FILED
JUNE 24, 2021
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 37578-1-III
)
Respondent, )
)
v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
JAVIER GARZA, )
)
Appellant. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — Javier Garza appeals after the juvenile court determined
it lacked statutory authority to vacate his 1995 adjudication that he was guilty of third
degree rape. We affirm.
FACTS
In 1995, a juvenile court adjudicated Javier Garza guilty of third degree rape.
In 2019, he moved to seal his juvenile file. In a later filed memorandum, citing
RCW 13.50.260(3), he argued the court should seal his juvenile file and vacate his
adjudication. The State objected insofar as Mr. Garza sought to vacate his adjudication.
After a contested hearing, the juvenile court granted Mr. Garza’s request to seal his file
No. 37578-1-III
State v. Garza
but denied his request to vacate his adjudication. The court later entered formal findings
of fact and conclusions of law.
Mr. Garza then filed a second motion to vacate, this time challenging the
constitutionality of Title 13 RCW, which governs juvenile courts and adjudications. He
argued Title 13 RCW, which governs juvenile courts and juvenile offenders, violates
federal and state equal protection to the extent that some adult convictions could be
vacated while no juvenile adjudications could. After a contested hearing, the court denied
Mr. Garza’s equal protection challenge. He then appealed to this court.
ANALYSIS
INTERPRETATION OF RCW 13.50.260(3)
Mr. Garza argues that RCW 13.50.260(3) grants a juvenile court the authority to
vacate his adjudication. We disagree.
RCW 13.50.260(3) provides in relevant part:
If a juvenile court record has not already been sealed pursuant to this
section, in any case in which information has been filed pursuant to
RCW 13.40.100 or a complaint has been filed with the prosecutor and
referred for diversion pursuant to RCW 13.40.070,[1] the person who is the
1
RCW 13.40.070(1) requires a prosecutor to review complaints referred to
juvenile court to ensure that court has jurisdiction and the complaint is supported by
probable cause. If so, the prosecutor then files an information in juvenile court or refers
the case for diversion. RCW 13.40.070(3).
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No. 37578-1-III
State v. Garza
subject of the information or complaint may file a motion with the court to
have the court vacate its order and findings, if any . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
We review the meaning of statutes de novo. State v. Wentz, 149 Wn.2d 342, 346,
68 P.3d 282 (2003). The purpose of statutory interpretation is to effectuate legislative
intent. State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186, 192, 298 P.3d 724 (2013). We do so by looking at
the plain language of the statute, considering the text of the provision and its context
within the statute, related provisions, and the statutory scheme. Id.
RCW 13.50.260 is entitled “Sealing hearings—Sealing of records.” (Boldface
omitted.) The plain language of RCW 13.50.260(3) does not permit a juvenile court to
vacate an adjudication. The language refers only to vacation of a juvenile court’s “order
and findings.” If the legislature intended the subsection to permit vacation of
adjudications, it could have said so. It did not.
Mr. Garza argues that “order and findings” include adjudications and cites
RCW 13.50.010(1)(c). That subsection defines “Official juvenile court file” as
including “findings of the court,” “court orders,” and “judgments.” Instead of supporting
his argument, RCW 13.50.010(1)(c) refutes it. It is evident that the legislature
differentiates between findings, orders, and judgments. An adjudication is a judgment.
RCW 13.50.260(3) permits a court to vacate its “order and findings”; it does not permit a
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No. 37578-1-III
State v. Garza
court to vacate its judgment or adjudication. We conclude that the juvenile court properly
denied Mr. Garza’s motion to vacate his adjudication.
EQUAL PROTECTION
Mr. Garza argues that Title 13 RCW violates his constitutional right to equal
protection because adult offenders can vacate some convictions while juvenile offenders
cannot. The State responds that Mr. Garza lacks standing to make this argument. We
agree.
“A defendant has no standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute unless the
defendant is harmfully affected by the particular feature of the statute alleged to be
unconstitutional.” State v. Jendrey, 46 Wn. App. 379, 384, 730 P.2d 1374 (1986) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 60 Wn.2d 397, 401, 374 P.2d 246 (1962)). The law does not allow a
court to vacate adult convictions of third degree rape. See RCW 9.94A.640(2)(b);
RCW 43.43.830(7). Because Mr. Garza is not harmed by the law’s unequal treatment of
juvenile adjudications and adult convictions, he has no standing to assert his equal
protection argument. The juvenile court correctly rejected Mr. Garza’s equal protection
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No. 37578-1-III
II
State v. Garza
challenge. 2
l
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
WE CONCUR:
Staab, J.
2
Courts may vacate some adult convictions but no juvenile adjudications. In this
manner, the law treats adult convictions and juvenile adjudications unequally. Yet for
Mr. Garza to prevail on his equal protection challenge, he must establish that persons-
not convictions-are treated unequally. State v. Schaaf, 109 Wn.2d 1, 17, 743 P.2d 240
(1987). We note that neither juveniles nor adults can vacate their juvenile adjudications.
5