In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: June 21, 2021
S21A0289. HUFFMAN v. THE STATE.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
A Forsyth County jury found Frank Huffman guilty of felony
murder in connection with the shooting death of James Tanner
Conrad (“Tanner”).1 On appeal, Huffman claims that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to law
enforcement officers by finding that he freely and voluntarily waived
his Miranda 2 rights. We affirm for the reasons set forth below.
1 On July 14, 2015, a Forsyth County grand jury indicted Huffman for
malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), and aggravated assault
(Count 3). At a jury trial held in September 2016, Huffman was found guilty of
Counts 2 and 3 and not guilty of Count 1. The trial court sentenced Huffman
to serve life in prison for felony murder (Count 2). Count 3 merged with Count
2. Huffman filed a motion for new trial on October 19, 2016, which he amended
on February 6, 2020. The trial court denied the motion for new trial as
amended on April 14, 2020. Huffman filed a timely notice of appeal, and the
case was docketed in this Court to the term beginning in December 2020 and
submitted for decision on the briefs.
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).
The evidence at trial showed that Huffman lived in his Forsyth
County home with his girlfriend, Sherry Conrad, and her adult son,
Tanner. On January 7, 2015, Tanner, Conrad, and Huffman drank
liquor together. Huffman became agitated, Conrad testified, when
Tanner used “cussing” language in front of her. After Tanner went
to bed, Conrad and Huffman sat in their recliners in the living room.
Conrad next recalled waking up and hearing Tanner calling her
name.
Conrad testified that after waking up she saw blood on the
floor and heard Huffman say, “look at my nose, he broke my nose.”
Tanner started cleaning up the blood. Meanwhile, Huffman went to
the master bedroom and returned with a gun. Conrad heard a loud
sound and saw smoke, and she turned and saw that Tanner had
been shot in his back left shoulder. Conrad took the gun from
Huffman, called 911, and reported that Huffman had shot Tanner.
Deputies with the Forsyth County Sheriff’s office responded to
the scene, where they found Huffman sitting in a chair with a wound
on his face. After summoning an ambulance for Tanner, deputies
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handcuffed Huffman and took him to a police station for
questioning. Tanner died shortly after reaching the hospital. In a
video-recorded interview, Huffman told the interviewing detective
that he shot Tanner.
Huffman filed a pretrial motion to suppress the statements he
made during the custodial interview on the grounds that the
statements were not freely and voluntarily given, and that he did
not understand or was not informed of his rights under Miranda.
The trial court held a pretrial Jackson-Denno 3 hearing to consider
Huffman’s motion to suppress. In pertinent part, the detective who
questioned Huffman testified at the hearing as follows. He advised
Huffman of his Miranda rights by reading those rights to him from
a form. Another officer brought a cup of coffee into the room while
the detective was reading the Miranda rights to Huffman, and the
detective told Huffman that he had a right to drink coffee. The
detective did not have Huffman sign the form because “it was on
video.” The detective described Huffman as having “looked rough,”
3 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).
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with a crooked nose and a bloody shirt and pants, consistent with
having been in a fight. The detective did not ask Huffman if he
needed medical attention, nor did he recall whether any officers
assisting him asked Huffman if he needed medical attention.
Huffman told the detective that he had been drinking, and the
detective discerned that Huffman’s speech was slurred, he smelled
strongly of alcohol, and he “appeared impaired.” However, Huffman
appeared to understand why he was there, understood the questions
asked of him, and answered appropriately as if he understood what
was asked. During the course of the interview, Huffman did not
invoke his right to remain silent or his right to an attorney.
Huffman did not testify at the Jackson-Denno hearing.
In addition to the detective’s testimony, the trial court
reviewed the video recording of Huffman’s interview. The trial court
entered a written order denying the motion to suppress. In that
order, the trial court noted that the video showed that Huffman was
“slightly bloody about his head, [had] blood on his shirt, and . . .
admitted to drinking prior in the evening.” The trial court found that
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the detective gave Huffman a cup of coffee when he read Huffman
the Miranda rights, adding that Huffman had “the right to drink
coffee.” The court assessed that “[t]hroughout the course of the
interview, [Huffman] coherently answered questions regarding the
events of the evening and described his relationship with the
victim.” The court found that Huffman was properly advised of his
Miranda rights, and that he understood those rights and did not
invoke them. The court also found that Huffman gave his
statements freely and voluntarily.
In its order denying Huffman’s motion for new trial, the trial
court rejected Huffman’s argument that he was not adequately
advised of his Miranda rights and that the court therefore erred in
denying his motion to suppress. The court affirmed that upon
“considering the totality of the circumstances, the State met its
burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
[Huffman’s] statements were freely and voluntarily given after a
knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights.”
On appeal, Huffman claims that the trial court erred in
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denying his motion to suppress by finding that he freely and
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. 4 More specifically, Huffman
claims that the trial court did not apply an “adequate analysis of the
totality of circumstances” in determining the admissibility of his
statements. As to those circumstances, Huffman argues that the
interviewing detective did not obtain a signed Miranda waiver form
and failed to ask him if he understood those rights or consented to
speaking with the detective. Huffman argues that the detective was
aware that he had been drinking and smelled of alcohol, and that he
was impaired and slurred his speech. The detective also knew,
Huffman asserts, that his nose was crooked and there was blood on
his pants and shirt, but did not ask him if he needed medical
attention. Huffman maintains that the detective “devalued” the
importance of informing him of his Miranda rights when he said
“you have the right to drink coffee” in the midst of reciting the
4Huffman does not challenge the admission of his statement on the
ground that it was involuntary under the more general due process standard,
and so we do not reach that issue. See Dozier v. State, 306 Ga. 29, 36 (4) (c)
(829 SE2d 131) (2019).
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Miranda rights. Huffman also asserts that he was not familiar with
the criminal process.
“To use a defendant’s custodial statements in its case-in-chief,
the State must show that the defendant was advised of his Miranda
rights and that he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived
them.” Hinkson v. State, 310 Ga. 388, 400 (5) (b) (850 SE2d 41)
(2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). A trial court, in assessing
whether a defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights is voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent, “must consider the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether the defendant’s waiver was
free of intimidation and coercion and whether the waiver was made
with a full awareness of both the nature of the rights being
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon them.”
Wells v. State, 307 Ga. 773, 776 (2) (838 SE2d 242) (2020) (citation
and punctuation omitted). An appellate court generally reviews a
trial court’s factual findings and determinations of credibility for
clear error; however, “where controlling facts are not in dispute,
such as those facts discernible from a videotape, our review is de
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novo.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
The interview video shows that, before reading the advisory of
the four rights on the Miranda form, the detective caught Huffman’s
attention by picking up the form and saying, “I’m going to go ahead
and do this real quick. Then we’ll talk.” In response, Huffman leaned
in toward the detective and watched the detective’s face attentively
while he read from the form. Huffman looked away from the
detective briefly when the other officer entered the interview room
with the coffee Huffman had requested and the detective said he had
a right to drink coffee. Once the officer set the coffee on the table,
Huffman again leaned in toward the detective and watched the
detective’s face while he completed reading the form. Huffman did
not express any confusion, verbally or in his facial expression, and
did not ask for any repetition or clarification of what the detective
had just advised him. The detective initiated the interrogation by
asking, “That being said, what happened to your nose? Is it broken,
or is it normally that way?” Huffman did not invoke his right to
silence or ask for an attorney, and he expressed no hesitation in
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responding to the detective with a narrative about the day’s events.
Huffman need not have had experience with the justice system
to understand what was said during the reading of his Miranda
rights. “While familiarity with the criminal justice system, and thus
with the Miranda warnings, may be one factor to consider in
determining whether a defendant has knowingly and intelligently
waived his rights, such a determination depends on the totality of
the circumstances.” Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 826 (1) (A) (2) (725
SE2d 260) (2012) (citations omitted). Here, the detective’s reading
of the Miranda warnings was not so rushed as to be unintelligible
absent familiarity with Miranda. Cf. id. at 825 (1) (A) (2) (evidence
supported trial court’s finding that Miranda warnings were read in
such a “super-speed” manner that they were likely not intelligible
without prior familiarity with Miranda). Although the detective told
Huffman he had a “right” to drink coffee, he did so after Huffman
had asked for coffee and while another officer was bringing the
beverage, and so the detective’s comment was specific to those
circumstances and could not be reasonably construed as more than
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a poor attempt at humor. But even taken literally, the detective’s
comment was not inconsistent with Huffman’s rights under
Miranda. Cf. Williamson v. State, 305 Ga. 889, 893-894 (2) (827
SE2d 857) (2019) (“A statement by an interrogating agent that
contradicts the Miranda warnings is a circumstance that can
indicate a suspect did not knowingly and intelligently waive his
rights.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
Huffman had been drinking alcohol earlier in the evening, and
there was blood along one side of his nose, which was visibly
wounded, as well as blood on his shirt and pants. However, the
detective testified at the Jackson-Denno hearing and at trial5 that
Huffman understood why he was there, appeared to understand the
questions that were asked, and answered them appropriately. Our
review of the video recording of the interview does not show
otherwise. Thus, notwithstanding that Huffman was impaired to
5An appellate court may consider all the evidence of record, and is not
limited to the evidence adduced at a Jackson-Denno hearing, in determining
the admissibility of a confession. See Butler v. State, 292 Ga. 400, 404 (2) n.7
(738 SE2d 74) (2013).
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some degree, “the [detective’s] testimony and the recorded interview
indicate that . . . [Huffman’s] mind was nevertheless clear enough to
make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights and to speak to
the [detective] without an attorney.” Rowland v. State, 306 Ga. 59,
64 (2) (829 SE2d 81) (2019).
Huffman did not sign a written waiver of his rights, but “a
written waiver is not necessary where a suspect is orally advised of
his or her rights and subsequently waives those rights through his
or her responses.” Kidd v. State, 304 Ga. 543, 546 (3) (820 SE2d 46)
(2018) (citations omitted). Nor did the detective ask for a verbal
waiver of Huffman’s Miranda rights or a verbal acknowledgment
that Huffman understood those rights. However, the trial court
could conclude from the detective’s testimony and its own
assessment of the interview recording—which accords with ours—
that Huffman understood his Miranda rights. And Huffman waived
his rights under Miranda when he understood those rights and then
freely made his statements without invoking his right to remain
silent and without requesting an attorney. See Berghuis v.
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Thompkins, 560 U. S. 370, 388-389 (III) (D) (30 SCt 2250, 176 LE2d
1098) (2010) (“[A] suspect who has received and understood the
Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives
the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the
police.”).6 The trial court’s decision to admit Huffman’s statements
was not clearly erroneous.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
6 See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U. S. 369, 373 (99 SCt 1755, 60
LE2d 286) (1979) (“An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right
to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity
of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish
waiver.”); Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 424 (3) (554 SE2d 458) (2001) (“Once
Miranda warnings are given and a person in custody gives a statement to
police without invoking his right to remain silent and without requesting an
attorney, he has in effect waived his rights.” (citation and punctuation
omitted)); United States v. Boon San Chong, 829 F2d 1572, 1574 (II) (11th Cir.
1987) (“In the absence of an express waiver, a waiver of [Miranda] rights can
be implied from the actions and words of the person being questioned. For
example, if after being advised of his rights an individual responds willingly to
questions without requesting an attorney, waiver may be implied.” (citation
omitted)).
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