IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
JEFFRY R. DICKERSON,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D16-3316
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
________________________________/
Opinion filed October 6, 2017
Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Citrus County,
Richard A. Howard, Judge.
Debra B. Tuomey, of Debra B. Tuomey,
Attorney at Law, LLC, Spring Hill, and
Charlie P. Vaughn, Law Office of Charles P.
Vaughn, Inverness, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant
Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Appellee.
EISNAUGLE, J.
Appellant, Jeffry Roy Dickerson, appeals his convictions for aggravated stalking
with a firearm, burglary of a dwelling with a firearm, false imprisonment, and aggravated
assault with a firearm against his ex-wife. We reverse.
Before trial, the State filed a Williams1 rule notice that it intended to offer evidence
of similar acts that Appellant allegedly committed against a different ex-wife. Appellant
“fired” counsel the day before the Williams rule hearing, after counsel admittedly told
Appellant that he planned to withdraw. At the hearing, Appellant’s counsel moved to
withdraw, stating that the relationship with his client had deteriorated to the point that he
could not represent Appellant “in good conscience.”
After granting counsel’s motion to withdraw, the trial court asked Appellant how he
wanted to proceed, and Appellant stated, “I'm going to hire a new lawyer,” but indicated
he had not yet done so. The State announced that it was prepared to proceed with the
Williams rule hearing and argued that Appellant had intentionally caused his counsel to
withdraw for purposes of delay.
The trial court did not make any finding that Appellant was intentionally delaying
the proceedings, but instead asked Appellant, “Do you have any problems with going
forward with the Williams rule hearing today?” Appellant answered, “No, I don't.” The
trial court then swore in Appellant, and asked him again if “it's okay to go ahead with the
Williams rule hearing today?” Appellant again answered in the affirmative. The Williams
rule hearing then commenced with testimony from both of Appellant’s ex-wives. The
State concedes that the trial court did not conduct a Faretta2 inquiry.
On appeal, Appellant argues the trial court’s failure to conduct any Faretta inquiry
prior to permitting him to represent himself at the pre-trial Williams rule hearing – a critical
stage of the proceeding – constitutes per se reversible error. We agree.
1 Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
2 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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of the proceedings whether he or she requires the assistance of counsel.” 3 596 So. 2d
at 968; see also Smith v. State, 845 So. 2d 937, 938 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (“[A] criminal
defendant facing incarceration has the right to counsel at each critical stage of the
proceedings.”).
While this issue appears to be one of first impression in Florida, we have little
difficulty concluding that the Williams rule hearing in this case was a crucial stage of the
proceedings. A crucial stage “is any stage that may significantly affect the outcome of
the proceedings.” Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 968. The opinion of our sister court in Kearse v.
State, 858 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), is instructive here. In Kearse, the defendant
unequivocally requested self-representation before a pre-trial hearing on his motion to
suppress evidence. Id. at 348. The trial court denied his request and proceeded with the
suppression hearing without conducting a Faretta inquiry. Id. On appeal, the first district
held that “[t]he hearing on [the defendant’s] suppression motion was a ‘crucial stage’ in
the proceedings below.” Id. at 349; see also Wilson v. State, 76 So. 3d 1085, 1089 (Fla.
2d DCA 2011) (“A hearing on a motion to suppress is in and of itself a crucial stage of the
proceedings.”). As such, the district court reversed, reasoning that the defendant “had a
right to ‘choose his manner of representation’ absent a finding that his waiver of counsel
was not competent or voluntary.” Kearse, 858 So. 2d at 349.
We can detect no substantive difference, at least for purposes of a defendant’s
constitutional right to counsel, between a suppression hearing and a Williams rule
3 “Under the state constitution, a defendant’s right to counsel’s presence applies
at each crucial stage of the proceedings; under the federal constitution, defendant is
entitled to counsel at each critical stage of the proceeding.” Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451,
469 (Fla. 2006) (citation omitted).
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of the proceedings whether he or she requires the assistance of counsel.” 3 596 So. 2d
at 968; see also Smith v. State, 845 So. 2d 937, 938 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (“[A] criminal
defendant facing incarceration has the right to counsel at each critical stage of the
proceedings.”).
While this issue appears to be one of first impression in Florida, we have little
difficulty concluding that the Williams rule hearing in this case was a crucial stage of the
proceedings. A crucial stage “is any stage that may significantly affect the outcome of
the proceedings.” Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 968. The opinion of our sister court in Kearse v.
State, 858 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), is instructive here. In Kearse, the defendant
unequivocally requested self-representation before a pre-trial hearing on his motion to
suppress evidence. Id. at 348. The trial court denied his request and proceeded with the
suppression hearing without conducting a Faretta inquiry. Id. On appeal, the first district
held that “[t]he hearing on [the defendant’s] suppression motion was a ‘crucial stage’ in
the proceedings below.” Id. at 349; see also Wilson v. State, 76 So. 3d 1085, 1089 (Fla.
2d DCA 2011) (“A hearing on a motion to suppress is in and of itself a crucial stage of the
proceedings.”). As such, the district court reversed, reasoning that the defendant “had a
right to ‘choose his manner of representation’ absent a finding that his waiver of counsel
was not competent or voluntary.” Kearse, 858 So. 2d at 349.
We can detect no substantive difference, at least for purposes of a defendant’s
constitutional right to counsel, between a suppression hearing and a Williams rule
3 “Under the state constitution, a defendant’s right to counsel’s presence applies
at each crucial stage of the proceedings; under the federal constitution, defendant is
entitled to counsel at each critical stage of the proceeding.” Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451,
469 (Fla. 2006) (citation omitted).
4
hearing. Indeed, if a suppression hearing “can significantly affect the outcome of the
proceedings,” as it undoubtedly can, then it necessarily follows that a Williams rule
hearing can as well. See Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 968. Perhaps it is possible, in theory, that
the evidence at a Williams rule hearing could be so innocuous that the right to counsel is
not implicated. However, we need not decide that today. The evidence presented at the
Williams rule hearing in the instant case was powerful, and included numerous prior acts
by Appellant which were strikingly similar to the conduct with which he was charged. This
evidence was, without a doubt, sufficient to “significantly affect the outcome of the
proceedings.” See id. Therefore, a Faretta colloquy was required once Appellant agreed
to move forward without counsel, and the failure to do so amounts to reversible error.
Second, the State argues that even if a Williams rule hearing is a crucial stage of
the proceedings, Appellant was nevertheless “sufficiently sophisticated in his knowledge
of the courts and the law that a formal hearing was not required,” citing to this court's
opinion in Davis v. State, 10 So. 3d 176 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). In Davis, this court observed
that “[t]hose occasions where no reversible error results from failure to conduct a Faretta
inquiry, following an unequivocal request for self-representation, are few and far between
and must be supported with findings of fact.” 10 So. 3d at 179. Here, as in Davis, the
record of the Williams rule hearing contains no findings at all regarding Appellant’s
knowledge or sophistication. Moreover, the record merely demonstrates that Appellant
was asked under oath whether he had “any problem going forward” with the Williams rule
hearing without counsel. In short, the record here falls far short of meeting the narrow
exception identified in Davis.
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Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial. We do not reach the additional
issues raised by Appellant.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
LAMBERT and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.
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