FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 14, 2021
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
ANDREW REDICK,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 21-3023
(D.C. No. 5:19-CV-03129-SAC)
KVC BEHAVIORAL HEALTHCARE, (D. Kan.)
INC., corporate entity for the State of
Kansas; JASON R. HOOPER, President
and Chief Officer, KVC Behavioral
Healthcare, Inc., in his official and
individual capacity; ALICIA BROWN,
Case Coordinator, KVC Behavioral
Healthcare, Inc., in her official and
individual capacity; SHARON PERKINS,
Case Coordinator, KVC Behavioral
Healthcare, Inc., in her official and
individual capacity; SAMANTHA
ZELLER, Case Coordinator, KVC
Behavioral Healthcare, Inc., in her official
and individual capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
_________________________________
Before MORITZ, BALDOCK, and EID, Circuit Judges. **
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
_________________________________
Pro se inmate Andrew Redick appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we dismiss
this appeal as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
I.
Redick is a Kansas state prisoner with two minor children. A few years into
Redick’s term of incarceration, his wife lost custody of them. KVC Behavioral
Healthcare, Inc. stepped in to manage the children’s placement, reintegration, and
eventual adoption. KVC is a private child placement agency licensed by the Kansas
Department of Children and Families.
Redick filed a § 1983 complaint in the district court seeking declaratory relief
and damages against KVC, its president, and three case coordinators. The crux of
Redick’s complaint, which contained several claims falling under a variety of
constitutional amendments, is that the defendants in this case violated his
constitutional rights by failing to provide him with custodial status updates about his
children.
In screening, the district court ordered Redick to show cause for why his
complaint should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court noted multiple
legal issues with Redick’s complaint, including that the domestic-relations exception
to federal jurisdiction bars Redick’s custodial-status claims and that Redick failed to
prove any of the named defendants in this case can be treated as state actors for
§ 1983 purposes.
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Redick’s response repeated the facts from his initial complaint and ignored the
legal issues raised by the court. It also disclosed that Redick had previously
presented his custodial-status claims in state court. ROA at 31 (“This issue was
addressed by the plaintiff, Mr. Redick, Wayne French attorney at law, plaintiff
attorney, and by the presiding Judge on several occasions at court.”). Redick
confirmed that in subsequent filings, as well. See id. at 36 (“The courts have this on
record that the plaintiff emotionally addressed the court, the attorneys addressed the
defendants and even the judge addressed the problem . . .”); id. at 46 (attaching
correspondence with a Kansas district court implying the court previously ordered
KVC to provide Redick with status updates about his children).
Accordingly, the district court dismissed Redick’s complaint for the reasons
given in its order to show cause and added that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 1 bars
his action since it appears to challenge a state-court decision. Redick filed a “motion
to object [to] dismissal and request to add additional jurisdictional statutes,” id. at 52,
which the court construed as a Rule 59(e) motion and denied. This appeal followed.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Full Life Hospice, LLC v. Sebelius, 709 F.3d 1012, 1016
(10th Cir. 2013). Although we liberally construe Redick’s pleadings because he
See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v.
1
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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appears pro se, we will not assume the role of his advocate. Hall v. Bellmon, 935
F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
On appeal, Redick contends that the district court erred in dismissing his
claims, but he offers no legal argument to explain why he believes the court should
have found jurisdiction. In fact, his brief again confirms that a state court has already
considered the custody issue. Aplt. Br. at 2 (stating the defendants violated his rights
“[e]ven after the judge told them to stop”). His only argument before us is that the
district court should have found “the state must follow . . . procedures when it comes
to informing the child[’]s parents of their wellbeing and when they fail [to] do this
they violate a liberty and due process clause.” Id. at 4.
We find no error in the district court’s dismissal of Redick’s claims. Under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal “courts do not have jurisdiction over
challenges to state-court decisions” or over claims that are “inextricably intertwined
with the state court decision.” Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1436 (10th
Cir. 1986) (quotations omitted). Since the record showed Redick’s claims pertaining
to the custodial status of his children had already been litigated, the district court
lacked jurisdiction over them. We need not address whether the domestic-relations
exception also barred jurisdiction. To the extent additional claims remained, we
agree with the district court that Redick failed to demonstrate the named defendants
are state actors for purposes of a § 1983 claim. See Schwab v. Kan. Dep’t of
Children & Families, No. 20-3099, 2021 WL 982246, at *17 (10th Cir. Mar. 16,
4
2021) (unpublished) (explaining that adoption services, including KVC, are not state
actors).
Redick’s appeal is “without merit in that it lacks an arguable basis in either
law or fact.” Thompson v. Gibson, 289 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir. 2002). We
therefore deny Redick’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, which requires a
litigant to show a “reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support
of the issues raised in the action.” Lister v. Dept. of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312
(10th Cir. 2005). We also dismiss this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Redick will receive a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Redick’s request for IFP status,
DISMISS his appeal, and assess a strike against him.
Entered for the Court
Allison H. Eid
Circuit Judge
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