NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 7 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-56249
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. Nos. 2:16-cv-07435-TJH
2:09-cr-00783-TJH-3
v.
GALVIN GIBSON, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Terry J. Hatter, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 2, 2021**
Pasadena, California
Before: IKUTA, BENNETT, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Galvin Gibson appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 motion. He contends that the district court erred in denying his claims under
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959),
as well as his ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims as they relate to a six-
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
level sentence enhancement. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253(a),
1291, and review the denial of a § 2255 motion de novo. United States v. Chacon-
Palomares, 208 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 2000). We also review Gibson’s Brady,
Napue, and IAC claims de novo. See Dow v. Virga, 729 F.3d 1041, 1049 (9th Cir.
2013) (Napue); United States v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1187, 1202 n.12 (9th Cir. 2008)
(Brady); United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1996) (IAC). We
affirm.
1. Gibson contends that the district court erred in denying his Brady and
Napue claims, arguing that those claims pertained to the first trial, which ended in a
hung jury, and not the second trial, which resulted in a conviction. The government
contends that these claims are identical to claims raised and rejected on direct appeal1
and are thus barred in this habeas proceeding. The district court rejected the claims
because we had rejected those claims on direct appeal. If the claims were raised in
the direct appeal, then, as the district court found, they are barred. United States v.
Redd, 759 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1985). But if the claims were never raised on
direct appeal, they are procedurally defaulted, and Gibson would need to show both
cause and prejudice to overcome that procedural default. See United States v. Frady,
456 U.S. 152, 167–68 (1982). Gibson has shown neither.2
1
See United States v. Gibson, 598 F. App’x 487, 489–90 (9th Cir. 2015).
2
It also appears that the “first trial” claims were forfeited, as they were not
explicitly presented to the district court. See Orr v. Plumb, 884 F.3d 923, 932 (9th
2
2. Gibson contends that his sentencing and appellate counsel were both
ineffective, arguing that the former failed to properly object to his six-level ransom
enhancement, and the latter failed to raise the enhancement claim on direct appeal.
Gibson also argues that the district court erred in holding that his sentencing counsel
IAC claim was procedurally defaulted.
We agree with Gibson that the district court erred in holding that his
sentencing counsel IAC claim was procedurally defaulted. See Massaro v. United
States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (IAC claims need not be raised on direct appeal for
them to be raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas proceeding). But we “may affirm on
any basis supported by the record even if the district court did not rely on that basis.”
United States v. Pope, 686 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 2012).
Gibson argues that sentencing counsel should have objected when the trial
court applied a preponderance standard to the ransom enhancement instead of a clear
and convincing evidence standard. But Gibson cannot show prejudice under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as the evidence supporting the
ransom enhancement was at least clear and convincing. Indeed, on direct appeal,
we held that “uncontroverted evidence” supported the finding that Gibson was
involved with the ransom demands. Gibson, 598 F. App’x at 489. The trial
Cir. 2018) (“[A]rguments raised for the first time on appeal . . . are deemed
forfeited.”). But the government does not argue forfeiture, so we need not consider
that alternative ground for rejecting the claims.
3
testimony shows that Gibson made some ransom calls and was present for others,
and demanded financial information (e.g., pin numbers and bank details) from the
victim, beating the victim when he was unresponsive or provided incorrect
information. A ransom “script” was also found in Gibson’s car. No matter the
standard, the sentencing court properly enhanced the sentence under U.S.S.G.
§ 2A4.1.
For the same reason—lack of prejudice—we also reject Gibson’s
ineffectiveness claim against appellate counsel.
AFFIRMED.
4