NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 9 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICARDO BIRCHER, Trustee of the No. 20-55608
Bircher Living Trust,
D.C. No.
Plaintiff-Appellant, 2:19-cv-04864-PA-SK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 7, 2021**
Pasadena, California
Before: D.M. FISHER,*** WATFORD, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Ricardo Bircher (“Bircher”), trustee of the Bircher Living Trust (“Trust”),
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
appeals from a district court judgment denying the Trust’s claim for supplemental
life insurance benefits under an ERISA-governed plan issued by Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company (“MetLife”). The plan insured Bircher’s mother, Lupe Bircher
(“Lupe”), a former AT&T employee who retired in June 1988. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
“Where, as here, a district court has conducted a de novo review of an ERISA
plan administrator’s decision, we review the court’s factual findings only to
determine whether they are ‘clearly erroneous.’” Muniz v. Amec Const.
Management, Inc., 623 F.3d 1290, 1294 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Silver v. Executive
Car Leasing Long–Term Disability Plan, 466 F.3d 727, 732–33 (9th Cir. 2006)).
“We look at a finding or a conclusion in its true light, regardless of the label that the
district court may have placed on it.” Tri-Tron Intern. v. Velto, 525 F.2d 432, 435
(9th Cir. 1975).
1. ERISA’s civil enforcement mechanism allows plan “participant[s] or
beneficiar[ies]” to seek “benefits due . . . under the terms of [their] plan[s].” 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1). MetLife’s Summary Plan Description (“SPD”) states:
[Supplemental life insurance] [c]overage ends on the last day of the
month upon Termination of Employment, except for Eligible Former
Employees of AT&T West who, with Termination of Employment
before the dates below, may continue Supplemental Life beyond age
65. . . .
The SPD goes on to list former employees of the “AT&T West Core Contract” as
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among those subject to the above exception. Under the terms of the SPD, Lupe’s
supplemental life insurance coverage would have terminated on June 30, 1988,
unless she was an eligible former employee of “AT&T West” who elected to
continue supplemental coverage post-retirement.
The district court, however, found that Lupe was an employee of AT&T
Corporation, not AT&T West. In arriving at this finding, the district court noted that
AT&T’s administrator concluded that Lupe’s legacy company was AT&T Corp. and
not AT&T West. Moreover, the district court found “no evidence in the record to
show that [Lupe] ever paid premiums for Supplemental Life Insurance coverage
after she retired.”
Bircher’s contention that Lupe was part of AT&T West by virtue of being
employed by AT&T within the Nevada and California region is not persuasive.
Bircher largely relies on three district court opinions allegedly suggesting AT&T
West refers to a region, as opposed to a specific legacy corporation. See Whatley-
Bonner v. Pac. Telesis Grp. Comprehensive Disability Benefit Plan, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 139599 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2011); Gordon v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 81657 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2014); Clay v. AT&T Umbrella Ben. Plan
No. 3, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190308 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2019). Nevertheless, none
of these cases compel a finding that all AT&T employees working within California
and Nevada were employees of AT&T West, nor do they rebut the district court’s
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factual findings specific to Lupe’s coverage.
In view of the record, the district court’s findings of fact were not clearly
erroneous. See Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 673 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e reverse
the district court’s findings of fact only if they are (1) illogical, (2) implausible, or
(3) without support in inferences that may be drawn from the record.” (simplified)).
To the contrary, we find the record provides sufficient support to affirm the district
court’s conclusion that Lupe was not eligible for post-retirement supplemental life
insurance coverage under the plan.
2. Bircher’s argument that MetLife lost or destroyed documents related to
Lupe’s eligibility and, therefore, cannot deny the existence of coverage also lacks
support. While MetLife concedes that it lost the 1988 SPD that was in effect at the
time of Lupe’s retirement, our court’s precedents instruct that a more recent SPD—
such as the 2016 SPD in the record—controls regardless. See Grosz-Salomon v.
Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1154, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 2001). Bircher offers
no evidence that any missing documents would have changed the outcome of this
case.
3. Finally, Bircher’s contention that MetLife committed various
procedural violations when handling the Trust’s claims has no impact on this appeal.
Because the decision of the plan administrator is reviewed de novo, courts do “not
give deference . . . but rather determine[] in the first instance if the claimant has
4
adequately established that he or she is [entitled to benefits] under the terms of the
plan.” Muniz, 623 F.3d at 1295–96. Thus, Bircher’s allegations of procedural
violations do not bear on our decision.
AFFIRMED.
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