Case: 20-11243 Document: 00515944732 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/20/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
July 20, 2021
No. 20-11243
Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Raymond Castillo,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
No. 5:19-CR-103-1
Before Smith, Stewart, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Raymond Castillo was sentenced to 21 months of imprisonment
followed by a three-year term of supervised release (“SR”) after pleading
guilty of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court imposed a special
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opin-
ion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances
set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-11243 Document: 00515944732 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/20/2021
No. 20-11243
condition of SR requiring that Castillo participate in sex-offender treatment,
which he challenges on appeal. We review for abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Caravayo, 809 F.3d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 2015).
Although a district court has broad discretion in imposing conditions
of SR, its discretion is limited by statute. United States v. Fernandez, 776 F.3d
344, 346 (5th Cir. 2015); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). In relevant part, the condi-
tion must be “reasonably related” to at least one of four factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), including the defendant’s history and characteristics.
§ 3583(d)(1); see § 3553(a)(1). Thus, even if the offense of conviction is not
a sex offense, a prior offense may be considered in determining the special
conditions. See United States v. Iverson, 874 F.3d 855, 861−62 (5th Cir. 2017).
A district court also may impose sex-offender-related special conditions even
if, as here, the only evidence of sexual misconduct is a remote past crime if
there is a connection between the prior offense and the condition. See Sealed
Appellee v. Sealed Appellant, 937 F.3d 392, 403−04 (5th Cir. 2019); see also
United States v. Fields, 777 F.3d 799, 803−04 (5th Cir. 2015).
First, insofar as Castillo suggests that the timing of his 1999 juvenile
adjudication for aggravated sexual assault implicates due process and
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel issues, the government correctly asserts
that a district court may not entertain such a challenge at sentencing. See
United States v. Longstreet, 603 F.3d 272, 277 (5th Cir. 2010).
Next, the presentence report sufficiently documented Castillo’s his-
tory, including the prior sexual-assault offense for which he was adjudicated
guilty, the offenses that led to his probation revocation, his treatment history,
and his conviction of failure to register as a sex offender. Despite Castillo’s
contentions to the contrary, the special condition was reasonably related to
his history and characteristics and the need for the sentence to afford ade-
quate deterrence, protect the public, and provide him with correctional treat-
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No. 20-11243
ment. See §§ 3553(a)(1), 3553(a)(2)(B)−(D), 3583(d)(1); see also Fernandez,
776 F.3d at 346. Finally, although the district court referenced the govern-
ment’s written response, which included Castillo’s history of abuse, the rec-
ord does not show that that was the primary basis for the special condition
and, more likely, it was Castillo’s history and characteristics, taken all
together, that guided the sentence. See United States v. Miller, 665 F.3d 114,
132 (5th Cir. 2011).
Accordingly, Castillo has not demonstrated that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing a special condition of SR requiring him to
participate in sex-offender treatment. See Caravayo, 809 F.3d at 272.
AFFIRMED.
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