court shopping in the vain hope to find someone who will
agree with him. Federal court jurisdiction does not work in such a
fashion. Enough is enough. This Court finds Plaintiff’s filings have
crossed the line into the realm of frivolous, malicious, and
unreasonable.
The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and
awarded Defendants $15,000 in attorneys’ fees and $76.06 in costs. Plaintiff
appealed.
2
In addition to the Defendants involved in this appeal, Plaintiff named as defendants various
state court judges, state court employees, the United States Department of Justice, and the United
States Attorney for the Northern District of Alabama.
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We review the district court’s decision to grant attorneys’ fees under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Davis v. Nat’l Med. Enters., 253 F.3d 1314, 1318-19
(11th Cir. 2001). An abuse of discretion occurs if the district court “fails to apply
the proper legal standard or to follow proper procedures in making the
determination, or bases an award upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.”
Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 613 F.3d 1035, 1039 (11th Cir. 2010). The
abuse-of-discretion standard implies necessarily that a district court has a range of
choices; unless the district court’s decision constitutes a clear error of judgment,
we will affirm even if we might have decided the issue another way. United States
v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
Courts have the inherent power to impose attorneys’ fees when a party acts
“in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991). A court’s inherent power is “governed
not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Id.
at 43. A party acts in bad faith when he “knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous
argument, or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent.”
Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 1998).
In the Jefferson County Action, the state court entered judgment against
Plaintiff. Among other forms of relief, the state court enjoined Plaintiff from
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“pursuing any cause of action against William B. Cashion, Merchants Commercial
Bank, Western Steel, . . . or any of Mr. Cashion’s other asserts, property or
interests . . . that attempts to assert that any asset, property or interest of William B.
Cashion is owned or controlled by” Plaintiff. The state court concluded that
injunctive relief was warranted in part because Plaintiff had “demonstrated that
little will stop [him] from attempting to acquire control of Cashion’s assets or
harassing [Cashion].” Plaintiff was also warned expressly that violating the court’s
injunction order would result in “severe sanctions.” The state court judgment was
affirmed on appeal by the Alabama Supreme Court.
In spite of the state court’s warnings, Plaintiff thereafter attempted
unsuccessfully to relitigate the same or similar issues and to otherwise attack the
final judgment in the Jefferson County Action by filing suit both in another
Alabama state court and in federal court. As a result, the Circuit Court of Jefferson
County twice held Plaintiff in contempt for knowingly violating the court’s order.
During the course of this federal proceeding, Plaintiff has continued his
attempts to attack collaterally the Jefferson County Action. Plaintiff also filed in
the district court a series of frivolous motions. Among other things, Plaintiff
asserted that Cashion was incompetent and moved for a psychological exam
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 35.
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Given this record of Plaintiff’s vexatious conduct and the repeated warnings
issued to Plaintiff, the district court committed no clear error in determining that
Plaintiff filed this civil action in bad faith. The district court thus abused no
discretion in imposing attorneys’ fees pursuant to its inherent power. 3 See
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45-46.
Plaintiff’s remaining arguments on appeal are without merit. 4 First, the
district court committed no error in considering documents filed in other cases
involving Plaintiff and Defendants. Many of these documents were filed as
exhibits by both parties in this case and, thus, were part of the record. Moreover,
the district court was permitted to take judicial notice of documents filed in other
court cases. See United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994).
We also reject Plaintiff’s argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction
to consider whether his civil action was filed in bad faith. The district court retains
3
Because we conclude that the district court was authorized to impose attorneys’ fees pursuant
to its inherent power, we need not address whether attorneys’ fees were also appropriate under
42 U.S.C. § 1988.
4
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to challenge the district court’s order dismissing his complaint, this
appeal is untimely filed. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (a notice of appeal must be filed “within
30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from”). To the extent Plaintiff’s appellate
brief can be construed as challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to void the
judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), Plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden of
demonstrating “a justification so compelling that the court was required to vacate its order.” For
background, see Cavaliere v. Allstate Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 1111 (11th Cir. 1993).
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jurisdiction to consider an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, even after judgment
is entered. Zinni v. ER Solutions, 692 F.3d 1162, 1168 n.10 (11th Cir. 2012).
AFFIRMED.
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