J-S62043-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
SAMUEL LEE MARTIN, :
:
Appellant : No. 1898 MDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order November 8, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,
Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-36-CR-0000252-2009,
CP-36-CR-0005063-2008, CP-36-CR-0005494-2008,
CP-36-CR-0005871-2008
BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED OCTOBER 17, 2017
Samuel Lee Martin (Appellant) appeals pro se from the November 8,
2016 order that dismissed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was
treated as a petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
In 2009, Appellant pled guilty to crimes of theft and violence and was
sentenced to an aggregate term of 13 to 35 years of imprisonment. 1 He has
sought post-conviction relief repeatedly, in the form of PCRA petitions and
habeas corpus petitions, in both state and federal court, but has had no
success. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 131 A.3d 94 (Pa. Super. 2015)
1 This included a mandatory minimum sentence under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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(unpublished memorandum at 1-4) (footnotes omitted), appeal denied, 134
A.3d 55 (Pa. 2016).
The instant appeal concerns Appellant’s October 12, 2016 praecipe and
petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. Therein Appellant
claimed that he is being detained unlawfully because there was no written
sentencing order entered and provided to the Department of Corrections
(DOC) upon his admission to the custody of the DOC. Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, 10/12/2016, at 5. The lower court determined that the
petition was properly treated as a PCRA petition and dismissed it as untimely
filed without a hearing. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, and both
Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant reiterates his challenge to the lawfulness of his
detention based on the lack of a written sentencing order, maintaining that
the law of habeas corpus, rather than the PCRA, is applicable. Appellant’s
Brief at 3. In his brief he also questions the legality of his sentence under
Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801 (Pa. Super. 2014). Id.
Before we consider the substance of Appellant’s claims, we must
determine the proper framework for our review. The first principle of note is
that “the PCRA subsumes all forms of collateral relief, including habeas
corpus, to the extent a remedy is available under such enactment.”
Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007). “[A] defendant
cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by titling his petition or motion as a writ of
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habeas corpus.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super.
2013). However, “claims that fall outside the eligibility parameters of the
PCRA may be raised through a writ of habeas corpus.” Commonwealth v.
Masker, 34 A.3d 841, 850 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc).
This Court has held that a claim that a prisoner’s detention is illegal
“due to the inability of the DOC to produce a written sentencing order
related to [his] judgment of sentence constitutes a claim legitimately
sounding in habeas corpus.” Joseph v. Glunt, 96 A.3d 365, 368 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). This Court
has also rejected the very claims that Appellant raised in his petition. See
id. at 372 (holding criminal docket and sentencing hearing transcript were
sufficient to establish the legitimacy of the sentence and the prisoner’s
continued detention by the DOC). Therefore, although the lower court erred
in applying the time constraints of the PCRA to Appellant’s sentencing-order
claim, it reached the right result and no relief is due. Commonwealth v.
Kennedy, 151 A.3d 1117, 1127 n.14 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“It is well-settled
that this Court may affirm a trial court’s ruling on any basis.”).
We next consider Appellant’s contention that his sentence is illegal
under Valentine, 101 A.3d at 809 (applying Alleyne v. United States, 133
S.Ct. 2151 (2013), to hold unconstitutional the mandatory minimum
sentencing statute applied to Appellant). Appellant’s Brief at 10-11. He
claims that this claim cannot be waived and can be presented at any time.
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A claim that a prisoner is serving an illegal sentence is cognizable
under the PCRA. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 521 (Pa.
Super. 2011). Therefore, because Appellant’s judgment of sentence became
final more than one year ago, he had the burden of establishing a PCRA
timeliness exception in order for this Court to have jurisdiction to entertain
his claim. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lewis, 63 A.3d 1274, 1280-81
(Pa. Super. 2013) (noting timeliness of PCRA petition is jurisdictional). As
this Court has explained,
an issue pertaining to Alleyne goes to the legality of the
sentence. … However, in order for this Court to review a
legality of sentence claim, there must be a basis for our
jurisdiction to engage in such review. As this Court recently
noted, [t]hough not technically waivable, a legality [of sentence]
claim may nevertheless be lost should it be raised … in an
untimely PCRA petition for which no time-bar exception applies,
thus depriving the court of jurisdiction over the claim.
Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 995 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Here, Appellant failed to plead and offer to prove a timeliness
exception. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to vacate Appellant’s
sentence even if it were illegal,2 and no relief is due.
2 Appellant’s sentence is not illegal. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Washington, 142 A.3d 810, 820 (Pa. 2016) (“Alleyne does not apply
retroactively to cases pending on collateral review, and [] Appellant’s
judgment of sentence, therefore, is not illegal on account of Alleyne.”).
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/17/2017
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