Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed July 14, 2021.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D21-1265
Lower Tribunal No. F21-6792
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Alex Garcia,
Petitioner,
vs.
Daniel Junior, etc., et al.,
Respondents.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Habeas Corpus.
Daniel J. Tibbitt, P.A., and Daniel Tibbitt, for petitioner.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Kseniya Smychkouskaya,
Assistant Attorney General, for respondent The State of Florida.
Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and LINDSEY and BOKOR, JJ.
BOKOR, J.
The early morning hours of New Year’s Day, 2021, found sixteen-year-
old Alex Garcia at the wheel of his mother’s black Chevrolet Tahoe. Despite
testimony from Garcia’s mom that she gave permission only for Garcia to
listen to music in the car, the State presented uncontroverted evidence, in
the form of surveillance videos, body camera footage, and testimony from
the responding officer and surviving crash victims that Garcia drove the
Tahoe. Possessing only a learner’s permit and accompanied by two 16-
year-old friends, Garcia drove westbound on West Flagler Street at speeds
of up to 111 miles per hour, according to black box data presented to the trial
court. Speeding down West Flagler at 79th Avenue, at approximately 3:37
am, Garcia plowed into a blue Hyundai Elantra pulling into the intersection.
Making contact at a black box recorded speed of 105 miles per hour (in an
area with a 40 mile per hour speed limit), the Tahoe dragged the Elantra 294
feet before coming to rest, with the front of the Tahoe wedged into the driver’s
side of the Elantra where it initially made contact. While Garcia survived the
crash unharmed, the impact killed all four occupants of the Elantra and
seriously injured Garcia’s passengers.
Based on the investigation into the crash, which included a blood draw
and toxicology report, on April 16, 2021, the State charged Garcia by
information as an adult with four counts of driving under the influence (DUI)
2
manslaughter, a second-degree felony, pursuant to section 316.193(3)(c)(3),
Florida Statutes (2020), and multiple other charges. 1 On April 19, 2021, the
State moved for pretrial detention under section 907.041(4)(c), and on April
25, 2021, Garcia moved for pretrial release on reasonable conditions.
The trial court conducted a multi-day evidentiary hearing and, on April
30, 2021, granted the State’s motion and ordered pretrial detention. Garcia
petitions this court for habeas relief. Garcia argues that the trial court erred
in ordering pretrial detention because the State failed to present sufficient
facts to support pretrial detention. Garcia argues that the trial court erred as
a matter of law in incorrectly interpreting the statutory prerequisites before
ordering pretrial detention, and that the trial court erred in making factual
findings unsupported by the record. The State argues otherwise, claiming
that the evidence presented a sufficient basis under the relevant statutory
scheme for the trial court to exercise its discretion and order no pretrial
release.
1
The State also charged Garcia with four counts of vehicular
homicide/reckless manner, a second-degree felony, section 782.071(1)(A);
and two counts of DUI causing serious bodily injury, a third-degree felony,
section 316.193(3)(c)(2). We focus on the DUI manslaughter charge as it is
the basis for the State seeking pretrial detention.
3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo legal conclusions regarding the meaning of a
statute. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So. 2d 287, 289 (Fla.
2003) (“Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo
review.”). We review the trial court’s factual determinations under an abuse
of discretion standard. Specifically, we look to determine whether competent
substantial evidence exists in the record to support the trial court’s findings
of fact. Quevedo v. So. Fla. Water Management Dist., 762 So. 2d 982, 988
(Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (explaining that the findings of a lower tribunal or agency
may be set aside only where “not supported by competent substantial
evidence in the record”) (citations omitted).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
For non-capital offenses not punishable by life imprisonment, the
Florida Constitution mandates “pretrial release on reasonable conditions. If
no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk of
physical harm to persons . . . the accused may be detained.” Art. I, § 14,
Fla. Const.; see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.131(a). For a non-capital, non-life
punishable offense delineated as a “dangerous crime,” including DUI
manslaughter, the statutory scheme codifies “the intent of the Legislature
that the primary consideration be the protection of the community from risk
4
of physical harm to persons.” § 907.041(1), Fla. Stat. (2020). The statute
continues, instructing that the trial court “may order pretrial detention” upon
finding a “substantial probability” that Garcia committed “DUI manslaughter
as defined by section 316.193” and that Garcia “poses a threat of harm to
the community.” Id. at (4)(c). The trial court held the evidentiary hearing in
two phases, first determining by a substantial probability that Garcia
committed the offense and next determining by a substantial probability that
he posed a threat of harm to the community, and that no conditions of pretrial
release would appropriately mitigate that threat. We will take each in turn in
the order addressed by the trial court.
Substantial Probability That Garcia Committed DUI Manslaughter
First, the trial court found a substantial probability that Garcia
committed DUI manslaughter based on evidence presented including
testimony at the hearing from the first responders on the scene, a review of
the bodycam footage showing at least one incident of slurred speech and
one incident of stumbling as Garcia attempted to sit, the toxicology report
from Garcia’s blood draw taken at the hospital two hours after the crash
showing the presence of alcohol (blood alcohol level of .062), THC and THC
metabolites, operating a vehicle at almost three times the posted speed limit
5
on a surface road, 2 the Tahoe’s limited or nonexistent braking before impact,
and Garcia’s impaired situational awareness (e.g., driving past Officer
Lozada in a marked unit and not slowing down or otherwise reacting,
showing a lack of peripheral awareness).
Garcia notes testimony regarding Garcia’s lack of bloodshot eyes, his
alertness at the scene, the lack of odor or presence of alcohol or marijuana
in Garcia’s vehicle, and the lack of a field sobriety test, among other facts in
evidence. But the trial court is in the best position to weigh these facts and
determine the probability that Garcia was “under the influence of alcoholic
beverages” or controlled substances “when affected to the extent that [his]
normal faculties [were] impaired” at the time of the crash. § 316.193(1)(a),
Fla. Stat.3 We will not reweigh or otherwise disturb the trial court’s
2
Excessive speed of the vehicle and the type of road, while not elements of
the charged offense, may be considered in context as possible indicia of
impaired judgment. See, e.g., State v. Kliphouse, 771 So. 2d 16, 23 (Fla.
4th DCA 2000) (noting in the context of probable cause for DUI, “other
components central to developing probable cause may include the
defendant's reckless or dangerous operation of a vehicle, slurred
speech, lack of balance or dexterity, flushed face, bloodshot eyes,
admissions, and poor performance on field sobriety exercises”) (emphasis
added). Evidence of impaired judgment goes to the totality of the
circumstances considered by the trial court, and, ultimately, our
determination under the abuse of discretion standard that substantial
competent evidence supported the trial court’s factual findings.
3
The parties stipulated to other necessary elements of DUI manslaughter,
that the victims are deceased, and that Garcia was driving or in actual
physical control of the vehicle.
6
determinations absent an abuse of discretion. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion where, as here, competent substantial evidence supports its
findings. See Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1034 (Fla. 1999)
(explaining a reviewing court’s deference to the trial court’s findings of fact
where “based on competent, substantial evidence” because “the trial court
is in a superior position ‘to evaluate and weigh the testimony and evidence
based upon its observation of the bearing, demeanor, and credibility of the
witnesses’”) (internal citations omitted).
Threat of Harm to the Community
Second, the trial court examined the evidence presented and
determined that Garcia posed a substantial probability of threat of harm to
the community and that “there are [no] conditions of release sufficient to
protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons.” Apr. 20, 2021,
Transcript at 77:20-22. In making such a finding, the trial court listed multiple
factors that led it to such a conclusion. Garcia takes issue with the finding
on two bases, one legal (subject to de novo review) and one factual (subject
to an abuse of discretion/competent substantial evidence review).
Garcia argues as a matter of law that a correct reading of section
907.041 bars a finding of threat of harm as applied to the facts in the record.
In sum, Garcia argues that the use of the conjunction “and” in section
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907.041(4)(c), means that a court must make findings pertaining to all of the
factors separated by “and” before deeming Garcia a threat of harm to the
community. We agree that “and” is conjunctive but disagree that it leads to
the result Garcia suggests. The subsection at issue must be read in the
context of the entire section, relying on plain language, and using common
sense. But we do not read a word or a phrase in such a way to create “an
unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion.” Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219
(Fla. 1984). 4 The use of “and” in the context of (4)(c) simply means that the
4
The Florida Supreme Court sets forth the standards we employ in
determining the meaning of a statute:
In interpreting the statute, we follow the “supremacy-of-text
principle”— namely, the principle that “[t]he words of a governing
text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their
context, is what the text means.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56
(2012). We also adhere to Justice Joseph Story’s view that
“every word employed in [a legal text] is to be expounded in its
plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes
some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.” Advisory Op. to
Governor re Implementation of Amendment 4, the Voting
Restoration Amendment, 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020)
(quoting Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States 157-58 (1833), quoted in Scalia & Garner, Reading
Law at 69).
We thus recognize that the goal of interpretation is to arrive at a
“fair reading” of the text by “determining the application of [the]
text to given facts on the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully
competent in the language, would have understood the text at
the time it was issued.” Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 33. This
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court must find a substantial probability of threat of harm after analyzing “past
and present patterns of behavior, the criteria in s. 903.046, and any other
relevant facts, that any of the following circumstances exist.” §
907.041(4)(c), Fla. Stat. The court engaged in such an analysis.
Garcia makes much of a case in which the Florida Supreme Court
found “and” to be conjunctive and found that the relevant statute in that case
required a finding of both elements separated by the “and.” See Fla. Birth-
Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass’n v. Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings, 686
So. 2d 1349, 1354-55 (Fla. 1997) (holding that the phrase “permanently and
substantially mentally and physically impaired” should be read in the
conjunctive). But counsel oversimplifies the holding, and the context. In
explaining the holding, the court examined the effect of the use of “and” and
noted “situations where the word ‘and’ or ‘or’ could not be read literally or
requires a methodical and consistent approach involving “faithful
reliance upon the natural or reasonable meanings of language”
and “choosing always a meaning that the text will sensibly bear
by the fair use of language.” Frederick J. de Sloovère, Textual
Interpretation of Statutes, 11 N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 538, 541 (1934),
quoted in Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 34.
Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946-47 (Fla.
2000).
9
given its ordinary meaning because to do so would lead to unreasonable,
absurd results and thus defeat the legislature’s intent.” Id. at 1355.5
Simply put, the trial court must decide if substantial probability exists
after considering all the specifically enumerated factors as well as the catch-
all, any other relevant facts. The trial court would not be free to ignore facts
supporting (or refuting) one element simply because it found another
element existed. The “and” in this context following “based on” means the
5
Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass’n, then, focused on
the context and purpose of “and” in that statute. In discussing the meaning
of words or phrases in a statute, the Florida Supreme Court explained:
Where, as here, the legislature has not defined the words used
in a phrase, the language should usually be given its plain and
ordinary meaning. Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v.
Department of Natural Resources, 453 So.2d 1351 (Fla.1984).
Nevertheless, consideration must be accorded not only to the
literal and usual meaning of the words, but also to their meaning
and effect on the objectives and purposes of the statute’s
enactment. See Florida State Racing Comm'n v. McLaughlin,
102 So.2d 574 (Fla.1958). Indeed, “[i]t is a fundamental rule of
statutory construction that legislative intent is the polestar by
which the court must be guided [in construing enactments of the
legislature].” State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 824 (Fla.1981).
Id. at 1354. This guidance supports reading “and” in context. “And” can still
mean “and” and conform with the legislative intent, without leading to the
result that Garcia suggests. In the instant statute, the phrase “based on”
begins the clause in which the “and” appears. § 907.041(4)(c), Fla. Stat.
The plain meaning, which is also the most harmonious with the intent of the
statute, results in reading “and” to create the universe of factors a trial court
must consider before determining a substantial probability of danger exists.
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trial court must conduct a thorough analysis and consider and weigh all
relevant factors listed in (4)(c) in determining if a substantial probability of
danger to the community exists. The transcript of the hearing reveals that
the trial court’s analysis and findings comported with the statutory scheme.
The trial court analyzed all the facts and noted the presence of some factors
listed in (4)(c), the absence of others, and after carefully weighing all of them,
concluded that the State met its burden of showing substantial probability.
Similarly, section 907.041(4)(c)4.a.-c. provides a non-exhaustive list of
“conditions that would support a finding by the court pursuant to this
subparagraph that the defendant poses a threat of harm to the community.”
Importantly, despite Garcia’s argument to the contrary, the statutory scheme
does not require the trial court to find all the factors here, or indeed any of
them from this subsection. Instead, the statute sets forth conditions that, as
part of the overall analysis, would support a finding of a threat of harm to the
community. Subsection (4)(c)5. further refutes Garcia’s parsed reading of
the statute.6 Garcia’s reading of 4(c) and 4(c)4. would render 4(c)5. mere
6
While (4)(c)4. addresses DUI manslaughter, (4)(c)5. expands on the
concept of threat of harm to the community. One section logically follows
the other, and all are tied in to (4)(c). “‘It is axiomatic that statutes must be
read with other related statutes and other related portions of the same
statute.’” Abbott Labs. v. Mylan Pharms., 15 So. 3d 642, 657 (Fla. 1st DCA
2009) (quoting State v. Negrin, 306 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975));
see also id. (“‘Where possible, courts must give effect to all statutory
11
surplusage, despite the fact it is part of the same subsection and addresses
the specific issue of threat of harm to the community. See Hechtman v.
Nations Title Ins. of NY, 840 So. 2d 933, 996 (Fla. 2003) (“It is an elementary
principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given
to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and
words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.”).
Accordingly, we hold that (4)(c) lists factors the trial court shall rely on in
making its ultimate determination of substantial probability of threat of harm,
but that such determination does not require finding the presence of all
factors the trial court may consider.
With our holding that the trial court correctly applied the law pertaining
to a finding of threat of harm, we now review its ultimate determination for
competent substantial evidence. Here, the presence or absence of specific
factors listed in (4)(c) may come into play, as it goes to the weight and
sufficiency of the evidence. However, at the appellate review level, we will
not disturb the trial court’s findings absent an abuse of discretion. Canarkis
v. Canarkis, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980) (recognizing the “superior
vantage point of the trial judge” in weighing facts and performing
provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one
another.’”) (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist.,
604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)).
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discretionary acts and noting no abuse of discretion where “reasonable
[people] could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court”).
The trial court, based on evidence in the record, made specific factual
findings under (4)(c) to support its conclusion that Garcia poses a substantial
probability of risk to the community. Further, the trial court relied on the facts
in the record to determine that no conditions of pretrial release would
reasonably protect the community. Based on the evidence presented, the
trial court found a substantial probability that Garcia would not “follow the
rules” and “act in conformity with the law.” In determining that no pretrial
release conditions sufficiently protected the community, the court noted
Garcia’s “disregard for safety” as well as “serious concerns about
supervision.”
Despite these tragic facts, reasonable people may differ on the
conclusion of whether these factors together rise to a “substantial
probability.” However, in reviewing the record for abuse of discretion, we
only determine if the facts in evidence provide competent substantial
evidence for each of the trial court’s findings. Similarly, in weighing the
evidence, the trial court may exercise its reasonable discretion without
second-guessing or re-weighing of factors by the appellate court. See De
Groot v. Sheffield, 85 So. 2d 912, 9016 (Fla. 1957) (“the reviewing court will
13
not undertake to re-weigh or evaluate the evidence . . . [t]he appellate court
merely examines the record to determine whether the lower tribunal had
before it competent substantial evidence to support its findings”); see also
Canarkis, 382 So. 2d at 1203.
Petition denied.
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