IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0418
Filed September 27, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NICHOLAS LOUIS KONZEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Mark T.
Hostager, District Associate Judge.
A defendant appeals his convictions asserting the district court should not
have denied his motion to suppress evidence. AFFIRMED.
Nathan D. Runde and Jeffrey E. Hiatt of Clemens, Walters, Conlon,
Runde & Hiatt, L.L.P., Dubuque, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ.
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VOGEL, Presiding Judge.
Nicholas Konzen was found guilty, following a bench trial on the minutes
of evidence, of possession of a controlled substance—marijuana—and
possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal he claims the district court
incorrectly denied his motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the
warrantless search of his vehicle because the police officers lacked probable
cause and exigent circumstances did not exist. Because we agree with the
district court that the automobile exception applies to the facts of the case, we
affirm the court’s denial of Konzen’s motion to suppress.
An officer stopped Konzen’s vehicle for an expired registration. Upon
interacting with Konzen, the officer smelled the odor of marijuana coming from
inside the vehicle. Over the officer’s sixteen years of experience working for the
police department, the officer had specific training and extensive experience
detecting the smell of marijuana. Backup officers arrived and also detected the
odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. Konzen’s car was searched, and
marijuana and a pipe were found. Konzen was arrested and charged.
Konzen filed a motion to suppress the marijuana and pipe found during
the search of his vehicle. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion.
He then stipulated to a bench trial on the minutes of evidence. The court found
him guilty as charged and sentenced him to 120 days in jail—suspended—and
two years of probation. He appeals contesting the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress.
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall within the
carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Gaskins, 866
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N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2015). One of those exceptions is probable cause coupled
with exigent circumstances, which is termed the automobile exception when
applied to motor vehicles. State v. Storm, 898 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Iowa 2017).
Konzen asserts the smell of marijuana emanating from his vehicle alone does not
provide probable cause to search his vehicle. In addition, he asserts the inherent
mobility of vehicles should no longer provide the basis for exigent circumstances
to search. He asks the Iowa courts to “re-evaluate the ‘automobile exception’
and find it incompatible with the Iowa Constitution.” In light of the recent
controlling Iowa precedent, we decline Konzen’s invitation.
Contrary to Konzen’s contention, Iowa Courts have held “a trained officer’s
detection of a sufficiently distinctive odor, by itself or when accompanied by other
facts, may establish probable cause.” State v. Watts, 801 N.W.2d 845, 854
(Iowa 2011) (emphasis added); State v. Eubanks, 355 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Iowa
1984) (“[T]he patrolman clearly had sufficient probable cause to search the
vehicle and its contents. The patrolman smelled the odor of marijuana drifting
from the car when he approached defendant, who was seated behind the
steering wheel. The odor of that controlled substance in the automobile gave the
patrolman reasonable cause to conduct a comprehensive search of the car.”).
Thus, the officer’s detection of the odor of marijuana emanating from Konzen’s
vehicle was sufficient, by itself, to provide the probable cause to search the
vehicle.
In addition, when recently faced with the question of the continuing
viability of the automobile exception in Iowa, our supreme court stated: “The
inherent mobility of motor vehicles satisfies the exigent-circumstances
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requirement.” Storm, 898 N.W.2d at 145. “The exigency inherent in vehicle
search cases is not necessarily dependent on whether the driver or passenger
remains in or exits from the car before or during the search.” Eubanks, 355
N.W.2d at 60. Because our supreme court recently decided to “elect to retain the
automobile exception, consistent with our precedent, federal caselaw, and the
overwhelming majority of other states,” Storm, 898 N.W.2d at 142, we affirm the
district court’s denial of Konzen’s motion to suppress. See State v. Hastings, 466
N.W.2d 697, 700 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (“We are not at liberty to overturn Iowa
Supreme Court precedent.”).
AFFIRMED.