FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
COMPTON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 07-55751
v.
D.C. No.
STARVENIA ADDISON; GLORIA CV-06-04717-AHM
ALLEN,
Defendants-Appellees.
COMPTON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 07-56013
v.
D.C. No.
CV-06-04717-AHM
STARVENIA ADDISON; GLORIA
ALLEN, OPINION
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
A. Howard Matz, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
October 23, 2008—Pasadena, California
Filed March 22, 2010
Before: Harry Pregerson and N. Randy Smith,
Circuit Judges, and Raner C. Collins,* District Judge.
*The Honorable Raner C. Collins, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
4665
4666 COMPTON USD v. ADDISON
Opinion by Judge Pregerson;
Dissent by Judge N.R. Smith
COMPTON USD v. ADDISON 4667
COUNSEL
Barrett K. Green and Daniel J. Cravens, Littler Mendelson,
Los Angeles, California, for the appellant.
4668 COMPTON USD v. ADDISON
George D. Crook, Newman Aaronson Vanaman, Sherman
Oaks, California, for the appellee.
OPINION
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
Compton Unified School District (the “School District”)
appeals the district court’s decision granting judgment on the
pleadings in favor of Starvenia Addison (“Addison”), a stu-
dent in the School District. The School District argues that
Addison does not have a cognizable claim against the School
District for its failure to identify her disabilities. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review matters of
law, such as the jurisdictional issue raised here, de novo, see
Johnson v. Special Educ. Hearing Office, 287 F.3d 1176,
1179 (9th Cir. 2002), and affirm.
I. Background
Addison received very poor grades and scored below the
first percentile on standardized tests during her ninth-grade
year in 2002-2003. The school counselor attributed Addison’s
poor performance to common “transitional year” difficulties.
The counselor did not consider it atypical for a ninth-grader
such as Addison to perform at a fourth-grade level.
In the fall of her tenth-grade year, Addison failed every
academic subject. The counselor considered these grades to
be a “major red flag.” Teachers reported that Addison was
“like a stick of furniture” in class, and that her work was “gib-
berish and incomprehensible.” Teachers also reported that
Addison sometimes refused to enter the classroom, colored
with crayons at her desk, played with dolls in class, and uri-
nated on herself in class.
COMPTON USD v. ADDISON 4669
Addison’s mother was reluctant to have the child “looked
at,” and School District officials decided not to “push.”
Instead, the School District referred Addison to a third-party
mental-health counselor. The third-party counselor recom-
mended that the School District assess Addison for learning
disabilities. Despite the recommendation, the School District
did not refer Addison for an educational assessment, and
instead promoted Addison to eleventh grade.
In September 2004, Addison’s mother wrote a letter to the
School District explicitly requesting an educational assess-
ment and Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) meeting.
The assessment took place on December 8, 2004. The IEP
team determined that Addison was eligible for special educa-
tion services on January 26, 2005.
Addison brought an administrative claim under the Individ-
uals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1485, seeking compensatory educational services for
the School District’s failure to identify her needs and provide
a free appropriate public education. The administrative law
judge found for Addison, and the district court affirmed. This
appeal timely followed.
II. Analysis
A. IDEA Claims
[1] The IDEA seeks to ensure that children with disabili-
ties have access to a free appropriate public education. 20
U.S.C. § 1400. The IDEA “provides federal funds to assist
state and local agencies in educating children with disabilities,
but conditions such funding on compliance with certain goals
and procedures.” Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d
1467, 1469 (9th Cir. 1993). One of these conditions is that
states enact policies and procedures ensuring that “all children
with disabilities . . . who are in need of special education ser-
vices[ ] are identified, located, and evaluated.” 20 U.S.C.
4670 COMPTON USD v. ADDISON
§ 1412(a)(3)(A). This obligation is also known as the “child
find” requirement.
[2] The IDEA also requires states to implement a number
of procedural safeguards to ensure that disabled children
receive an appropriate education. Among these safeguards is
the opportunity for any party to present a complaint “with
respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation,
or educational placement of the child.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(b)(6)(A). 34 C.F.R. § 300.507 implements this due
process complaint requirement.
[3] As another, separate procedural safeguard, the IDEA
requires that local educational agencies provide written notice
to a child’s parents whenever the agency “proposes to initiate
or change” or “refuses to initiate or change the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement of the child . . . .” 20
U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3). 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(a) implements these
notice requirements.
[4] California, in compliance with the IDEA, mandates
that local educational agencies “shall actively and systemati-
cally seek out all individuals with exceptional needs.” Cal.
Educ. Code § 56300. “All children with disabilities . . . shall
be identified, located, and assessed.” Cal. Educ. Code
§ 56301(a). California also allows parents to initiate a due
process hearing when there is a proposal or a refusal to initi-
ate or change “the identification, assessment, or educational
placement” of a child. Cal. Educ. Code § 56501(a).
The School District first argues that the IDEA’s written
notice procedures limit the jurisdictional scope of the due pro-
cess complaint procedure. The notice provisions set forth in
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(a) apply to
proposals or refusals to initiate a change regarding a student’s
identification, assessment, or placement. The School District
asserts that, because it chose to ignore Addison’s disabilities
and take no action, it has not affirmatively refused to act. The
COMPTON USD v. ADDISON 4671
School District therefore contends that the notice requirement
does not apply. The School District further asserts that there
can be no due process right to file a claim unless the notice
provisions specifically apply to such a claim. We reject this
argument.
[5] We read statutes as a whole, and avoid statutory inter-
pretations which would produce absurd results. See United
States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984); Arizona State Bd.
for Charter Schools v. United States Dep’t of Educ., 464 F.3d
1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2006). As the Supreme Court recently
stated in the context of an unrelated provision of the IDEA,
a “reading of the [Individuals with Disabilities Education] Act
that left parents without an adequate remedy when a school
district unreasonably failed to identify a child with disabilities
would not comport with Congress’ acknowledgment of the
paramount importance of properly identifying each child eli-
gible for services.” Forest Grove School Dist. v. T.A., 129
S.Ct. 2484, 2495 (2009). The jurisdictional requirements for
an IDEA complaint are clearly set out in 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(b)(6)(A), apart from the notice provisions of 20
U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3). Section 1415(b)(6)(A) states that a party
may present a complaint “with respect to any matter relating
to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of
the child.” (emphasis added). The notice requirements of 20
U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) do not cabin this broad jurisdictional man-
date.1 Addison’s claim is cognizable under the IDEA.2
1
The School District also argues that notice requirements in 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(b)(7)(A) strictly limit the scope of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). Strict
adherence to the language of Section (b)(7)(A), however, would conflict
not only with 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (granting jurisdiction over “any mat-
ter”), but also with 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) (establishing notice require-
ments where an agency proposes or refuses to act). Section
(b)(7)(A)(ii)(III) requires “a description of the nature of the problem of the
child relating to such proposed initiation or change.” Nowhere does Sec-
tion (b)(7)(A) refer to a refusal to act, despite the explicit inclusion of such
language in Section (b)(3). “It is a well-established principle of statutory
construction that legislative enactments should not be construed to render
4672 COMPTON USD v. ADDISON
[6] The School District also contends, based on Arlington
Century School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291
(2006), that it did not have “clear notice” of the availability
of an administrative hearing in “child find” cases. This argu-
ment has no merit, as the IDEA clearly allows complaints
“with respect to any matter relating to the identification, eval-
uation, or educational placement of the child.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(b)(6)(A) (emphasis added).
B. Attorneys’ Fees
[7] We lastly address, and reject, the School District’s
argument that the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees
should be vacated. The district court may, in its discretion,
award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party. Aguirre v. Los
Angeles Unified School Dist., 461 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir.
2006). In Aguirre, we held that the “degree of success
obtained” is the most critical factor in determining whether
fees are warranted in an IDEA case. Id. at 1118. Citing Hen-
ley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), we also stated that
their provisions mere surplusage.” American Vantage Cos., Inc. v. Table
Mountain Rancheria, 292 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quota-
tion omitted). We therefore do not accept the School District’s suggestion
that we should read Section (b)(7)(A) to strictly control the scope of
IDEA’s notice and jurisdictional provisions.
2
Even if the School District were correct in its contention that IDEA
claims may only be brought over proposals or affirmative refusals to initi-
ate a change, Addison’s claim would still be cognizable. The School Dis-
trict does not contest that a due process hearing is available when an
education agency “refuses to initiate or change[ ] the identification, evalu-
ation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free
appropriate education to the child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(3)(B). Instead,
the School District seeks to cast its deliberate indifference as something
other than a “refusal.” We do not agree with the School District’s charac-
terization. To refuse is “to show or express an unwillingness to do . . . .”
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 972 (1973 ed.). The School Dis-
trict’s wilful inaction in the face of numerous “red flags” is more than suf-
ficient to demonstrate its unwillingness and refusal to evaluate Addison.
COMPTON USD v. ADDISON 4673
there is “no precise rule or formula for making these determi-
nations,” and that a district court may award “full fees even
where a party did not prevail on every contention.” Id. at 1121
(citations omitted). Here, though the district court did not use
the term “degree of success,” it did cite Aguirre as the appli-
cable standard. Considering Addison’s substantial degree of
success in administrative and district court proceedings, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attor-
neys’ fees.
III. Conclusion
We conclude that claims based on a local educational agen-
cy’s failure to meet the “child find” requirement are cogniza-
ble under the IDEA, and that here, the School District had
clear notice of this fact. Accordingly, the district court’s
orders granting judgment on the pleadings and awarding attor-
neys’ fees are AFFIRMED.
N.R. Smith, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The majority finds and district judge found that Congress
clearly intended to create a cause of action when it drafted 20
U.S.C. § 1415 of the IDEA. I cannot agree. The clear lan-
guage of the statute makes them wrong. Further, even if their
position could be harmonized with the statute, one cannot find
that Addison is entitled to relief on this record.
This case comes before our panel as an appeal from a judg-
ment on the pleadings against Plaintiff, CUSD. We review de
novo a Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings. Fleming v. Pic-
kard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). A judgment on the
pleadings is proper if, taking all of CUSD’s allegations in its
pleadings as true, Addison is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal, 10 F.3d
667, 670 (9th Cir. 1993).
4674 COMPTON USD v. ADDISON
On appeal to the district court, CUSD only challenged
whether the ALJ had authority to conduct a due process hear-
ing, in which the ALJ could determine whether CUSD vio-
lated the IDEA’s child-find provision. CUSD argued that,
under the IDEA and state law, a due process hearing may be
held only where the school district purposefully acts or
refuses to act, not when the complained-of conduct is best
described as negligence.
“In the absence of clear evidence of congressional intent,
we may not usurp the legislative power by unilaterally creat-
ing a cause of action.” In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig.,
549 F.3d 1223, 1230-31 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (“The ultimate
question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether
this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory
scheme that Congress enacted into law.”)). Thus, the burden
of establishing a private cause of action falls upon the plain-
tiff; a burden Addison has not carried.
I. THE EXISTENCE OF A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION
In federal court, parents may only challenge a school dis-
trict’s failure to carry out its IDEA obligations based on the
provisions of the IDEA. It is not a common law action, and
an action cannot be brought against a school district pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While the IDEA presents standards for
educating children, a private right of action must exist in
order for a court to grant relief for a statutory violation. Thus,
it is not enough that Addison shows a statutory violation, she
must also establish that the statute creates a private cause of
action.
Looking first to the IDEA, Congress left the details of how
the objectives of the IDEA are to be achieved to the states, by
requiring those states who wish to obtain funding, “submit[ ]
a plan that provides assurances to the Secretary that the State
has in effect policies and procedures to ensure that the State
COMPTON USD v. ADDISON 4675
meets [the conditions of the IDEA].” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a). In
California, this plan is found in Part 30 of the California Edu-
cation Code. As set out in the California Education Code, the
state has, in turn, given local education areas the task of estab-
lishing written policies and procedures to govern implementa-
tion of the IDEA in its area. Cal. Educ. Code § 56301(d)(1).
Therefore, to determine whether parents may bring an IDEA
due process hearing, one must consider all three plans: fed-
eral, state, and local. Addison brought her claim for due pro-
cess on the ground that CUSD violated the IDEA’s Child-find
provision. The district court found § 1415(b)(6) and its
accompanying regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 300.507, establish a
private cause of action for violations of the Child-find provi-
sion.
The plain language of § 1415 requires that states establish
and maintain procedures allowing parties to present a com-
plaint as to matters regarding identification of children.1 The
Child-find provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A), requires that
the state has “in effect policies and procedures to ensure that
the State meets . . . the following condition[ ]:”
All children with disabilities residing in the State,
. . . regardless of the severity of their disabilities, and
who are in need of special education and related ser-
vices, are identified, located, and evaluated and a
practical method is developed and implemented to
determine which children with disabilities are cur-
rently receiving needed special education and related
services.
The state must present these policies and procedures to the
1
When a statute only requires that the state or school district have a pro-
cedure in place, governing a certain course of action, I refer to it as creat-
ing a “procedural requirement.” However, when the statute actually
governs the very course of action, I refer to it as creating a “substantive
standard” or “substantive requirement.”
4676 COMPTON USD v. ADDISON
satisfaction of the Secretary. Id. at § 1412(a). Section 1412
thus requires that the state have policies and procedures in
place, to the satisfaction of the Secretary.
In § 1415, Congress requires that the education agency
“shall establish and maintain procedures in accordance with
this section to ensure that children with disabilities and their
parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to
the provision of free appropriate public education by such
agencies.” Id. at § 1415(a) (emphases added). Looking at the
plain language of § 1415, a school district “maintains” a pro-
cedure when it follows and enforces that procedure. The list
of procedures that must be maintained includes a procedure
providing “[a]n opportunity . . . to present [ ] complaint[s]
with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evalu-
ation, or educational placement of the child . . . .” Id. at
§ 1415(b)(6)(A). By requiring that the states develop and
maintain procedures governing initiating a due process hear-
ing, Congress instructed the courts that we are to give defer-
ence to the states.
California allows parents to initiate due process hearing
procedures (as prescribed by Chapter 5, Part 30, Division 4,
Title 2, of the California Education Code) under circum-
stances where the school district has refused to initiate the
identification, assessment, or education placement of a child.
Cal. Educ. Code § 56501(a)(2). The majority holds that
CUSD’s inaction, in the face of these troubling facts, amounts
to a “refusal” under the IDEA. The majority cites no authority
for its interpretation of the term “refusal.”
A. Defining “Refusal”
(1) Refusal Is Not Defined In The IDEA, The CFRs, or The
California Education Code
The IDEA does not define the term “refusal.” However, it
does discuss the consequences of a school district’s refusal to
COMPTON USD v. ADDISON 4677
initiate identification, evaluation, or educational placement of
a child of Addison’s age (at the relevant time) in its section
on procedural safeguards. Section 1415 requires that states
establish and maintain a procedure requiring the governmen-
tal agency provide parents written prior notice whenever it
“refuses to initiate or change, the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of the child.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(b)(3)(B). Such notice must include :
(1) “a description of the action . . . refused by the
agency,” § 1415(c)(1)(A);
(2) “an explanation of why the agency . . . refuses to
take the action,” § 1415(c)(1)(B);
(3) “a description of each evaluation procedure,
assessment, record, or report the agency used as a
basis for the . . . refused action,” Id.;
(4) “a description of other options considered by the
IEP Team and the reasons why those options were
rejected,” § 1415(c)(1)(E); and
(5) “a description of the factors that are relevant to
the agency’s . . . refusal,” § 1415(c)(1)(F).
The regulations accompanying the IDEA also do little to
help this court interpret “refusal.” An agency must give writ-
ten notice to the parent of a child with a disability “a reason-
able time before the public agency” “[r]efuses to initiate or
change the identification, evaluation, or educational place-
ment of the child.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(a)(2). The regulation
mimics § 1415 as to the required contents of that notice, in
that it requires that the notice include all five of the statements
listed above. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.503(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3),
(b)(6), (b)(7).
The California Education Code repeats the requirements
found in the IDEA and accompanying CFRs without adding
4678 COMPTON USD v. ADDISON
any more detailed definition for “refusal.” Pursuant to
§ 1415(b)(3) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.503, California requires a
public agency provide parents with prior written notice upon
a child’s initial assessment, and notice a reasonable time
before its refusal to initiate or change identification, assess-
ment, or educational placement of a child. Cal. Educ. Code
§ 56500.4(a). The agency must also “provide a description of
any assessment procedures the agency proposes to conduct.”
Id. The contents of a notice requirement are identical to the
content requirements found in the CFR. See id. at
§ 56500.4(b).
(2) Statutory Interpretation
The IDEA, the CFRs, and the California Education Code
all presuppose that there has been purposeful action with
regard to a specific student, before any “refusal” occurred.
“When the statutory ‘language is plain, the sole function of
the courts—at least where disposition required by the text is
not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.’ ” Arling-
ton Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291,
296-97 (2006) (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)). Interpreting
refusal to include a school district’s negligent failure to iden-
tify students with disabilities in a timely manner—as the
majority argues here—leads to an absurd result (even under
the distressing facts before us) and leaves a host of questions
in its wake.
The IDEA states implicitly, and the CFR and the California
Education Code state explicitly, that written notice is to be
given to a parent prior to the refusal. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c), 34
C.F.R. § 300.503(a), and Cal. Educ. Code § 56500.4(a). Pub-
lic agencies are required to give prior written notice to the
parents of the student (a) describing the refused action, (b)
explaining why the agency refused the action, and (c) setting
out the factors considered by the agency in making its refusal.
We cannot read the IDEA to require an agency give prior
COMPTON USD v. ADDISON 4679
written notice that it will be negligent: describing the decision
concerning which it will be negligent, the reasons it has
decided to be negligent, and the factors it considered in decid-
ing to be negligent. It would make the prior written notice
requirement absurd (unless CUSD’s actions are described as
something other than negligence; here, neither party claims
that CUSD acted purposefully in its failure to evaluate Addi-
son).
The term “refusal” obviously includes purposeful agency
action in response to a conflict over (1) whether to evaluate
a student, or (2) how to deal with an evaluated student. The
plain language of the statute makes that a reasonable interpre-
tation. Plenty of IDEA cases come before the courts as the
result of a parent and the local education agency disagreeing
over the proper classification of a child or the proper appro-
priate education. Such cases fit neatly into the statutory
scheme. As discussed above, once an issue has come to a
point of contention, the content requirements for the prior
written notice (and the due process hearing complaint, for that
matter) make sense.
However, applying the IDEA in cases where there is no
point in dispute between a parent and the public agency not
only renders the statutory language absurd, but also appears
to go against the purpose of the IDEA. The core of the IDEA
“is the cooperative process that it establishes between parents
and schools.” Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49,
53 (2005). The IDEA was enacted to provide better education
for children with disabilities by “strengthening the role and
responsibility of parents and ensuring that families of such
children have meaningful opportunities to participate in the
education of their children at school and at home.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400(c)(5)(B). Rather than empowering parents and
strengthening their role and responsibility in their children’s
education, this majority’s interpretation of the school district’s
duties weakens parents’ role by casting the responsibility to
4680 COMPTON USD v. ADDISON
monitor and identify children’s development solely on to the
shoulders of our school system.
Finally, not having a private cause of action does not mean
that there is no public recourse for violations of the IDEA, the
CFRs, or the California Education Code. As seen at every
level of this legislation, funding is conditioned upon compli-
ance. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56045, 56125, 56845. Furthermore,
such compliance is ensured not merely through the investiga-
tion of complaints—as discussed in § 56500.2—but also in
monitoring. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56125, 56135.
Finding that CUSD did not “refuse” under the statute
means that the ALJ did not have authority to conduct a due
process hearing, because Congress did not create a private
right of action as a method of recourse for the school district’s
actions here.
II. FINDING A CHILD-FIND VIOLATION
Even if Addison were to demonstrate that a private cause
of action existed under the IDEA, the record before this panel
is not sufficiently developed so that we should render judg-
ment in this case. On a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
the panel cannot properly determine whether CUSD violated
its Child-find requirement, because the CUSD local plan is
not in this record. This panel must review the CUSD local
plan, because the IDEA and its accompanying CFRs are
procedural—allowing the states to determine how best to
achieve the Child-find requirement, so long as certain proce-
dures are in place. At the state level, the California Education
Code allows the school districts to develop local plans detail-
ing how the districts will satisfy the Child-find requirement.
In the absence of this local plan, the majority not only rules
without a standard to apply, it ignores the statutory framework
of the IDEA.
As mentioned above, § 1412 outlines the Child-find
requirement for school districts. Unlike § 1415, § 1412 only
COMPTON USD v. ADDISON 4681
requires that states establish certain procedures to the satisfac-
tion of the Secretary. Therefore, while a state can violate
§ 1415 if it fails to either establish a procedure or to maintain
that procedure, a state can only violate § 1412 by not having
a procedure at all. Given that Congress included that addi-
tional substantive requirement only three sections later, it
appears that Congress did not intend to create such a require-
ment in § 1412. (Again, this does not leave the public without
redress; failure to perform under the IDEA can and does lead
to reduced funding. See Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4
F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining that funding is
conditioned “on compliance with certain goals and proce-
dures.”). A state does not comply with the IDEA, in regard to
the Child-find provision, if it does not provide procedures that
satisfy the Secretary.)
Therefore, in order to show that there was some sort of sub-
stantive Child-find violation, Addison must identify that vio-
lation in the Code of Federal Regulations or state or local
procedures that were adopted pursuant to this statute. The
ALJ cited 34 C.F.R. § 300.125 (2006) (currently codified at
34 C.F.R. § 300.111) in her finding that Addison prevailed on
the pleadings in her cause of action. However, 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.125 only requires that “[t]he State must have in effect
policies and procedures to ensure that (i) All children with
disabilities residing in the State . . . are identified, located, and
evaluated.” This mirrors the language of § 1412; it is a proce-
dural requirement. Plaintiff never contended that California
failed to have these procedures in place. The ALJ also cited
California Education Code sections 56300 and 56301 as set-
ting forth obligations that were violated by CUSD in this case.
Again, because Addison did not allege any procedural viola-
tions, the panel must find that these statutory sections provide
a substantive standard that has been violated.
At first glance, it would appear that the California Educa-
tion Code may establish a substantive standard against which
we might compare CUSD’s actions. The California Education
4682 COMPTON USD v. ADDISON
Code does begin with an imperative: an “agency shall actively
and systematically seek out all individuals with exceptional
needs.” Cal. Educ. Code § 56300. However, the following
two sections of the Education Code continue on to detail the
manner in which that imperative is to be achieved. It must be
achieved through the creation of local plans. Cal. Educ. Code
§§ 56301, 56302.
Sections 56301 and 56302 clarify that the local plans gov-
ern what the Child-find process will look like. “Each special
education local plan area shall establish written policies and
procedures . . . for a continuous child-find system . . . .” Cal.
Educ. Code § 56301(d)(1). “Identification procedures shall
include systematic methods of utilizing referrals of pupils
from teachers, parents, agencies, appropriate professional per-
sons, and from other members of the public.” Cal. Educ. Code
§ 56302.
It seems apparent from sections 56301 and 56302 that the
purpose of the imperative was to set the local plans as a stan-
dard against which a school district’s actions are to be com-
pared. Section 56205 supports such a reading by explaining
the manner in which California assures compliance with
IDEA requirements: “Each special education local plan area
submitting a local plan to the Superintendent under this part
shall ensure . . . that it has in effect policies, procedures, and
programs that are consistent with state laws, regulations, and
policies governing the following: . . . (3) Child-find and refer-
ral. . . . (11) Compliance assurances . . . . (12)(A) A descrip-
tion of the governance and administration of the plan . . . .
(15) Participation in state and districtwide assessments, . . .
and reports relating to assessments.” Cal. Educ. Code
§ 56205(a).
Given this precedent, we cannot hold that there has been a
violation of the Child-find requirement without, at very least,
reviewing the CUSD local plan. Further, if reviewing the
local plan is not a prerequisite, local plans serve no purpose.
COMPTON USD v. ADDISON 4683
The IDEA has been recognized as a model of “cooperative
federalism,” see Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 52, a system where
Congress set out the goals and procedures, but allows states
the freedom to decide how those goals and procedures were
to be implemented on a day-to-day basis. By finding that the
school district has violated the Child-find provision, without
even reviewing the CUSD procedures, the majority ignores
the statutory complex outlined here.
III. CONCLUSION
I am sympathetic to Addison’s plight in this case and disap-
pointed that more was not done to aid her while she was as
student in the school district. However, I cannot find a private
cause of action within the IDEA statutory structure, and I can-
not harmonize the language of the statute with a private cause
of action for negligence. Further, even if I were to find such
things, I do not believe that the record is sufficiently devel-
oped for a final judgment at this juncture. For these reasons,
I must dissent.