[Cite as State ex rel. Bradford v. Bowen, 2021-Ohio-2336.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MAHONING COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, ex rel. PELE K. BRADFORD,
Petitioner,
v.
RICHARD A. BOWEN, JR., WARDEN,
Respondent.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Case No. 20 MA 0025
Writ of Habeas Corpus
BEFORE:
Cheryl L. Waite, Gene Donofrio, David A. D’Apolito, Judges.
JUDGMENT:
Dismissed.
Pele K. Bradford, Pro se, #A475-341, Ohio State Penitentiary, 878 Coitsville-Hubbard
Road, Youngstown, Ohio 44505
Atty. William H. Lamb, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Justice Section, 1600
Carew Tower, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for Respondent.
Dated: June 30, 2021
–2–
PER CURIAM.
{¶1} Petitioner Pele K. Bradford, a prison inmate representing himself, has filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking immediate release from the Ohio State
Penitentiary (OSP) in Youngstown, Ohio, where he is presently incarcerated. The petition
names as respondent, Richard A. Bowen, Jr., Warden of the OSP. Petitioner argues his
conviction in adult court is void ab initio because he was 17 years old at the time of the
offense, apprehension, and trial. Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition
or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment, with a copy of Petitioner’s birth
certificate attached establishing that he was 18 years old at the time of the offense. For
that reason, the Court grants Respondent’s motion for summary judgment and dismisses
the petition.
{¶2} In 2005, a Hamilton County Common Pleas Court jury convicted Petitioner
of aggravated murder, having a weapon while under disability, and attendant firearm
specifications. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to an aggregate 23-year term of
imprisonment. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and
sentences. State v. Bradford, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040382, 2005-Ohio-2208.
Petitioner did not seek review from the Ohio Supreme Court.
{¶3} In 2007, Petitioner pleaded guilty to escape after climbing the perimeter
fence at Ross Correctional Institution. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a 2-year
term of imprisonment to be served consecutively to the sentence for which he was
imprisoned at the time of the offense. Petitioner did not pursue a direct appeal of that
conviction and sentence, but did file a postconviction relief petition claiming the indictment
Case No. 20 MA 0025
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named Pele K. Bradford, a wholly separate and distinct entity which Petitioner attempted
to prove by way of a security agreement, two affidavits, and several Uniform Commercial
Code documents. The trial court rejected the argument and dismissed the petition. The
Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Bradford, 4th Dist. Ross No. 08CA3053,
2009-Ohio-1864.
{¶4} Petitioner continues his attempts to collaterally attack his convictions and
sentences. To date, Petitioner has identified in his civil litigation history affidavit 38
instances of collateral attack, including: postconviction motions filed in the trial courts;
appeals of the denial of those motions to the courts of appeal and the Ohio Supreme
Court; original actions (habeas, mandamus, procedendo, and prohibition) filed in various
common pleas courts, courts of appeal, and the Ohio Supreme Court; appeal of the
dismissals of those original actions to the courts of appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court;
habeas filed in federal district court and appeal of the denial of that writ to the federal
circuit court of appeals; and two court of claims actions. Petitioner’s most recent iteration
is the original action in habeas corpus that he filed with this court.
{¶5} R.C. 2725.01 provides: “Whoever is unlawfully restrained of his liberty, or
entitled to the custody of another, of which custody such person is unlawfully deprived,
may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment,
restraint, or deprivation.” Generally, the writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary writ
and will only be issued in certain circumstances of unlawful restraint of a person’s liberty
where there is no adequate legal remedy at law, such as a direct appeal or postconviction
relief. In re Pianowski, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 03MA16, 2003-Ohio-3881, ¶ 3; see also
State ex rel. Pirman v. Money, 69 Ohio St.3d 591, 593, 635 N.E.2d 26 (1994).
Case No. 20 MA 0025
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{¶6} However, the availability of an adequate remedy at law is not a barrier to
habeas when the state prosecutes a juvenile in adult court under the mistaken belief that
the defendant was an adult when the offense was committed. Smith v. May, 159 Ohio
St.3d 106, 2020-Ohio-61, 148 N.E.3d 542, ¶ 21, reconsideration denied, 158 Ohio St.3d
1437, 2020-Ohio-877, 141 N.E.3d 254. As the Ohio Supreme Court observed, this result
is compelled by the General Assembly in the bindover statute which expressly provides
that “[a]ny prosecution that is had in a criminal court on the mistaken belief that the person
who is the subject of the case was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be deemed a nullity, and the person shall not be
considered to have been in jeopardy on the offense.” R.C. 2152.12(H).
{¶7} Respondent has requested summary judgment in this matter. Summary
judgment is governed by Civ.R. 56(C). Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), a trial court shall grant
a motion for summary judgment if, after construing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, the court finds an absence of a genuine issue of material fact and
that reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion, that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. State ex rel. Sweeting v. Starr, 7th Dist. No. 14 NO 412,
2014-Ohio-5505, ¶ 3, citing State ex rel. Parsons v. Flemin, 68 Ohio St.3d 509, 511, 628
N.E.2d 1377 (1994).
{¶8} In this instance, the viability of Petitioner’s habeas claim centers on whether
Petitioner was a juvenile at the time of the offense. Respondent has submitted a copy of
Petitioner’s birth certificate which demonstrates he was 18 years old at the time of the
offense. Petitioner relies on a copy of a U.S. Department of Education Student Financial
Assistance document which bears a date of birth that would make him 17 years old at the
Case No. 20 MA 0025
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time of the offense. We find that reasonable minds can only conclude that Petitioner’s
birth certificate provides the more reliable and credible evidence of his date of birth.
{¶9} Accordingly, Respondent’s motion for summary judgment is sustained and
Petitioner’s original action for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed.
{¶10} Final order. Clerk to service notice as provided by the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Costs taxed to Petitioner.
JUDGE CHERYL L. WAITE
JUDGE GENE DONOFRIO
JUDGE DAVID A. D’APOLITO
Case No. 20 MA 0025