IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-1583
Filed June 30, 2021
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ZACHARY ALAN BECKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Jeffrey L. Harris,
District Associate Judge.
After pleading guilty to operating while intoxicated, third or subsequent
offense, and driving while barred, as an habitual offender, the defendant
challenges his sentences on appeal. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED FOR ENTRY
OF A NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER.
Thomas J. Viner of Viner Law Firm, PC, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Katie Krickbaum, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., Ahlers, J., and Potterfield, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2021).
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POTTERFIELD, Senior Judge.
Zachary Becker pled guilty to operating while intoxicated (OWI), third or
subsequent offense, and driving while barred as an habitual offender. In
September 2019, he was sentenced to terms of incarceration not to exceed five
years and two years, respectively. On appeal, Becker challenges his sentences,
arguing the court failed to state adequate reasons on the record to support
imposing them.
Because judgment was entered against Becker in September 2019, Iowa
Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) (Supp. 2019) controls his right to appeal. See State
v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 103 n.1 (Iowa 2020) (“We iterate that date of the
judgment being appealed controls the applicability of the amendment to section
814.6.”). In other words, Becker needs “good cause” to appeal because he pled
guilty to crimes that are not class “A” felonies. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3).
And here, where he challenges his sentences, he has good cause. See Damme,
944 N.W.2d at 105 (“[G]ood cause exists to appeal from a conviction following a
guilty plea when the defendant challenges his or her sentence rather than the guilty
plea.”).
“Sentencing decisions of the district court are cloaked with a strong
presumption in their favor.” State v. Majors, 940 N.W.2d 372, 385–86 (Iowa 2020)
(citation omitted). If, as here, the sentence imposed is within the statutory limits,
we review for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 385. When considering a discretionary
sentencing ruling, we note that we may find an abuse of discretion
if a sentencing court fails to consider a relevant factor that should
have received significant weight, gives significant weight to an
improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only appropriate facts but
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nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment by arriving at a
sentence that lies outside the limited range of choice dictated by the
facts of the case.
Id. (quoting State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 138 (Iowa 2017)).
To begin, we note the discrepancy between the sentences the court orally
stated it was imposing at the sentencing hearing and the sentencing order that was
filed. In its oral pronouncement, the court ordered Becker to serve the
indeterminate five-year sentence and the indeterminate two-year sentence
consecutively, for a term not to exceed seven years. However, the written
sentencing order states, “Counts 1 and 2 are to run concurrently with one another.”
When “there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of sentence and
the written judgment and commitment, the oral pronouncement of sentence
controls.” State v. Hess, 533 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Iowa 1995). So we review
Becker’s challenge to his sentence with this in mind.
Becker claims the court failed to state adequate reasons on the record for
the sentences imposed because it “did not fully address [his] age, education,
employment, family situation, or other potentially mitigating factors.” He also
claims the court made no findings as to how the sentence was appropriate for him
and how it would benefit or protect the community. We disagree. At the sentencing
hearing, the State recommended that the court order Becker to serve the maximum
sentences and to run the two sentences consecutively, noting the September 2018
incidents to which Becker pled guilty included him hitting a vehicle and then fleeing
the scene. When officers apprehended him a short time later, Becker admitted he
had consumed alcohol before driving and a cold, open beer was found in his
vehicle. Becker denied his involvement in the hit and run, claiming damage to his
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vehicle was the result of hitting a raccoon. Meanwhile, the passenger in the vehicle
he hit was taken to the hospital by ambulance.
Additionally, Becker was thirty years old at the time of the 2018 incident,
and he already had four previous OWI convictions and two other driving-while-
barred offenses.1 He also had a history of eluding—not including leaving the scene
of the crime here. And it was Becker’s second time being part of an accident while
driving intoxicated. According to the presentence investigation (PSI) report,
Becker continued to consume alcohol in the period after his arrest. Becker
“acknowledge[d] his alcohol problem and need for substance abuse treatment but
did not seek treatment.” He did not have a substance-abuse evaluation scheduled
until May 2019—about eight months after the incident. The State argued Becker
had not taken advantage of the resources the State had provided him in his other
cases and was “continuing to put society in danger.” The PSI preparer
recommended Becker be placed in the OWI Continuum, admitted to the Iowa
Medical and Classification Center for sixty days, and then placed in a residential
OWI program. The preparer noted Becker was “resistant” to be placed in the
program but “is willing to be placed in such in lieu of serving a 5-year prison term.”
The State argued a more strict punishment was needed because Becker had
already completed the program once, in 2013, and had several more convictions
afterward.
1 Becker had previous OWI convictions in 2008, 2009, 2012, and 2013. He was
also charged with OWI in 2007; he received a deferred judgment and successfully
discharged his probation in that case.
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The court listened to the detailed recommendations of the State and
defense counsel. It also referenced the PSI report, which included statements
about Becker’s age, employment, education, family and housing situation, and
more. The court also listened to Becker’s statement, expressing that he was sober
after getting treatment and he recognized he should have done it “long before any
of this ever happened.”
In sentencing Becker, the court stated:
Mr. Becker, there are a number of sentencing goals and
objectives that the court must consider in reaching what it believes
to be an appropriate sentence. One of the first sentencing goals and
objectives is, of course, to punish you for the offense of operating
while intoxicated third and driving while barred. As I just read into
the record, you are certainly not a stranger to the offense of operating
while intoxicated and driving while license barred.
Yet another sentencing goal is to rehabilitate you, if possible.
I’ve certainly heard what you’ve presented and what your counsel
has argued on your behalf. I believe part of what you say about how
the recent treatment has assisted you. I’m confused as to why it’s
taken you so long to get to that point, why it’s taken you five operating
while intoxicated convictions and three previous driving while license
barred convictions to get you to that point.
Yet another sentencing goal is to deter you and others
similarly situated from committing this offense in the future, and then
another sentencing goal and objective is to protect society.
The court has balanced the sentencing goals and objectives
in light of your written plea of guilty and acceptance of responsibility,
the arguments of counsel, the favorable and unfavorable matters
submitted in the 14-page presentence investigation filed on May 23rd
of 2019. The court has certainly considered your unsworn statement
to the court, and the court has also considered the letters of support
principally filed by Ms. Powell in Defendant Exhibit A and Ms.
Mangrich in Defendant Exhibit B.
You have had a prior 321J placement. You need to
understand that placement in the 321J program is not a revolving
door. It is very difficult, if not impossible, for this court to go back in
the sentencing continuum when you’ve already been placed in the
321J program. If you have not adjusted your behavior, stepped
punishment should be imposed, which I am about to do.
The court has afforded some weight to the victim impact
statement filed in this matter. The court finds that the victim
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encountered considerable difficulties obtaining a ride to work and
getting her child to school because of damages you caused to her
vehicle. Either you were lying or you were quite inebriated at the
time you talked to the . . . police official and asked you what had
happened and whether or not you had been involved in a motor
vehicle accident, and you said no, that you had not been involved in
a motor vehicle accident and that you had hit a raccoon.
The court imposed a term not to exceed five years for the OWI, third offense,
conviction and a term not to exceed two years for the driving-while-barred
conviction. The court then explained:
I have determined that based upon the matters presented by the
State of Iowa, and further finding that the defendant has received
sentences on six operating while intoxicated and three driving while
license barreds, that he is not getting the message; that the message
will best be served upon the defendant by directing that Counts I and
II be served consecutively, which I am so ordering.
Further, the court finds that the elements of these two
offenses are wholly distinguishable, as they contained elements of
proof that are totally separate and distinct from each other. The
defendant could easily have driven without the influence of alcohol,
which he did not do in this case.
The court explained its sentencing decision at length. And it “need not explain its
reasons for rejecting a particular sentence.” State v. Crooks, 911 N.W.2d 153, 171
(Iowa 2018). “The court did not fail to consider the available options and explained
why it selected the sentence it imposed. The court therefore did not abuse its
discretion.” Id.
We affirm Becker’s sentences and remand for entry of a nunc pro tunc order
so the sentencing order reflects that Becker is to serve consecutive terms of
imprisonment. See Hess, 533 N.W.2d at 529 (remanding for entry of nunc pro
tunc order to correct the written judgment entry).
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED FOR ENTRY OF A NUNC PRO TUNC
ORDER.