NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 13 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DULCE MONTES-DE OCA PEREZ,
No. 20-70107
et al,
Agency Nos. A208-593-095
Petitioners, A208-593-096
A208-593-097
MEMORANDUM*
v.
MERRICK GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of a
Final Order of the Immigration Judge
Submitted July 9, 2021**
Pasadena, California
Before: WATFORD and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and FREUDENTHAL, ***
District Judge
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except
as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Nancy D. Freudenthal, United States District Judge for the
District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.
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Dulce Montes-De Oca Perez and her two children (collectively “Petitioner”1)
appeal a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their
appeal of a decision by an Immigration Judge (IJ) denying Petitioner’s application
for asylum. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and we deny the petition.
Petitioner challenges the agency’s determination that her proposed social
groups were circular. Petitioner also challenges the determination that she failed to
prove membership in her social groups and that the Mexican government was unable
or unwilling to protect her. We review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo and
findings of fact for substantial evidence. Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1056
(9th Cir. 2009); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
Petitioner’s social groups are all premised on the inability of a Mexican
woman to leave a domestic relationship. Petitioner argues inability to leave based
on financial dependence which she claims is supported by the Mexico 2016 Human
Rights Report discussing gender wage discrimination and her expert’s declaration.
Petitioner testified she left her abuser approximately twelve times, but voluntarily
returned because of pity and affection, not because of financial dependence or
economic abuse. General reports and declarations from expert witnesses do not
substitute for Petitioner’s own explanation of her motives for repeatedly leaving and
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The children are derivative beneficiaries of their mother’s asylum application.
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returning to her abuser. On the record presented, the BIA correctly concluded
Petitioner failed to prove membership in her proposed social groups. We need not
address Petitioner’s circularity argument.
Petitioner suffered abuse from a private actor she did not report. Petitioner’s
primary reason for not contacting the police was that she believed the police would
do nothing. In at least two instances, though, others called the police who arrived,
but Petitioner still did nothing to seek protection from the abuse. While Petitioner
need not report abuse to the authorities, her failure to do so simply because she
believed the police would do nothing is not sufficient to “demonstrate that a
country’s laws or customs effectively deprive the petitioner of any meaningful
recourse to governmental protection” or “convincingly establish that [going to the
authorities] would have been futile or would have subjected [Petitioner] to further
abuse.” Rahimzadeh v. Holder, 613 F.3d 916, 921–922 (9th Cir. 2010) (simplified).
The passages of the Human Rights Report that Petitioner cites regarding this issue
do not compel the contrary conclusion.
Finally, Petitioner misreads Niz-Chavez v. Garland, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct.
1474 (2021), as invalidating her removal proceedings. As in Pereira v. Sessions,
___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), Niz-Chavez interprets 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1),
which only concerns the stop-time rule. Immigration court jurisdiction, by contrast,
is governed by federal regulation, which “does not require that the time and date of
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proceedings appear in the initial notice.” Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158,
1160 (9th Cir. 2019).
PETITION DENIED.
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