IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-1560
Filed September 27, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MICHAEL ANTHONY WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Jeffrey A.
Neary, Judge.
Defendant appeals the consecutive sentences imposed asserting the
court failed to state reasons on the record. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Maria Ruhtenberg,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., Potterfield, J., and Blane, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2017).
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BLANE, Senior Judge.
Michael Williams entered into a plea agreement with the State whereby he
agreed to plead guilty to two charges: robbery in the second degree, a class “C”
felony, in violation of Iowa Code sections 711.1 and 711.3 (2016); and burglary in
the first degree, a class “B” felony, in violation of sections 713.1 and 713.3.
Because of a change in the law and questions over the effective date of the
change, the parties agreed to leave the imposition of a mandatory minimum
sentence on the robbery charge to the discretion of the district court. See Iowa
Code § 902.12(3) (allowing court discretion to impose mandatory minimum
between one-half and seven-tenths of maximum term of person’s sentence); see
also 2016 Iowa Acts ch. 1104, § 8 (introducing discretion). The other elements of
Williams’s sentence, including that the sentences would be imposed
consecutively, were incorporated in the parties’ plea agreement.
At sentencing, the court heard argument on the mandatory-minimum
question. The court imposed a five-year minimum sentence on the ten-year
robbery sentence. Williams was additionally sentenced to an indeterminate term
of twenty-five years for the burglary charge, along with fines, surcharges, and
fees. The two prison sentences were ordered to run consecutively.
Williams now appeals. On appeal, he claims the sentencing court abused
its discretion in sentencing him because the court failed to provide adequate
reasons for adopting the plea agreement’s recommendation that the sentences
run consecutively. Our review of sentencing decisions is for correction of errors
at law. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). A sentence
imposed in accordance with applicable statutes will be overturned only for an
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abuse of discretion or a defect in the sentencing procedure. State v. Wright, 340
N.W.2d 590, 592 (Iowa 1983). An abuse of discretion occurs “when the court
exercises its discretion on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly
unreasonable.” State v. Evans, 672 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Iowa 2003).
A sentencing court must state its reasons for imposing a particular
sentence on the record. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d); State v. McGonigle,
401 N.W.2d 39, 43 (Iowa 1987). This includes its reasons for imposing
sentences consecutively or concurrently. See State v. Barnes, 791 N.W.2d 817,
827 (Iowa 2010). The reasons “need not be detailed,” but must provide “at least
a cursory explanation” of the court’s reasoning. Id.
Here, the court considered a number of factors in determining whether to
impose a 50% or 70% mandatory minimum before deciding to impose the 50%
minimum. The court stated: “I have also considered all sentencing options
available to the defendant, especially in light of the plea agreement. I’ve
considered the presentence report, the nature of the offense, and other matters
that I’ve identified with regard to the discretion that I can exercise on the
mandatory minimum.” The court made no mention of discretion as to any other
part of the plea agreement or sentence. The court went on to say, “The Court
then is going to sentence the defendant in accordance with the parties’ plea
agreement,” which the court then proceeded to do. Williams argues this was
improper because the court failed to articulate its reasons for imposing
consecutive sentences.
In support, Williams cites State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Iowa 2016).
In Hill, the defendant pleaded guilty to a failure to comply with sex-offender
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registry requirements. See 878 N.W.2d at 271–72. At sentencing, Hill requested
a suspended sentence; the State requested a two-year prison term to be served
consecutive to his parole revocation. See id. at 272. The district court imposed
the sentence requested by the State with no explanation. See id. The supreme
court concluded this was error. See id. at 273–74. Williams argues his
sentencing court’s failure to state reasons, too, was an abuse of discretion
mandating reversal.
We disagree. In Hill, the sentencing court was required to resolve a real
dispute between the parties over the correct sentence. See id. at 272. Here, the
district court was merely “giving effect to the parties’ agreement,” which does not
require an exercise of discretion, only that the sentencing court “make the
particulars of the plea agreement part of the sentencing record.” See State v.
Smith, No. 16-1528, 2017 WL 1733246, at *1 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 3, 2017).
This is a longstanding principle in our case law. See id. (citing State v. Thacker,
862 N.W.2d 402, 408–09 (Iowa 2015); State v. Cason, 532 N.W.2d 755, 756–57
(Iowa 1995); State v. Snyder, 336 N.W.2d 728, 729 (Iowa 1983)). Hill “does not
appear to undermine this principle.” Id. The court here made the particulars of
the plea agreement part of the sentencing record, thereby meeting its obligation
to explain its reasoning for imposing the sentence it chose. We find no abuse of
discretion.
AFFIRMED.