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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
P.E. PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.G., NATURAL FATHER
No. 707 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree Entered April 11, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 49 In Adoption 2016
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 18, 2017
J.G. (“Father”) appeals from the decree entered April 11, 2017, in the
Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, which involuntarily terminated
Father’s parental rights to his minor child, P.E. (“Child”) (born in September
of 2014), pursuant to sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(11), and (b) of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938.1 After careful review of the record
and applicable law, we affirm.
The orphans’ court summarized the procedural history and relevant
facts of this case in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, as follows:
[Child] was born [in] September [of] 2014 and adjudicated
dependent on September 30, 2014. At the time of the
adjudication, [Father’s] paternity was not established. [Father]
stipulated to being a Tier III Megan’s Law offender and to
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
The parental rights of Child’s biological mother, E.E. (“Mother”), were also
involuntarily terminated by separate decree on the same date. Mother is not
a party to the instant appeal.
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violating the conditions of his probation which forbid him from
having direct and indirect contact with minor females.
Confirmation of [Father’s] paternity occurred shortly after the
dispositional hearing in late October [of] 2014.
[Erie County Office of Children and Youth (“the Agency”)]
filed a [“]Motion for Aggravated Circumstances and to Suspend
Visitation[”] on November 3, 2014. The Agency’s motion as to
the finding of aggravated circumstances was granted, but [its]
motion to suspend visitation was denied. The Agency’s request
to eliminate reunification as a goal was also denied. The Agency
was then ordered to implement a service plan for [Father].
Several permanency review hearings were held.
Ultimately, the goal of the dependency action was changed to
adoption after the April 7 and 20, 2016 review hearings. The
juvenile court’s decision was based in large part on [Father’s]
lack of progress with services.
[Father] appealed the change of goal to the Superior
Court. The Superior Court affirmed the juvenile court’s ruling in
toto by non-precedential memorandum opinion filed November
1, 2016, and docketed at 799 WDA 2016. Subsequently, Father
filed a timely petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, docketed at 505 WAL 2016. The petition
was denied February 6, 2017.
In the interim, the Agency filed a petition for involuntary
termination of [Father’s] parental rights on July 6, 2016. The
Agency filed an amended petition on February 28, 2017, adding
grounds for termination under 23 Pa.C.S.[] 2511(a)(11) as to
[Father].
Orphans’ Court Opinion (“OCO”), 7/10/17, at 1-2 (citations to record and
unnecessary capitalization omitted).
A termination hearing was held on March 9 and 10, 2017. The lower
court made the following findings of fact based on the evidence presented at
the hearing:
[Father] was offered a variety of services through the
Agency and associated providers. Father also participated in a
psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Peter von Korff. A
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theme was readily apparent in all the Agency’s witnesses: that
[Father] minimized his own long-term mental health needs,
failed to respond to services provided, and failed to demonstrate
an ability to put [Child’s] needs ahead of his own.
Tina Ferraro [(“Ms. Ferraro”)], the Director of Project First
Steps, and Sally Huston [(“Ms. Huston”)], a case aide, both
testified to [Father’s] abysmal performance with services and
inappropriate behavior during visits with [Child].
[Father] became involved with [Ms.] Ferraro’s program in
March [of] 2015[,] until he was unsuccessfully discharged in
January [of] 2016. [Ms.] Ferraro recalled that during [his] first
interactions with her, [Father] displayed a range of emotions
from “zero to sixty” and tended to “stay at sixty”. [Ms.] Ferraro
noted this was an area [Father] needed to address in order to
establish a healthy relationship with both the adults assisting
him and his child.
[Ms.] Ferraro also worked with [Father] through the
implementation of behavior modification techniques and the use
of a Real Care Baby Simulator (the [“]doll[”]). Despite
[Father’s] overall positive scores, [Ms.] Ferraro reported the first
time [Father] used the doll, its readings indicated all of its
clothes were removed immediately and that it had been shaken.
When [Ms.] Ferraro collected the doll from [Father] after this
occasion, [Father’s] comments insinuated that he was “testing”
the doll to see what data it could record and what data it could
not.
When [Ms.] Ferraro observed [Father] during visitation
with [Child], [she] noted [Father] appeared to reign in his
escalated behavior, but was still difficult to control. Of particular
concern to [Ms.] Ferraro was her impression [Father’s] actions
were “scripted or coming from an agenda.” After correction,
[Ms.] Ferraro described [Father] appeared to improve, and she
became hopeful [he] was making progress towards independent
parenting. Unfortunately, [Father] later told [Ms.] Ferraro he
simply “learned to give people what they wanted to see.” After
a similar incident [Father] lamented, “I’m so excited—you can’t
hold this against me,” and “I knew I should stop but I wanted to
see what would happen.” In this instance, [Father] was
swinging [Child] around the room shortly after [Child] ate, which
caused the child to vomit. After some time, it was clear to the
workers [Father] could not appreciate how his behavior effected
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[sic] [Child]. In their opinion, it was “all about [Father] and how
[he] felt.”
According to [Ms.] Huston, [Father] was also unable to
appreciate [Child’s] medical needs, which included an allergy to
milk and severe eczema. [Father] attended medical
appointments for [Child], but was unable to recall basic
information about [Child’s] condition or the name of [Child’s]
primary care physician. When [Ms.] Ferraro tried to address this
concern with [Father], [he] reacted defensively, stating he “just
doesn’t do well when he’s on the spot,” and “doesn’t like pop
quizzes.”
Though [Father] knew [Child] had an allergy to dairy,
[Ms.] Huston testified [that he] insisted on bringing [Child] ice
cream for his birthday. When providers told [Father] the dessert
was not medically appropriate for [Child], [Father] attempted to
justify his gift by saying “it was just a little pint of ice cream.”
Over time, even [Father’s] participation in random
urinalysis became inconsistent, which caused him to miss visits
with [Child]. [Father] missed at least two months of visits in
total because the specimens he provided were dilute or he could
not produce.
[Ms.] Ferraro tried to brainstorm ways of remedying this
problem with [Father]. Instead of taking responsibility for his
actions and making an earnest attempt to do better, [he]
cavalierly blamed his failures on his “kidneys because they didn’t
filter beverages quickly enough.” [Ms.] Ferraro suggested
[Father] see a doctor to address this condition, but [he] never
followed up with a physician.
On at least one occasion when [Father] submitted a
sample for testing, he tested positive for alcohol. When
confronted, instead of admitting to consuming alcohol, [Father]
became argumentative. [He] swore he didn’t drink, only later to
admit he “had taken a calculated risk [to consume alcohol] and it
didn’t pay off.”
[Father’s] missed visits greatly influenced his developing
relationship with [Child]. Both [Ms.] Ferraro and [Ms.] Huston
testified [Child’s] initial responses to [Father]—failure to reach
for him, showing little to no excitement [Father] was in the
room, and not caring whether [Father] was there—became
[Child’s] go-to behavior. [Father], in turn, became more
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animated, anxious, and emotional around [Child], which pushed
[Child] further away. It was apparent to both [Ms.] Huston] and
[Ms.] Ferraro [that Child] shared little to no bond with [Father].
In sum, [Ms.] Ferraro and [Ms.] Huston felt they provided
[Father] with endless opportunities to improve his parenting
skills. Despite their efforts, [Father] resisted treatment and
displayed the same negative behaviors over a prolonged period
of time.
The ongoing caseworker’s testimony confirmed many of
[Ms.] Ferraro and [Ms.] Huston’s observations about [Father’s]
behavior with [Child], lack of bond, and lack of progress with
services. At least one caseworker testified she observed [the
vomiting incident], and after being shown how to properly
position [Child] in a supported position, [Father] would still allow
[Child] to fall over and hit his head.
The testimony from Gaylene Abbott-Fay [(“Ms. Abbott-
Fay”)], the permanency caseworker, revealed [Child] was placed
in a pre-adoptive home, was no longer in need of Early
Intervention services, and no longer had allergies. She stated
[Child] was verbal, bonded to the adoptive family, the home met
his needs, and it was in [Child’s] best interest [Father’s] parental
rights be terminated.
Dr. von Korff’s testimony addressed the effect of [Father’s]
psychological condition on his ability to parent and [Father’s]
lack of success with Agency programs. [Dr.] von Korff also
discussed the bonding assessment he performed on [Father] and
[C]hild. The court gave Dr. von Korff’s testimony great weight.
At the outset, [Dr. von Korff] found [Father] was defensive
and hostile towards Project First Step’s findings. [Father] even
went so far as saying “maybe there’s no more progress because
there’s no more progress to be made” in reference to his
abysmal performance with Project First Step. The doctor stated
[Father] felt his problems were not related to his own issues, but
instead were “circumstantial;” the result of “bad deals in life and
were not his fault.” Dr. von Korff did not agree. Instead, the
doctor opined [Father’s] problems were “longstanding” and that
[Father] required long[-]term counseling to address deficiencies
in his attachment orientation and personal and social
adjustment. Dr. von Korff stated [Father] “was more self-
involved and more self-gratifying than he was aware of his
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child’s needs and these issues needed to be remedied before
[Father] could adequately and safely parent [Child].
Additional testimony addressed Dr. von Korff’s
observations of [Father] and [C]hild’s interactions and the
results of the bonding assessment he performed. Dr. von Korff
observed [Father] could, on occasion, interpret his son’s cues,
but would often echo [Child’s] distress, which caused [Child] to
pull away from him. Dr. von Korff also observed that when
[Father] left the room, [Child] didn’t “skip a beat.” Instead of
crying out, [Child] invited the doctor to play. According to the
doctor, this behavior is often seen in children with avoidant
attachment because they develop a way to manage the absence
of a parent, though they still feel psychological stress.
As a final point, the doctor opined giving [Father]
additional time to address his deficiencies and try a different
method of care would be “challenging and possibly even
damaging” to the child because the child was at a time in his life
when stability and attachment to a primary caregiver was
paramount.
The credibility of [Father’s] testimony was suspect given
[his] inability to candidly answer questions, if at all, and take
responsibility for his actions. When asked why he chose to
consume alcohol even though he knew testing positive for
alcohol would result in missing visits with his son, [Father]
stated he made a terrible choice and recanted his prior
statement that he made a “calculated risk” to drink. Despite
[Father’s] recantation, [Father] testified that in deciding whether
to drink, he weighed the facts as he knew them: that he was
already called in to provide a sample twice that week, had
already appeared on a Sunday that month, and therefore[,]
concluded the likelihood he would be called in that Sunday to
produce was minimal. [Father] went on to state his choice to
describe the incident as one in which he took a “calculated risk
to drink” amounted to merely a poor choice in words, and
nothing more, even though the thought process [Father]
described amounted to just that.
[Father] used the excuse he made a “poor choice in words”
several other times in his testimony to explain away any
statement he previously made that reflected poorly on him. In
all of these instances[, Father] tried to convince the court his
words, as stated, did not reflect his true intention.
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[Father’s] answers to questions about his poor
performance with Project First Step, failure to complete Dr. von
Korff’s evaluations, and[] conversely[,] his completion of
services with Parkside [P]sychological [Associates], showed
[Father] only applied himself to things he chose to, when he
wanted to, despite admitting knowledge of the effect his failure
would have on his ability to see [Child].
Id. at 2-9 (citations to the record and footnote omitted).
On April 11, 2017, after reviewing the evidence presented at the
termination hearing and the briefs submitted by the parties, the court
entered its decree terminating Father’s parental rights. Father timely filed a
notice of appeal on May 11, 2017, along with a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). Father now
raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the [o]rphans’ court commit an abuse of discretion and/or
error of law when it concluded that [Father] was unwilling to
successfully parent [Child] and accept constructive criticism
from service providers?
2. Did the [o]rphans’ court commit an abuse of discretion and/or
error of law when it found [Father] had difficulty improving as
a parent due to his lack of consistency and insight into his
own mental health?
3. Did the [o]rphans’ court commit an abuse of discretion and/or
error of law when it concluded that [Father] failed to comply
with the service plan?
4. Did the [o]rphans’ court commit an abuse of discretion and/or
error of law when it found [Father] was unable to appreciate
[Child’s] medical needs or put [Child’s] needs ahead of his
own?
5. Did the [o]rphans’ court commit an abuse of discretion and/or
error of law when it determined [Father] would only do what
he wanted to do when he wanted to do it?
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6. Did the [o]rphans’ court commit an abuse of discretion and/or
error of law when it found [Father] failed to implement basic
parenting skills and was unable to interpret his son’s cues?
7. Did the [o]rphans’ court commit an abuse of discretion and/or
error of law when it concluded that [Father’s] testimony was
not credible?
8. Did the [o]rphans’ court commit an abuse of discretion and/or
error of law when it concluded that [Father’s] parental rights
should be terminated because he is required to register as a
sexual offender?
9. Did the [o]rphans’ court commit an abuse of discretion and/or
error of law when it concluded that that [sic] the termination
of [Father’s] parental rights was in [Child’s] best interest in
view of the evidence of record that [Child] and … [F]ather
share a loving relationship and bond?
Father’s Brief at 8-9.2
We review an appeal from the termination of parental rights under the
following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a
petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency
cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to
accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., …
9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; In re:
R.I.S., 36 A.3d [567,] 572 [(Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As
has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result
merely because the reviewing court might have reached a
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2
Father essentially treats issues one through seven as one claim in his brief
and asserts that the orphans’ court committed an abuse of discretion and/or
error of law by terminating his parental rights to Child pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and (2). See Father’s Brief at 35-45. Accordingly, we
address these issues together herein.
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different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia
Motors America, Inc., … 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011);
Christianson v. Ely, … 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead,
a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these
cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are
not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during
the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at
1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an
opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial
judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the
record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an
error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of
Atencio, … 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).
In termination cases, the burden is upon the petitioner to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the
termination of parental rights are valid. In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 806 (Pa.
Super. 2005). We have previously stated:
The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as
testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating
parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the
parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a).
Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interest of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511;
other citations omitted).
This Court must agree with only one subsection of 2511(a), in addition
to section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental rights. See
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Herein, we
review the decree pursuant to sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as
follows:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
…
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions
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and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
…
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2).
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] §
2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that
cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the
contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to
perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super.
2002) (citations omitted).
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental
duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A
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child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These
needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely
passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this
[C]ourt has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty
which requires affirmative performance.
In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008).
Moreover, this Court has previously stated:
A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the
parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in
resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-
child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting
for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental
responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her
physical and emotional needs.
Id. Where a parent does not “exercise reasonable firmness in declining to
yield to obstacles, his [parental] rights may be forfeited.” In re A.S., 11
A.3d 473, 481 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Instantly, Father asserts that he remedied the causes which led to the
removal of Child, consistently worked towards the goals of his treatment
plan, and successfully demonstrated a willingness and ability to perform
parental duties for Child. Father’s Brief at 35. Father also insists that he
was “misjudged” and was not given “an opportunity to demonstrate his
abilities as a father.” Id. at 38. After careful review, we discern that the
record clearly belies Father’s claims.
As summarized by the orphans’ court,
[t]he testimony elicited from the Agency workers and other
service providers revealed numerous occasions in which [Father]
was unable to accept criticism or appeared to progress, but later
admitted to “giving the workers what they wanted to see.”
Other statements [Father] made to [Dr.] von Korff[,] musing
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that no more progress was being made because there was no
more progress to make[,] support the notion [Father] was
unable or unwilling to accept constructive criticism. Dr. von
Korff testified extensively about [Father’s] mental health
deficiencies and need for long-term counseling services before
[Father] could even attempt to successfully parent [Child]. In
failing to complete Project First Step and failing to abstain from
the use of drugs and alcohol, [Father] did not comply with the
service plan.
[Father’s] own testimony showed he would comply with the
service plan and complete[] services only when he wanted to….
Given the manipulative nature of [Father’s] testimony, and
repeated assertion any of the statements he made which gave
the Agency pause were nothing more than a “poor choice of
words,” it was not error to find [Father’s] testimony lacked
credibility and reliability.
OCO at 14 (citations to record omitted). We deem the court’s
determinations to be well-supported by the record.
After we determine that the requirements of section 2511(a) are
satisfied, we proceed to review whether the requirements of subsection (b)
are met. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super.
2008) (en banc). This Court has stated that the focus in terminating
parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but the focus is on
the child pursuant to section 2511(b). Id. at 1008.
In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section
2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child
have been properly interpreted to include “intangibles such as
love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781,
791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa.
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1992)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s
“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional
bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at
791.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). With respect to the bond
analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b), the Court explained, “the mere
existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily
result in the denial of a termination petition.” Id. “Common sense dictates
that courts considering termination must also consider whether the children
are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster
parents.” Id. at 268 (citation omitted). Moreover, in weighing the bond
considerations pursuant to section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking
clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are young for a scant number of
years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development
quickly. When courts fail, … the result, all too often, is catastrophically
maladjusted children.” Id.
Here, the orphans’ court concluded that it would be in Child’s best
interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. The court emphasized
Father’s incapacity to parent Child and the lack of bond between Father and
Child. To the contrary, Father argues that the court erred in terminating his
parental rights, claiming that he shared a bond with Child and that during
his visits with Child, they began to develop a father-son relationship.
Father’s Brief at 50-51. Father added, “I don’t doubt my capacity to safely
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raise my son in a loving, nurturing, supportive, warm home…. No one wants
[the] best for [Child] more than I do.” Id. at 52.
After careful review, we conclude that the record overwhelmingly
supports the orphans’ court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights
pursuant to section 2511(b). In support of its determination, the court
explained:
[Father] draws attention to Dr. von Korff’s indications
reunification may be achievable, but ignores the impact
reunification would have on [Child]. [Child] has never lived in
[Father’s] care. While services to [Father] were available, visits
never progressed beyond two hours, weekly, due to [Father’s]
actions. [Father] has not seen [Child] since services were
terminated in April, 2016.
In assessing whether [Child] was bonded to [Father], Dr. von
Korff stated when [Father] left the room, [Child] “did not skip a
beat,” and adapted quickly. Service providers stated during
community visits with the child, the child would gravitate
towards them instead of [Father].
Dr. von Korff also opined [Child] was at a time in his life where
permanency and stability was of utmost importance. Failure to
terminate [Father’s] parental rights would only leave [Child] in
limbo, waiting for [Father] to address his long-term individual
needs, with no assurance [he] would succeed. The testimony
indicated that at present, [Child] is a happy, well-adjusted
toddler, who is bonded to another child in the adoptive home as
a sibling.
OCO at 12-13 (citations to record omitted).
The record reflects Lisa Langer (“Ms. Langer”), the ongoing caseworker
employed by the Agency, agreed that Father’s lack of progress with court-
ordered services and his inability to remedy any of the conditions that led to
Child’s original placement, coupled with Child’s young age and need for
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permanency, the lack of bond between Father and Child, and the fact that
Child never spent any time in Father’s care, were all factors that pointed in
favor of terminating Father’s parental rights. N.T. Termination, 3/10/17, at
59.3 Moreover, Ms. Langer was unable to identify any possible negative
effect that terminating Father’s parental rights may have on Child. Id. at
62.
Additionally, the termination of Father’s parental rights under section
2511(b) is supported by Ms. Abbott-Fay’s testimony. She reported that
Child is thriving in the adoptive home and is developmentally on target.
Child no longer needs early intervention services and his allergies have
improved. Id. at 83-84. Ms. Abbott-Fay added that Child only knows the
current foster family as “his family” and refers to the foster parents as
“Mommy and Daddy.” Id. at 85, 87. When asked if she believed there
would be any detrimental effect on Child if Father’s parental rights were
terminated, Ms. Abbott-Fay replied, “Absolutely not.” Id. at 87.
As there is competent evidence in the record that supports the
orphans’ court’s credibility and weight assessments regarding Child’s needs
and welfare, and the absence of any bond with Father, we conclude that the
court did not abuse its discretion as to section 2511(b). See S.P., 47 A.3d
____________________________________________
3
The transcripts of the termination hearing indicate that the proceedings
occurred on May 9 and 10, 2017; however, the actual dates the hearing
occurred are March 9 and 10, 2017. The correct dates are used in the
citations herein.
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at 826-27. Accordingly, we affirm the decree terminating Father’s parental
rights to Child.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/18/2017
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