J-S62026-17 & J-S62027-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: B.L.I., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: E.L. :
:
:
:
: No. 811 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered April 19, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County Civil Division at No(s):
2017-00005
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: B.M.D., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: E.L. :
:
:
:
: No. 812 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered April 19, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County Civil Division at No(s):
04 of 2017-OC
IN THE INTEREST OF: B.M.D., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: E.L., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 633 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered March 16, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-29-DP-0000004-2011
J-S62026-17 & J-S62027-17
IN THE INTEREST OF: B.L.I., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: E.L., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 634 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered March 16, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-29-DP-0000005-2011
BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2017
E.L. (“Mother”) appeals from the April 19, 2017 decrees and the March
16, 2017 orders entered in the Court of Common Pleas of the 39th Judicial
District (Fulton County Branch). The April 19, 2017 decrees terminated
Mother’s parental rights to her children, B.M.D. (“Son”) and B.L.I.
(“Daughter”) (collectively “Children”), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b).1 The March 16, 2017 orders
changed Children’s permanency goal to adoption pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Son was born in April 2004 and Daughter was born in November 2008.
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6351.2 We affirm.3
The relevant factual and procedural history of this case is as follows. In
January 2016, Fulton County Services for Children (“Agency”) received a
report alleging that Mother had given birth to a drug-exposed child and that
Children were living in a tent. N.T., 3/16/17, at 34-35; Petitioner’s Exh. F.
Children were placed with, and continue to reside with, Foster Parents, who
had been a placement resource when Children were previously adjudicated
dependent.4
In November 2016, Mother was sentenced to 6 to 60 months’
imprisonment and was incarcerated at State Correctional Institution Muncy.
N.T., 3/16/17, at 8. Following her incarceration, no visits occurred between
Mother and Children. Id. at 15, 17-18. Mother sent Children three letters
each, the first of which was received on Christmas Eve. Id. at 10. No other
contact occurred between Mother and Children. Id. at 15.
____________________________________________
2On May 4, 2017, this Court sua sponte consolidated Mother’s appeals
challenging the orders changing Children’s permanency goal to adoption. On
July 6, 2017, this Court sua sponte consolidated Mother’s appeals challenging
the involuntary termination of her parental rights. We will address the appeals
in the same memorandum decision for ease of disposition.
The orphans’ court also terminated the parental rights of Son’s father,
3
M.D., and Daughter’s father, D.I. No father has filed an appeal, nor is any
such individual a party to the present appeal.
4Children were previously adjudicated dependent on November 23,
2011, after Mother’s arrest for driving under the influence with Children in the
car, and on July 18, 2013, due to Mother’s criminal charges and lack of stable
housing. N.T., 3/16/17, at 32-34.
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On February 9, 2017, the Agency filed a petition to terminate Mother’s
parental rights to Children and to change Children’s permanency goal to
adoption. On March 16, 2017, the orphans’ court held a hearing on the
petition. At the conclusion of the hearing, the orphans’ court orally delivered
its decree involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights and changing
Children’s permanency goal to adoption. N.T., 3/16/17, at 94-98. The
orphans’ court entered its order changing Children’s permanency goal to
adoption on that same date. Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, challenging the orphans’
court’s orders changing Children’s permanency goal to adoption. On April 18,
2017, the orphans’ court entered its decrees involuntarily terminating
Mother’s parental rights. On May 8, 2017, Mother timely filed a notice of
appeal and a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, challenging
the orphans’ court’s decrees terminating her parental rights.
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues:
[1.] The trial court abused its discretion in changing the
permanency goal to adoption where services have been
provided for only 13 months toward achieving the goal of
return to Mother, Mother was incarcerated at the time of
the hearing, but testified that she would soon be released
and the circumstances that existed that resulted in
placement could only be alleviated upon Mother’s release
from incarceration.
Mother’s Br., 633 MDA 2017 and 634 MDA 2017, at 4 (“Goal Change Br.”).
[2.] The trial court abused its discretion in terminating
the parental rights of E.L. (“Mother”) where services had
been provided for only 13 months toward achieving the
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goal of returning children to Mother, Mother was
incarcerated at the time of the hearing, but testified that
she would soon be released from incarceration, and only
then would she have the opportunity to remedy the
conditions that led to placement of the children and to
fulfill the requirements set by the Agency for
reunification.
Mother’s Br., 811 MDA 2017 and 812 MDA 2017, at 4 (“Termination Br.”).
We first address Mother’s claim regarding the termination of her
parental rights.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact
and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
supported by the record. If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s
decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
“In termination cases, the burden is upon [the petitioner] to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that its asserted grounds for seeking the
termination of parental rights are valid.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276
(Pa.Super. 2009). We have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and
convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty
and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
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without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (quoting In
re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa.Super. 2003)).
Termination of parental rights is governed by statute. See 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511. The orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), which provide as
follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
at least six months immediately preceding the filing of
the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused
or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
...
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will
not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
available to the parent are not likely to remedy the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child within a reasonable period of time and
termination of the parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
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...
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from
the date of removal or placement, the conditions
which led to the removal or placement of the child
continue to exist and termination of parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
...
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving notice of the filing
of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).
This Court need only agree with the orphans’ court’s decision as to any
one subsection of section 2511(a), as well as section 2511(b), to affirm the
termination. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en
banc). Accordingly, we will examine the facts of this case under section
2511(a)(2).5
____________________________________________
5Mother does not challenge the termination of her parental rights
pursuant to section 2511(b) in the argument section of her brief; nor did she
include any such challenge in her concise statement or statement of questions
involved. Thus, we conclude that Mother has waived any challenge as to
section 2511(b). See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa.Super. 2017)
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To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(2), the moving party
must produce clear and convincing evidence that the following three
conditions are met: “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his
physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In re Adoption of M.E.P.,
825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003); 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). The
grounds for termination of parental rights under section 2511(a)(2), due to
parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not limited to affirmative
misconduct; “[t]o the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as
well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326,
337 (Pa.Super. 2002).
Mother has been incarcerated repeatedly throughout Children’s lives.
Our Supreme Court addressed the relevance of incarceration in termination
decisions under section 2511(a)(2) as follows:
[I]ncarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a
determinative factor, in a court’s conclusion that grounds for
termination exist under § 2511(a)(2) where the repeated
and continued incapacity of a parent due to incarceration
has caused the child to be without essential parental care,
control or subsistence and that the causes of the incapacity
cannot or will not be remedied.
____________________________________________
(holding that the appellant waived her challenge to section 2511(b) by failing
to include it in her concise statement and statement of questions involved).
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In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 828 (Pa. 2012). Our Supreme Court
further stated:
[W]e now definitively hold that incarceration, while not a
litmus test for termination, can be determinative of the
question of whether a parent is incapable of providing
“essential parental care, control or subsistence” and the
length of the remaining confinement can be considered as
highly relevant to whether “the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent,” sufficient to provide grounds for
termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). See e.g.
Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d [883,] 891 [(Pa. 1986)] (“[A]
parent who is incapable of performing parental duties is just
as parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the
duties.”); [In re:] E.A.P., 944 A.2d [79,] 85 [(Pa.Super.
2008)] (holding termination under § 2511(a)(2) supported
by mother’s repeated incarcerations and failure to be
present for child, which caused child to be without essential
care and subsistence for most of her life and which cannot
be remedied despite mother’s compliance with various
prison programs).
Id. at 830.
Mother contends that because she expected to be released from
incarceration in April 2017, one month after the termination hearing,
“insufficient time was afforded Mother to successfully complete her required
objectives for reunification.” Termination Br. at 11.
The orphans’ court found that Mother’s repeated incarcerations have
impaired her ability to parent Children, stating:
Mother has repeatedly proved incapable of adequately
parenting her children. Namely, Mother has had consistent
substance abuse problems, has been unable to prov[id]e the
children with adequate housing, and has remained
unemployed. Most recently, Mother is currently serving a
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sentence of six (6) to sixty (60) months imprisonment, with
no evidence offered as to a likely release date.
Perhaps most telling, over the past five years, there have
been three separate periods of time where these children
have been in placement. The children were first adjudicated
dependent on November 23, 2011, when they were without
proper parental care and control due to Mother’s arrest for
driving under the influence while both [Son] and [Daughter]
were in the car. The children were adjudicated dependent
a second time on July 18, 2013, when they were without
proper parental care and control due to Mother’s numerous
criminal charges and her lack of stable housing. Most
recently, the children were placed in the temporary legal
and physical custody of the Agency on January 22, 2016,
when Mother gave birth to a drug exposed baby. After
consideration of the record, and specifically the foregoing
facts, it is clear Mother’s neglect meets the “repeated and
continued” standard of Section 2511(a)(2).
Having established the first element, the Agency easily
met the second – that the neglect left “the child . . . without
essential parental care, control or subsistence”. See 23
Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(2). Mother’s neglect has left the
children without a stable home. Providing stable and
adequate housing is perhaps one of the most essential
requirements of caring for one’s children. Further, Mother’s
repeated and numerous criminal charges have rendered her
unable to consistently care for her children. This is most
recently evidenced by her current incarceration. Mother’s
failure to comply with the law and consequent
incarcerations, in tandem with her . . . repeated failure to
refrain from drug use, indicate to this Court that Mother is
not prepared to meet the level of parental care expected of
a custodial parent. This Court is persuaded that Mother’s
neglect “has created a situation and an environment that
has left [her c]hildren without the necessary care they
require.” See In re A.S., 11 A.3d [473,] 480 [(Pa.Super.
2010)].
Finally, the frequency with which Mother has faced
criminal charges, coupled with her repeated drug use and
inability to provide her children with stable housing, further
demonstrates that the likelihood of remedying the
underlying conditions “within a reasonable period of time” is
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minimal at best. Thus, the Agency has met the requirement
of unlikely remediation under Section 2511(a)(2).
Opinion Sur Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), 5/24/17, at 17-19 (some internal citations
omitted) (“Termination 1925(a) Op.”).
Furthermore, the orphans’ court credited the testimony of Angela Rotz,
the caseworker with Fulton County Children Services, who testified that she
spoke with Children regarding potential visits or phone calls with Mother
during her incarceration. Specifically, Ms. Rotz explained:
[Son] said, no, he did not want to have [visitation or phone
calls with Mother]. When I talked to [Daughter], she did not
want to have visits or phone calls with her mother as well.
...
[Son], you know, stated that, you know, they were not
positive visits in the past. He didn’t feel like the visit[s] were
positive with his mom and he just didn’t want to go. I asked
if they wanted to do phone calls and [Son] clearly said, no.
N.T., 3/16/17, at 17-18.
As we have stated many times, “[a] child’s life simply cannot be
put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle
the responsibilities of parenting.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 9 (Pa.Super.
2009) (quoting In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276
(Pa.Super. 2003)). This Court has further stated:
Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more
suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental
responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her
physical and emotional needs. . . . This Court cannot and
will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for
permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress
and hope for the future. Indeed, we work under statutory
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and case law that contemplates only a short period of time,
to wit eighteen (18) months, in which to complete the
process of either reunification or adoption for a child who
has been placed in foster care. . . . [A] parent desiring to
retain parental rights must exert himself to take and
maintain a place of importance in his child’s life.
In re E.A.P., 944 A.2d 79, 83 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s decision.
Following Children’s adjudication, Mother was directed to complete the
following objectives before Children would be returned to her care: (1)
maintain stable housing; (2) obtain and maintain financial stability; (3) obtain
a psychological evaluation and follow all treatment recommendations; (4)
participate in a drug and alcohol assessment and follow all treatment
recommendations; (5) participate in random drug screens; (6) maintain
consistent visitation with Children; and (7) participate in in-home parenting
services. N.T., 3/16/17, at 35-43; Petitioner’s Ex. (B.M.D. termination) H.
These problems rendered her incapable of parenting Children at the time of
their removal.
Although Mother made several efforts to achieve sobriety, she failed to
complete a drug treatment program, having enrolled in two programs during
the ten months prior to her incarceration and failing to complete either
program. N.T., 3/16/17, at 37. Likewise, in the six random drug screens
conducted by the Agency, Mother tested positive for illegal substances in all
six drug screens. Id. at 36-37. Moreover, Mother was frequently
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uncooperative with the Agency and refused to sign releases of information to
the Agency. Id. at 38. In fact, the only release the Agency received from
Mother was a release from her inpatient drug treatment program, which
indicated that Mother had signed herself out of the program on July 4, 2016,
five days after she enrolled in the program on June 29, 2016. Id.
Mother also failed to address the Agency’s concerns regarding her lack
of stable housing and lack of employment. The Agency attempted to
implement in-home services through Counseling Options and Parent Education
(“COPE”). Id. at 39-40. While these services typically occur in the home
where the parent and children reside, Mother’s lack of stable housing required
that these services take place at the COPE building in McConnellsburg,
Pennsylvania. Id. Moreover, after Children were placed with Foster Parents,
Mother provided the Agency with another address, where Mother alleged she
was living. Id. at 41. However, the Agency visited the address provided by
Mother, only to discover that “it did not exist. The land was for sale. It was
a run down, you know, home. There was a mobile home on the property.”
Id. at 40-41. Mother also reported that she was staying with a friend in
Hancock, Pennsylvania, which the Agency was also unable to verify. Id. at
41.
In the five years prior to the termination hearing, Mother repeatedly
failed to comply with the law or maintain sobriety for any appreciable amount
of time, resulting in her repeated incarceration throughout the lifetimes of
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both Children. Mother has been incapable of providing parental care, control
or subsistence for Children’s physical and mental well-being, and this
incapacity persisted to the day of the termination hearing. We, therefore, find
no error or abuse of discretion in the orphans’ court’s decision to terminate
Mother’s parental rights to Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).
Finally, we address Mother’s challenge to the orders changing the
permanency goals for Children to adoption. We have stated:
In cases involving a court’s order changing the placement
goal . . . to adoption, our standard of review is abuse of
discretion. To hold the trial court abused its discretion, we
must determine that its judgment was manifestly
unreasonable, that the court disregarded the law, or that its
action was a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.
While this Court is bound by the facts determined in the trial
court, we are not tied to the court’s inferences, deductions
and conclusions; we have a responsibility to ensure that the
record represents a comprehensive inquiry and that the
hearing judge has applied the appropriate legal principles to
that record. Therefore, our scope of review is broad.
In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). We are mindful, however, that “[w]hen the trial
court’s findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we will affirm
‘even if the record could also support an opposite result.’” In re N.C., 909
A.2d 818, 823 (Pa.Super. 2006) (quoting In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d
502, 506 (Pa.Super. 2006)).
Furthermore, this Court has stated,
Placement of and custody issues pertaining to dependent
children are controlled by the Juvenile Act [42 Pa.C.S. §§
6301-65], which was amended in 1998 to conform to the
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federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”). The policy
underlying these statutes is to prevent children from
languishing indefinitely in foster care, with its inherent lack
of permanency, normalcy, and long-term parental
commitment. Consistent with this underlying policy, the
1998 amendments to the Juvenile Act, as required by the
ASFA, place the focus of dependency proceedings, including
change of goal proceedings, on the child. Safety,
permanency, and well-being of the child must take
precedence over all other considerations, including the
rights of the parents.
Id. (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
Section 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act provides in relevant part:
(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.-
- At each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of
the following:
(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the
placement.
(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of
compliance with the permanency plan developed for the
child.
(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the
circumstances which necessitated the original placement.
(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current
placement goal for the child.
(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the child
might be achieved.
(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize the
permanency plan in effect.
(6) Whether the child is safe.
...
(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of the
last 22 months or the court has determined that aggravated
circumstances exist and that reasonable efforts to prevent
or eliminate the need to remove the child from the child’s
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parent, guardian or custodian or to preserve and reunify the
family need not be made or continue to be made, whether
the county agency has filed or sought to join a petition to
terminate parental rights and to identify, recruit, process
and approve a qualified family to adopt the child unless:
(i) the child is being cared for by a relative best suited to
the physical, mental and moral welfare of the child;
(ii) the county agency has documented a compelling
reason for determining that filing a petition to terminate
parental rights would not serve the needs and welfare of
the child; or
(iii) the child’s family has not been provided with
necessary services to achieve the safe return to the
child’s parent, guardian or custodian within the time
frames set forth in the permanency plan.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f); see also In re S.B., 943 A.2d at 977-78.
“The trial court must focus on the child and determine the goal with
reference to the child’s best interests, not those of the parents.” In re S.B.,
943 A.2d at 978.
In challenging the orphans’ court’s decision to change Children’s
permanency goal to adoption, Mother presents the same argument she raised
in challenging the involuntary termination of her parental rights. In fact,
Mother does no more than copy and paste her argument from her brief
challenging the termination of her parental rights. Compare Termination Br.
at 9-11 with Goal Change Br. at 8-9. Mother’s argument is essentially that
her incarceration prevented her from completing her court-ordered objectives
and, thus, the orphans’ court erred by changing Children’s permanency goal
to adoption.
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The orphans’ court determined that the goal change to adoption would
be in Children’s best interest, stating:
Despite Mother’s assertion that she will soon be released
from her incarceration, no guarantee or evidence of any
certainty has been provided to this Court regarding when
Mother will actually be released. This Court believes, like
Attorney Abigail Salawage [(“GAL”)] articulated before this
Court at the hearing – that Mother is being overly positive
with her estimate of when she will be released from prison.
As this Court noted at the hearing:
Mom has not provided parental duties in the
past six months and it’s not just because of
incarceration.
The history shows that the agency attempted
to work with [Mother] since the time of the
adjudication in February of 2016 up until the
time of her incarceration in November of 2016.
During that time, by her testimony, she admits
that her major problem was drug addiction and
that she did not successfully complete a
program.
...
What the Court is faced with today is a promise
of a change on the part of [Mother]. I hope
for her sake, that she is successful upon her
parole from incarceration. I have only her
words that she is to be released in April, which
is doubtful to the Court, given the history of
[Mother] and her incarceration in November
with the sentence of 6 to 60 months within the
state system.
This Court further noted that it finds Mother has minimally
complied with established goals “based solely on her efforts
to communicate via writing with the children.”
Opinion sur Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), 5/9/17, at 12-13 (“Goal Change 1925(a) Op.”)
(citations to record omitted).
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The orphans’ court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are properly
supported in the record. Children were first placed with Foster Parents in July
of 2013, where they lived with Foster Parents for approximately eighteen
months. In January of 2016, Mother again failed to maintain sobriety, and
Children were removed from Mother’s care and placed with Foster Parents. At
the time of the March 16, 2017 hearing, Children had been in Foster Parents’
care for fifteen months. N.T., 3/16/17, at 21. The Agency established
objectives for Mother, including: refrain from using illegal drugs and alcohol
and maintain stable housing. Although Mother has expressed her desire to
raise Children upon her release from prison, Mother has not been able to meet
the essential needs of Children. Notably, Mother testified that she would be
released from prison in April of 2017, but failed to present any evidence
supporting her claim of an early release.
Children have adjusted well living with Foster Parents. N.T., 3/16/17,
at 22-24. Children have bonded with Foster Parents and their foster siblings.
Foster Mother testified that she is able to comfort Children when they are
upset and has expressed that she “would always be there” for Children. Id.
at 22, 24. Foster Mother indicated that Children experience anxiety due to
their lack of permanency and that Daughter sees a counselor at Laurel Life
twice a month to learn how to “take control of her future and understand how
to process things, process loss.” Id. at 23-24, 26. Foster Mother testified
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J-S62026-17 & J-S62027-17
that a strong bond exists between Children and Foster Mother and that
Children are doing “great” in her care. Id. at 24, 26.
Based on the record before us, we conclude that the orphans’ court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that Children’s welfare would best be served
by changing the goal to adoption. As this determination is supported by the
record, we may not disturb it on appeal. See N.C., 909 A.2d at 823.
Decrees and orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/14/2017
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